Urgrammar and the Sentience Set
----------------------

Let's assume that everything in reality is nonsense and that there is
some rule capable of describing this nonsense in order to resolve
Russell's paradox. We then ask:

If there is a universal Ursprache in the predicates of predication, is
there some primitive for this Ursprache in the form of an urgrammar?

P "differences" are nonsense and yet are proven the universal source
of everything known and knowable through consideration of universally
contradictory alternatives Q "different from differences".

In other words differences are nonsense and we ask whether there is
any rule for nonsense which is also nonsense yet which can make sense
of nonsense and resolve Russell's paradox.

And the answer to this is yes, that there is in the sentience set
S "differences between differences" some form of nonsense which
despite being nonsense in the form of differences can nonetheless
make sense of the nonsense in the form of the absence of difference
through the application of differences between differences.

Thus it is concluded that there is an urgrammar in the form of
differences between differences compounded in terms of itself.

Regards - Lester

You've done this before.
You've said that things can have 'differences' in common.
Please stop doing that.

Lester Zick <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:40338c32.64358492@netnews.att.net...

Urgrammar and the Sentience Set
----------------------

Let's assume that everything in reality is nonsense and that there is
some rule capable of describing this nonsense in order to resolve
Russell's paradox. We then ask:

If there is a universal Ursprache in the predicates of predication, is
there some primitive for this Ursprache in the form of an urgrammar?

P "differences" are nonsense and yet are proven the universal source
of everything known and knowable through consideration of universally
contradictory alternatives Q "different from differences".

In other words differences are nonsense and we ask whether there is
any rule for nonsense which is also nonsense yet which can make sense
of nonsense and resolve Russell's paradox.

And the answer to this is yes, that there is in the sentience set
S "differences between differences" some form of nonsense which
despite being nonsense in the form of differences can nonetheless
make sense of the nonsense in the form of the absence of difference
through the application of differences between differences.

Thus it is concluded that there is an urgrammar in the form of
differences between differences compounded in terms of itself.

Regards - Lester

You've done this before.
You've said that things can have 'differences' in common.
Please stop doing that.
JJ

Lester Zick <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:40338c32.64358492@netnews.att.net...

Urgrammar and the Sentience Set
----------------------

Let's assume that everything in reality is nonsense and that there is
some rule capable of describing this nonsense in order to resolve
Russell's paradox. We then ask:

If there is a universal Ursprache in the predicates of predication, is
there some primitive for this Ursprache in the form of an urgrammar?

P "differences" are nonsense and yet are proven the universal source
of everything known and knowable through consideration of universally
contradictory alternatives Q "different from differences".

In other words differences are nonsense and we ask whether there is
any rule for nonsense which is also nonsense yet which can make sense
of nonsense and resolve Russell's paradox.

And the answer to this is yes, that there is in the sentience set
S "differences between differences" some form of nonsense which
despite being nonsense in the form of differences can nonetheless
make sense of the nonsense in the form of the absence of difference
through the application of differences between differences.

Thus it is concluded that there is an urgrammar in the form of
differences between differences compounded in terms of itself.

Regards - Lester

In article <c10gbr$krn$1@sparta.btinternet.com>, John Jones
jiversjivers@btopenworld.com> writes
You've done this before.
You've said that things can have 'differences' in common.
Please stop doing that.
JJ

I doubt that he can. The notion of "difference" appears to be an
obsession (an "idee fixe", aka "an overvalued idea"). He's intoxicated
by it, and as he resists (and resents) all efforts to encourage him to
look at it more rationally in historical context, and how it has been
more coherently and usefully developed elsewhere, I suspect it's a
clinical phenomenon and whilst it may fade in time if he doesn't seek
clinical help with it, once this one goes, another might pop up to
replace it! I suspect he knows this, but like Collins, won't do anything
about it.

He has a tendency to re-define terms, macerate language, and reject all
kinds of conventions for no better reason than to intoxicate himself in
his own confusion/verbosity. I guess we all have our foibles, but when
his are pointed out to him, he just gets abusive....

Lester Zick <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:40338c32.64358492@netnews.att.net...

Urgrammar and the Sentience Set
----------------------

Let's assume that everything in reality is nonsense and that there is
some rule capable of describing this nonsense in order to resolve
Russell's paradox. We then ask:

If there is a universal Ursprache in the predicates of predication, is
there some primitive for this Ursprache in the form of an urgrammar?

P "differences" are nonsense and yet are proven the universal source
of everything known and knowable through consideration of universally
contradictory alternatives Q "different from differences".

In other words differences are nonsense and we ask whether there is
any rule for nonsense which is also nonsense yet which can make sense
of nonsense and resolve Russell's paradox.

And the answer to this is yes, that there is in the sentience set
S "differences between differences" some form of nonsense which
despite being nonsense in the form of differences can nonetheless
make sense of the nonsense in the form of the absence of difference
through the application of differences between differences.

