Lester Zick wrote:
Subjective Mechanics
~v~~

The origin of subjective mechanics is to found in the nature of finite
tautological regression. When empiricial observations are regressed
tautologically as in "A, not A" the result is considered true. However
this can only be the case where "not A" encompasses all the universe
except A. Thus "A" together with "not A" would exhaust possibilities
for truth and we could conclude their combination must be true.

But if the tautological negation "not A" does not encompass the entire
universe apart from "A" we find that the truth of their combination is
not exhaustive and becomes in fact subjective for exactly this reason
since tautological regressions through the negation of "A" do not
exhaust all possibilities for truth and we are left to determine the
truth of "A" together with "not A" by other tautological regressions.

In mechanically definitive terms this is the distinction between
objective and subjective mechanics. Objective mechanics is based on
truly exhaustive tautological negation as in the case of a "ball"
together with its tautologically exhaustive alternative "not ball".

In other words when it is possible to define tautologically exhaustive
alternatives matter and material interactions are defined in terms of
differences alone and the mechanics involved are objective. And when
it is not possible to define tautologically exhaustive alternatives
the mechanics involved is subjective and the mechanisms are sentient
because they are not material and result from various compoundings of
differences between differences.

~v~~

Hey Zick, nice to see you are still around and kicking.

You know Zick,
if you didn't already exist, someone would have to invent you.

On the
other hand, the near future will bring mechanichal contraptions capable
of producing the same output as yourself.

Until then, ive long and
prosper.

Subjective Mechanics
~v~~

The origin of subjective mechanics is to found in the nature of finite
tautological regression. When empiricial observations are regressed
tautologically as in "A, not A" the result is considered true. However
this can only be the case where "not A" encompasses all the universe
except A. Thus "A" together with "not A" would exhaust possibilities
for truth and we could conclude their combination must be true.

But if the tautological negation "not A" does not encompass the entire
universe apart from "A" we find that the truth of their combination is
not exhaustive and becomes in fact subjective for exactly this reason
since tautological regressions through the negation of "A" do not
exhaust all possibilities for truth and we are left to determine the
truth of "A" together with "not A" by other tautological regressions.

In mechanically definitive terms this is the distinction between
objective and subjective mechanics. Objective mechanics is based on
truly exhaustive tautological negation as in the case of a "ball"
together with its tautologically exhaustive alternative "not ball".

In other words when it is possible to define tautologically exhaustive
alternatives matter and material interactions are defined in terms of
differences alone and the mechanics involved are objective. And when
it is not possible to define tautologically exhaustive alternatives
the mechanics involved is subjective and the mechanisms are sentient
because they are not material and result from various compoundings of
differences between differences.

~v~~

Subjective Mechanics
~v~~

The origin of subjective mechanics is to found in the nature of finite
tautological regression. When empiricial observations are regressed
tautologically as in "A, not A" the result is considered true. However
this can only be the case where "not A" encompasses all the universe
except A. Thus "A" together with "not A" would exhaust possibilities
for truth and we could conclude their combination must be true.

But if the tautological negation "not A" does not encompass the entire
universe apart from "A" we find that the truth of their combination is
not exhaustive and becomes in fact subjective for exactly this reason
since tautological regressions through the negation of "A" do not
exhaust all possibilities for truth and we are left to determine the
truth of "A" together with "not A" by other tautological regressions.

In mechanically definitive terms this is the distinction between
objective and subjective mechanics. Objective mechanics is based on
truly exhaustive tautological negation as in the case of a "ball"
together with its tautologically exhaustive alternative "not ball".

In other words when it is possible to define tautologically exhaustive
alternatives matter and material interactions are defined in terms of
differences alone and the mechanics involved are objective.

And when
it is not possible to define tautologically exhaustive alternatives
the mechanics involved is subjective and the mechanisms are sentient
because they are not material and result from various compoundings of
differences between differences.

~v~~

Mike wrote:


More importantly: if you cannot quantify what you say, reduce it in a
form that generates new possibilities, you better not say it.

I am trying to discourage you but you basically do not make any sense.

Ah. You noticed that.

Bob Kolker

Robert J. Kolker wrote:
Mike wrote:


More importantly: if you cannot quantify what you say, reduce it in a
form that generates new possibilities, you better not say it.

I am trying to discourage you but you basically do not make any sense.

Ah. You noticed that.

Bob Kolker

What I'm trying to say to him is that mechanics issues cannot be dealt
only at a philosophical level. Every claim or statement must be backed
by a demonstration. Otherwise, the arguments are empty and very often
naive, as in his case.

You should notice that.

On Sat, 01 Apr 2006 20:00:16 -0500, "Robert J. Kolker"
nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

Mike wrote:


More importantly: if you cannot quantify what you say, reduce it in a
form that generates new possibilities, you better not say it.

I am trying to discourage you but you basically do not make any sense.

Ah. You noticed that.

Ah well, Bob, there wouldn't be any reason to discourage me if I did
not make any sense. You try to discourage me. Ergo I conclude I make
sense.

~v~~

On 2 Apr 2006 05:44:21 -0700, "Mike" <eleatis@yahoo.gr> in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:


Robert J. Kolker wrote:
Mike wrote:


More importantly: if you cannot quantify what you say, reduce it in a
form that generates new possibilities, you better not say it.

I am trying to discourage you but you basically do not make any sense.

Ah. You noticed that.

Bob Kolker

What I'm trying to say to him is that mechanics issues cannot be dealt
only at a philosophical level. Every claim or statement must be backed
by a demonstration. Otherwise, the arguments are empty and very often
naive, as in his case.

