Differential Cognition

We have adduced several considerations that need to be addressed and
resolved by any mechanical explanation for cognition:

The apparently finite nature of cognitive envelopes

The non direct, non copy nature of cognitive information

The interface between mind and brain.

Now there is only one mechanism that can be used to explain all of
these considerations as they pertain to cognition: the mechanism of
differences. In other words what we are looking at at the root of
cognition is a mechanical determinism whose basic mechanism is
differences and whose effect is what I call differential cognition.

Let's examine the implications of differences as a mechanism in the
context of the issues raised above.

For one thing the notion of differences as the basic cognitive
mechanism limits the scope of cognition. In other words it implies
some finite envelope within which cognition occurs. For even if we
assumed unlimited scope for external material sensations, differences
between material circumstances will be finite and limited in scope to
differences between them.

In addition the idea of differences as the basic element of cognition
explains the hybrid nature of information. Whatever the difference
between material circumstances may be is not only finite, it is also
neither antecedent circumstance. It is hybrid in nature because it
only represents the difference between material circumstances and thus
is neither circumstance in itself.

Thus we are no longer dealing with copy theory. Copies represent
material artifiacts of the objects copied. Differences between
material artifacts however do not. Because they only represent
differences between artifacts and not the artifacts themselves.

This means that information in cognitive terms assumes something more
than physical significance alone. It assumes logical as well as
material characteristics. Information is no longer just material or
physical in this sense despite residing in the brain because it
represents the difference between material circumstances. This is why
it is information and the reason it assumes logical properties in
addition to physical significance as a material circumstance in its
own right.

Thus cognitive information represents the logical interface between
material circumstances because it is the difference between them. It
is of both and yet is neither. And this is where the mind arises as a
distinct phenomenon as the seat of information and the interface
between material circumstances in logical rather than material terms.

This is why we don't see the operation of cognition in objective terms
in our minds. We only see the final result, the information produced
by cognition. Cognition mechanizes the process of taking differences
in subjective terms.

This is the reason the process is not objective. The subjective merely
represents material circumstances in themselves whereas the
information produced by the operation of cognition is objective
because it represents neither material circumstance from which it is
drawn, only the difference between them.

Yet neither is the objective information produced by cognition a
direct manifestation of any external object. It only corresponds to
the difference between material circumstances. And it is for this
combination of reasons that it assumes logical significance and
produces mental implications not evident in purely material
interactions generally.

Material interactions in general represent the conventional
implications of equal and opposite reactions studied by physics in
empirical terms. And we can study differences in such terms as well.
However what we cannot do is get at the logical implications of
objective differences without reference to the material circumstances
in terms of which the differences are taken.

This is why materialism represents an inappropriate methodology for
the study of mental circumstances and interactions. It is the logical
implications of those circumstances and interactions and antecedents
that matter for the mind and not simply their material circumstances.

On Wed, 29 Oct 2003 15:58:38 GMT, lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net
(Lester Zick) in sci.cognitive wrote:


Differential Cognition

We have adduced several considerations that need to be addressed and
resolved by any mechanical explanation for cognition:

The apparently finite nature of cognitive envelopes

The non direct, non copy nature of cognitive information

The interface between mind and brain.

Now there is only one mechanism that can be used to explain all of
these considerations as they pertain to cognition: the mechanism of
differences. In other words what we are looking at at the root of
cognition is a mechanical determinism whose basic mechanism is
differences and whose effect is what I call differential cognition.

Let's examine the implications of differences as a mechanism in the
context of the issues raised above.

For one thing the notion of differences as the basic cognitive
mechanism limits the scope of cognition. In other words it implies
some finite envelope within which cognition occurs. For even if we
assumed unlimited scope for external material sensations, differences
between material circumstances will be finite and limited in scope to
differences between them.

In addition the idea of differences as the basic element of cognition
explains the hybrid nature of information. Whatever the difference
between material circumstances may be is not only finite, it is also
neither antecedent circumstance. It is hybrid in nature because it
only represents the difference between material circumstances and thus
is neither circumstance in itself.

Thus we are no longer dealing with copy theory. Copies represent
material artifiacts of the objects copied. Differences between
material artifacts however do not. Because they only represent
differences between artifacts and not the artifacts themselves.

