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Joined: 26 Oct 2004
Posts: 4263
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There are a number of actions or "ways of things" which are claimed to
be inimical to entailment, and which consequently take no part in any
system of logic, nor even in our daily affairs.
One of these actions is transmutation. This is a derivative of
appearance and disappearance which themselves are considered as markers
of nonsense, both in logical and natural languages. In logic, symbols
don't simply appear and disappear, whether in analysis and synthesis, or
in deductive and inductive sequences.
'Identity' also plays no part in entailment except where the term is
used ordinarily to mean "substituble for" or "identical to". The other
meaning of identity, with which these are confused, is the ground of
support of elements. Thus, for example, an element A supports itself by
virtue of being A. It is "as it is in itself" A. This is not the same as
"A is equal/identical to itself". Alternatively, element A may have its
identity secured transcendentally through a matrice or manifesting
condition. These 'ways of things' for identity cannot be represented by
entailment.
Another logical outlaw that evades participation in entailment, also
associated with identity, is that outcome that arises when an element
identifies with or exists in itself. An object that is specifiable in
the ordinary way, for example "a balloon", has no properties whatsoever
when it identifies with itself. To put that another way, the balloon is
either a bog-standard empirical or physical balloon, but when its nature
is taken entirely within itself (cf Kant's "transcendental object") it
has no specifiable properties. this does not announce a void, but
introduces a framework for specifiable objects. The "brain" for example
is an empirical object but when taken in itself it loses empirical
properties and as consciousness gives rise to objects. This transmutaion
of the being, or way, of things is also not expressible through entailment.
But should we keep these renegades out of logic? |
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