Well Bob and I certainly agree that mechanics cannot be dealt with on
a philosophical level. The difference is I maintain that mechanics can
be dealt with on a logical level whereas Bob maintains that he cannot
deal with mechanics on any level he cannot slice, dice, chop or peel.
Bob cannot find the mind by slicing, dicing, chopping, and peeling the
brain so Bob concludes there is no mind. On the other hand Bob cannot
find gravitation by slicing, dicing chopping and peeling the planets
so he concludes there is gravitation despite this. Bob is nothing if
not inconsistent. From which we conclude Bob is both parts of a
tautology. Bob is always true: we just don't know where or when.

You should notice that.

Oh Bob notices quite a lot. He notices that there is no single real
number line in formal terms. He notices that empiricism is guesswork.
He notices he cannot find gravitation by slicing, dicing, chopping,
and peeling the planets. He just doesn't notice when I'm right and
he's wrong. Which seems to be pretty much all the time.

~v~~

On 30 Mar 2006 23:16:42 -0800, "guenther vonKnakspot"
apacur@gmail.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:


Lester Zick wrote:
Subjective Mechanics
~v~~

The origin of subjective mechanics is to found in the nature of finite
tautological regression. When empiricial observations are regressed
tautologically as in "A, not A" the result is considered true. However
this can only be the case where "not A" encompasses all the universe
except A. Thus "A" together with "not A" would exhaust possibilities
for truth and we could conclude their combination must be true.

But if the tautological negation "not A" does not encompass the entire
universe apart from "A" we find that the truth of their combination is
not exhaustive and becomes in fact subjective for exactly this reason
since tautological regressions through the negation of "A" do not
exhaust all possibilities for truth and we are left to determine the
truth of "A" together with "not A" by other tautological regressions.

In mechanically definitive terms this is the distinction between
objective and subjective mechanics. Objective mechanics is based on
truly exhaustive tautological negation as in the case of a "ball"
together with its tautologically exhaustive alternative "not ball".

In other words when it is possible to define tautologically exhaustive
alternatives matter and material interactions are defined in terms of
differences alone and the mechanics involved are objective. And when
it is not possible to define tautologically exhaustive alternatives
the mechanics involved is subjective and the mechanisms are sentient
because they are not material and result from various compoundings of
differences between differences.

~v~~

Hey Zick, nice to see you are still around and kicking.

Wish I could say the same for you, guenther.

You know Zick,
if you didn't already exist, someone would have to invent you.

Which is exactly why I invented me.

On the
other hand, the near future will bring mechanichal contraptions capable
of producing the same output as yourself.

Wish I could say the same for you, guenther.

Until then, ive long and
prosper.

Ditto.

~v~~
Well Zick, this is quite an unsurprising turn of the dialog, we've seen

Lester Zick wrote:
On 2 Apr 2006 05:44:21 -0700, "Mike" <eleatis@yahoo.gr> in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:


Robert J. Kolker wrote:
Mike wrote:


More importantly: if you cannot quantify what you say, reduce it in a
form that generates new possibilities, you better not say it.

I am trying to discourage you but you basically do not make any sense.

Ah. You noticed that.

Bob Kolker

What I'm trying to say to him is that mechanics issues cannot be dealt
only at a philosophical level. Every claim or statement must be backed
by a demonstration. Otherwise, the arguments are empty and very often
naive, as in his case.

Well Bob and I certainly agree that mechanics cannot be dealt with on
a philosophical level. The difference is I maintain that mechanics can
be dealt with on a logical level whereas Bob maintains that he cannot
deal with mechanics on any level he cannot slice, dice, chop or peel.
Bob cannot find the mind by slicing, dicing, chopping, and peeling the
brain so Bob concludes there is no mind. On the other hand Bob cannot
find gravitation by slicing, dicing chopping and peeling the planets
so he concludes there is gravitation despite this. Bob is nothing if
not inconsistent. From which we conclude Bob is both parts of a
tautology. Bob is always true: we just don't know where or when.

You should notice that.

Oh Bob notices quite a lot. He notices that there is no single real
number line in formal terms. He notices that empiricism is guesswork.
He notices he cannot find gravitation by slicing, dicing, chopping,
and peeling the planets. He just doesn't notice when I'm right and
he's wrong. Which seems to be pretty much all the time.

~v~~

I do not know about Kolker. I often get the impression he is a
rationalist but then when he attempts to defend his ideas he uses
elements of empiricism. This type of eclectic approach is a sign of
confusion.

You on the other hand make the mistake of superimposing physical
significance on logic.

You make the freshman mistake of confusing truth
and validity.

Logic is about validity.

Truth is the subject of the
experimentalist.

the two of course are combined to arrive at new
knoweledge but one must always keep clear the distinction otherwise he
is left with a bunch of formal fallacies, at the best case.

Lester Zick wrote:
On Sat, 01 Apr 2006 20:00:16 -0500, "Robert J. Kolker"
nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

Mike wrote:


More importantly: if you cannot quantify what you say, reduce it in a
form that generates new possibilities, you better not say it.

I am trying to discourage you but you basically do not make any sense.

Ah. You noticed that.

Ah well, Bob, there wouldn't be any reason to discourage me if I did
not make any sense. You try to discourage me. Ergo I conclude I make
sense.

You know I forgat the NOT (discourage you). But, either way it makes
sense because that is a valid tautology.

Thigs are simpler in Mechanics. You have two appoaches historically:

1. Induction: used by Newton. Laws are discovered from observation and
afterwards rendered general by induction. This is subject to the
induction problem (the sun may not rise tomorrow).

2. Deduction: from a set of axioms the laws are derived. used by
Einstein and others. This is subject to failure of verifibility
principle if the axioms are not self evident and verifiable
propositions. (ex. contancy of the speed of light)

Any other method, like the one you confusingly describe, is just based
on an emotive approach and gross misunderstandings 9which you have
gloriously exhibited).