This means that information in cognitive terms assumes something more
than physical significance alone. It assumes logical as well as
material characteristics. Information is no longer just material or
physical in this sense despite residing in the brain because it
represents the difference between material circumstances. This is why
it is information and the reason it assumes logical properties in
addition to physical significance as a material circumstance in its
own right.

Thus cognitive information represents the logical interface between
material circumstances because it is the difference between them. It
is of both and yet is neither. And this is where the mind arises as a
distinct phenomenon as the seat of information and the interface
between material circumstances in logical rather than material terms.

This is why we don't see the operation of cognition in objective terms
in our minds. We only see the final result, the information produced
by cognition. Cognition mechanizes the process of taking differences
in subjective terms.

This is the reason the process is not objective. The subjective merely
represents material circumstances in themselves whereas the
information produced by the operation of cognition is objective
because it represents neither material circumstance from which it is
drawn, only the difference between them.

Yet neither is the objective information produced by cognition a
direct manifestation of any external object. It only corresponds to
the difference between material circumstances. And it is for this
combination of reasons that it assumes logical significance and
produces mental implications not evident in purely material
interactions generally.

Material interactions in general represent the conventional
implications of equal and opposite reactions studied by physics in
empirical terms. And we can study differences in such terms as well.
However what we cannot do is get at the logical implications of
objective differences without reference to the material circumstances
in terms of which the differences are taken.

This is why materialism represents an inappropriate methodology for
the study of mental circumstances and interactions. It is the logical
implications of those circumstances and interactions and antecedents
that matter for the mind and not simply their material circumstances.



Schematic Considerations

Differences lend themselves to schematic interpretation. They are in
fact the fundamental operation of reality in logical terms. In purely
material terms we are faced with a continuum of equal and opposite
interactions. However in cognitive terms of what we can know of
reality we have no choice but to rely on differential information.

Of course we have sensations and these are denoted by upper case
letters. And the operation between sensations that renders differences
is denoted by the minus sign. We do not have any further exact idea of
what this operation amounts to or how it is mechanized in various
cognitive contexts. But we know it produces differences between
sensations and reflects whatever differences amount to in such
contexts.

Thus as between certain sensations A and C we have a schematic
representation (A - C) correponding to the difference between the two
sensations. Now we might proceed in this way to interpret various
differences. However we assume instead that there is some cognitive
interface present in ontological contexts - that is in the context of
beings - that is used as the basis for the mechanization of
differences generally.

This cognitive interface within beings is denoted by an uppercase I
and the mechanization of differences between circumstances represented
schematically by expressions like (A - I), (C - I), etc. instead of
the previous (A - C) and so on. In effect we are presuming there is a
determinable inside and outside to cognitive beings reflected in the
use of a common interface for the taking of differences. There are
several reasons for this alternate approach which will become apparent
as the implications of cognitive differences are explored.

So what we have in the context of differential cognition are series of
differences such as (A - I), (C - I) and so on and we need to ask what
the implications of such differences are in mechanical terms. One
thing that should be apparent at the outset is that the minus
operation is directional in nature. Thus (A - I) represents
fundamentally different information from (I - A).

A second consideration is that the result is segmented in terms of the
difference. In other words the result only represents some finite part
of the initial sensations according to the difference between them and
the identity or what is common to both is not reflected in the
difference.

Now this needs some clarification. We need not assume that initial
sensations are unlimited in material scope. In fact there is no way to
know this one way or the other in such basic terms. Nor is there any
reason to assume that the result represents binary information. What
we can know is that the result represents some finite, limited, or
delimited segment of the original sensations according to the
difference between them.

The same would be true even if we are considering successive
differences. The difference between finite segments is also a finite
segment. What we find in this regard is that information is not only
derived in terms of differences between basic sensations, it is also
subject to recursion in terms of differences between information. Thus
we have the implications of differences like (A - I) - (C - I) to
consider as well.

One other consideration concerns the material implications of the
interface. We cannot simply assume that I represents exactly the same
cognitive interface under all conditions. Functionally it remains
identical. However its actual circumstances change because there are
material reactions between things like A and I or C and I to consider
as differences are taken.