Thus it is concluded that there is an urgrammar in the form of
differences between differences compounded in terms of itself.

Regards - Lester




--
David Longley

On Wed, 18 Feb 2004 21:48:26 +0000, David Longley
David@longley.demon.co.uk> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

In article <c10gbr$krn$1@sparta.btinternet.com>, John Jones
jiversjivers@btopenworld.com> writes
You've done this before.
You've said that things can have 'differences' in common.
Please stop doing that.
JJ

I doubt that he can. The notion of "difference" appears to be an
obsession (an "idee fixe", aka "an overvalued idea"). He's intoxicated
by it, and as he resists (and resents) all efforts to encourage him to
look at it more rationally in historical context, and how it has been
more coherently and usefully developed elsewhere, I suspect it's a
clinical phenomenon and whilst it may fade in time if he doesn't seek
clinical help with it, once this one goes, another might pop up to
replace it! I suspect he knows this, but like Collins, won't do anything
about it.

He has a tendency to re-define terms, macerate language, and reject all
kinds of conventions for no better reason than to intoxicate himself in
his own confusion/verbosity. I guess we all have our foibles, but when
his are pointed out to him, he just gets abusive....

Nothing more powerful than an idea whose time has come.

Unlike
behaviorism whose time has gone.

Lester Zick <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:40338c32.64358492@netnews.att.net...

Urgrammar and the Sentience Set
----------------------

Let's assume that everything in reality is nonsense and that there is
some rule capable of describing this nonsense in order to resolve
Russell's paradox. We then ask:

If there is a universal Ursprache in the predicates of predication, is
there some primitive for this Ursprache in the form of an urgrammar?

P "differences" are nonsense and yet are proven the universal source
of everything known and knowable through consideration of universally
contradictory alternatives Q "different from differences".

In other words differences are nonsense and we ask whether there is
any rule for nonsense which is also nonsense yet which can make sense
of nonsense and resolve Russell's paradox.

And the answer to this is yes, that there is in the sentience set
S "differences between differences" some form of nonsense which
despite being nonsense in the form of differences can nonetheless
make sense of the nonsense in the form of the absence of difference
through the application of differences between differences.

Thus it is concluded that there is an urgrammar in the form of
differences between differences compounded in terms of itself.

Regards - Lester




--
David Longley


Regards - Lester

In article <4034cc7e.74698639@netnews.att.net>, Lester Zick
lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> writes
On Wed, 18 Feb 2004 21:48:26 +0000, David Longley
David@longley.demon.co.uk> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

In article <c10gbr$krn$1@sparta.btinternet.com>, John Jones
jiversjivers@btopenworld.com> writes
You've done this before.
You've said that things can have 'differences' in common.
Please stop doing that.
JJ

I doubt that he can. The notion of "difference" appears to be an
obsession (an "idee fixe", aka "an overvalued idea"). He's intoxicated
by it, and as he resists (and resents) all efforts to encourage him to
look at it more rationally in historical context, and how it has been
more coherently and usefully developed elsewhere, I suspect it's a
clinical phenomenon and whilst it may fade in time if he doesn't seek
clinical help with it, once this one goes, another might pop up to
replace it! I suspect he knows this, but like Collins, won't do anything
about it.

He has a tendency to re-define terms, macerate language, and reject all
kinds of conventions for no better reason than to intoxicate himself in
his own confusion/verbosity. I guess we all have our foibles, but when
his are pointed out to him, he just gets abusive....

Nothing more powerful than an idea whose time has come.

Ken Collins talks like that - he's obsessional, compulsive and deluded
as well.

Unlike
behaviorism whose time has gone.

How would you know? Do you assess everything on the basis of fashion or
social desirability? You certainly don't appear to assess the merits of
your own posts to these newsgroups on such grounds. You should look at
what you do a little more carefully perhaps.

Lester Zick <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:40338c32.64358492@netnews.att.net...

Urgrammar and the Sentience Set
----------------------

Let's assume that everything in reality is nonsense and that there is
some rule capable of describing this nonsense in order to resolve
Russell's paradox. We then ask:

If there is a universal Ursprache in the predicates of predication, is
there some primitive for this Ursprache in the form of an urgrammar?

P "differences" are nonsense and yet are proven the universal source
of everything known and knowable through consideration of universally
contradictory alternatives Q "different from differences".

In other words differences are nonsense and we ask whether there is
any rule for nonsense which is also nonsense yet which can make sense
of nonsense and resolve Russell's paradox.

And the answer to this is yes, that there is in the sentience set
S "differences between differences" some form of nonsense which
despite being nonsense in the form of differences can nonetheless
make sense of the nonsense in the form of the absence of difference
through the application of differences between differences.

Thus it is concluded that there is an urgrammar in the form of
differences between differences compounded in terms of itself.

Regards - Lester




--
David Longley


Regards - Lester


--
David Longley