Thus we lose not only the identity between A and I in the course of
taking differences, we also lose the exact same interface for the
taking of differences. And this will have significant implications in
the course of further taking of differences and compounding the taking
of differences in terms of one another.

On Mon, 03 Nov 2003 15:35:35 GMT, lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net
(Lester Zick) in sci.cognitive wrote:

On Wed, 29 Oct 2003 15:58:38 GMT, lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net
(Lester Zick) in sci.cognitive wrote:


Differential Cognition

We have adduced several considerations that need to be addressed and
resolved by any mechanical explanation for cognition:

The apparently finite nature of cognitive envelopes

The non direct, non copy nature of cognitive information

The interface between mind and brain.

Now there is only one mechanism that can be used to explain all of
these considerations as they pertain to cognition: the mechanism of
differences. In other words what we are looking at at the root of
cognition is a mechanical determinism whose basic mechanism is
differences and whose effect is what I call differential cognition.

Let's examine the implications of differences as a mechanism in the
context of the issues raised above.

For one thing the notion of differences as the basic cognitive
mechanism limits the scope of cognition. In other words it implies
some finite envelope within which cognition occurs. For even if we
assumed unlimited scope for external material sensations, differences
between material circumstances will be finite and limited in scope to
differences between them.

In addition the idea of differences as the basic element of cognition
explains the hybrid nature of information. Whatever the difference
between material circumstances may be is not only finite, it is also
neither antecedent circumstance. It is hybrid in nature because it
only represents the difference between material circumstances and thus
is neither circumstance in itself.

Thus we are no longer dealing with copy theory. Copies represent
material artifiacts of the objects copied. Differences between
material artifacts however do not. Because they only represent
differences between artifacts and not the artifacts themselves.

This means that information in cognitive terms assumes something more
than physical significance alone. It assumes logical as well as
material characteristics. Information is no longer just material or
physical in this sense despite residing in the brain because it
represents the difference between material circumstances. This is why
it is information and the reason it assumes logical properties in
addition to physical significance as a material circumstance in its
own right.

Thus cognitive information represents the logical interface between
material circumstances because it is the difference between them. It
is of both and yet is neither. And this is where the mind arises as a
distinct phenomenon as the seat of information and the interface
between material circumstances in logical rather than material terms.

This is why we don't see the operation of cognition in objective terms
in our minds. We only see the final result, the information produced
by cognition. Cognition mechanizes the process of taking differences
in subjective terms.

This is the reason the process is not objective. The subjective merely
represents material circumstances in themselves whereas the
information produced by the operation of cognition is objective
because it represents neither material circumstance from which it is
drawn, only the difference between them.

Yet neither is the objective information produced by cognition a
direct manifestation of any external object. It only corresponds to
the difference between material circumstances. And it is for this
combination of reasons that it assumes logical significance and
produces mental implications not evident in purely material
interactions generally.

Material interactions in general represent the conventional
implications of equal and opposite reactions studied by physics in
empirical terms. And we can study differences in such terms as well.
However what we cannot do is get at the logical implications of
objective differences without reference to the material circumstances
in terms of which the differences are taken.

This is why materialism represents an inappropriate methodology for
the study of mental circumstances and interactions. It is the logical
implications of those circumstances and interactions and antecedents
that matter for the mind and not simply their material circumstances.



Schematic Considerations

Differences lend themselves to schematic interpretation. They are in
fact the fundamental operation of reality in logical terms. In purely
material terms we are faced with a continuum of equal and opposite
interactions. However in cognitive terms of what we can know of
reality we have no choice but to rely on differential information.

Of course we have sensations and these are denoted by upper case
letters. And the operation between sensations that renders differences
is denoted by the minus sign. We do not have any further exact idea of
what this operation amounts to or how it is mechanized in various
cognitive contexts. But we know it produces differences between
sensations and reflects whatever differences amount to in such
contexts.

Thus as between certain sensations A and C we have a schematic
representation (A - C) correponding to the difference between the two
sensations. Now we might proceed in this way to interpret various
differences. However we assume instead that there is some cognitive
interface present in ontological contexts - that is in the context of
beings - that is used as the basis for the mechanization of
differences generally.

This cognitive interface within beings is denoted by an uppercase I
and the mechanization of differences between circumstances represented
schematically by expressions like (A - I), (C - I), etc. instead of
the previous (A - C) and so on. In effect we are presuming there is a
determinable inside and outside to cognitive beings reflected in the
use of a common interface for the taking of differences. There are
several reasons for this alternate approach which will become apparent
as the implications of cognitive differences are explored.

So what we have in the context of differential cognition are series of
differences such as (A - I), (C - I) and so on and we need to ask what
the implications of such differences are in mechanical terms. One
thing that should be apparent at the outset is that the minus
operation is directional in nature. Thus (A - I) represents
fundamentally different information from (I - A).

A second consideration is that the result is segmented in terms of the
difference. In other words the result only represents some finite part
of the initial sensations according to the difference between them and
the identity or what is common to both is not reflected in the
difference.

Now this needs some clarification. We need not assume that initial
sensations are unlimited in material scope. In fact there is no way to
know this one way or the other in such basic terms. Nor is there any
reason to assume that the result represents binary information. What
we can know is that the result represents some finite, limited, or
delimited segment of the original sensations according to the
difference between them.

The same would be true even if we are considering successive
differences. The difference between finite segments is also a finite
segment. What we find in this regard is that information is not only
derived in terms of differences between basic sensations, it is also
subject to recursion in terms of differences between information. Thus
we have the implications of differences like (A - I) - (C - I) to
consider as well.

One other consideration concerns the material implications of the
interface. We cannot simply assume that I represents exactly the same
cognitive interface under all conditions. Functionally it remains
identical. However its actual circumstances change because there are
material reactions between things like A and I or C and I to consider
as differences are taken.

Thus we lose not only the identity between A and I in the course of
taking differences, we also lose the exact same interface for the
taking of differences. And this will have significant implications in
the course of further taking of differences and compounding the taking
of differences in terms of one another.


Further Considerations

Let's suppose we have a series of differences like (A - I), (C - I),
etc. and wish to determine what the ontological implications of such
differences may be. Of course we have no idea what things like A and C
actually are in themselves in absolute terms. All we know is that we
have residuary differences between A and I on the one hand and C and I
on the other.

Now in conventional terms there is some interaction between A and I
and C and I in the course of mechanizing the differences between them.
We don't actually know what the interactions amount to but we assume
they are material interactions according to the definition of A, C,
and I as material circumstances. The results of the differences are
logical and ontological results of material circumstances like A, C,
and I, but the circumstances themselves are only material in nature.

However we cannot infer that the I interface represents exactly the
same material circumstance in both cases because the interaction
between A and I as the result of taking the difference between them
changes something about I. Consequently the successive difference
between C and I will not be between exactly the same I and we cannot
just factor out the interface I by taking the difference between A and
I on the one hand and C and I on the other. There is some difference
but exactly what that difference amounts remains ambiguous.

In this respect we can infer that a difference like (A - I) - (C - I)
does not correspond exactly to a difference like (A - C). It
corresponds to some further difference but we cannot definitely say
what because the middle interface term I is unknowable.

This means that an organism mechanized solely in such terms is logical
and ontological in nature. But there is no strictly definable content
to its being apart from the sequence of interactions corresponding to
the series of differences. It simply reacts from one difference to
another. Yet the sequence of interactions despite reflecting material
interactions is termed an action as opposed to material interactions
because the sequence involves an undefined middle term in the
interface between A and I on the one hand and C and I on the other.

Based on such considerations it is a relatively straightforward matter
to define terms like information, logical, ontological, perceptual,
cognitive, conscious, etc. in analytically definitive terms by means
of differences and differences among differences.

Differences like (A - I) or (C - I) represent material differences in
this sense. The result of a difference is information.

Isolated differences are logical in this respect but they are not
ontological because they only entail equal and opposite reactions
characteristic of material interactions generally. And these can be
and are studied by the physical sciences because they occupy only the
one dimension characteristic of equal and opposite reactions.

On the other hand if we take differences among material differences
such as [(A - I) - (C - I)] we are no longer dealing just with logical
information. We are dealing with information of ontological scope
because we are no longer talking about equal and opposite reactions in
linear terms.

In other words each piece of information entails a one dimensional
equal and opposite reaction. But the combination does not necessarily
because the equal and opposite reactions pertinent to each can lie in
different directions and will define a plane. Thus we are no longer
looking at information defining a material circumstance in relation to
another material circumstance. We are instead looking at an immaterial
or nonmaterial difference between material differences. And the result
is not only logical but ontological as well for this reason.

Immaterial Differences

There are many serious minded students of science who scoff at the
notion of immaterial or nonmaterial effects who see everything
knowable in definitive terms as being material in origin and nature.
This doctrine is known as materialism and is considered by its
adherents as being the only basis for the study of science in general.

However advocates of materialism don't really know how to define what
is material except through the empirical methods peculiar to physics
and physical sciences generally, a doctrine know as empiricism. In
other words if we can see, feel, hear things or study things by
methods we can see, feel, hear, etc. through the senses, they are
considered material in nature and are suitable subjects for empirical
analysis and form an appropriate basis for science and scientific
knowledge. Otherwise not.

But what the adherents of materialism and empiricism fail to realize
is that their definition for material is purely ostensible. It has no
analytical significance whatsoever because it defines material things
not in terms of properties but in terms of consequences: because they
produce certain kinds of interactions under given conditions.

This just isn't good enough for science. This isn't a definition: it's
a supposition. In other words a guess. It presumes that all the
consequences of material things are either sensate or can be known and
studied by methods which are sensate. And it leads to the further
supposition that science is what studies things by sensate methods
rather than the idea that science is what studies things in systematic
terms suitable to the subject studied.

I define material phenomena in terms of differences instead - which
applies to all phenomena across the board. In other words a material
phenomenon is one defined in terms of a single difference. And higher
orders of immaterial phenomena are defined by higher orders of
differences compounded in terms of material differences. And they are
immaterial because they do not just react in terms of isolatable equal
and opposite reactions suitable for study by empirical methods of the
natural sciences.

This is exactly why the empirical methods of the physical sciences are
suitable for the study of material interactions but not immaterial
interactons. Physics could study a symphony in empirical terms but
only those aspects like sheet music, pen, and ink which are material
in nature. It cannot study the composition itself because that is not
material in nature. It is immaterial.


Categorical Differences

Thus we are left to decide what to make of a categorical hierarchy of
differences among differences in ontological terms.

1 - Material Differences -

(A - I)

2 - Differences among Material Differences -

[(A - I) - (C - I)]

3 - Differences among Differences in Material Differences

{[(A - I) - (C - I)] - [(E - I) - (G -I)]}

4 - And Differences among such Differences.


Now category 1 phenomena are defined as material in nature because
their interactions are one dimensional and result in equal and
opposite reactions. The higher level categorical differences however
do not just result in equal and opposite reactions. Their reactions
are thus termed actions instead because they do not just react in
material terms but in terms of the compounded difference among
material differences. And their actions are considered ontological in
nature for this reason.

So category 2 differences among material differences are fundamentally
different in nature from material phenomena. And for lack of a better
alternative I consider category 2 phenomena to be perceptual in
nature. They have the ability to react or move among material
differences.

Category 3 differences are what I call cognitive in nature because
they are compounded of differences between perceptual differences.
Thus category 3 phenomena have the ability to move among perceptual
states and posses locomotion.

Category 4 differences result in what I call voluntary cognition. That
is they are able to move among cognitive states and change the form of
their cognition for that reason. And they also possess a variety of
additional characteristics peculiar to this category for an unusual
reason.

If we recognize the one dimensional nature of material interactions
and the two dimensional nature of category 2 differences among
material differences then category 3 cognitive phenomena will be three
dimensional in nature as representing the difference between
coincidental two dimensional differences.

However with category 4 differences among cognitive differences we
appear to run into an unusual constraint. The three spatial dimensions
are already occupied by category 3 differences. Thus differences
between category 3 differences cannot simply spread into another
spatial dimension. And what results from those differences is a shell.

This has several important consequences. A shell is an anomalous
structure in dimensional terms. We can commensurate a line to a plane
and a plane to a sphere but we cannot commensurate any of these to a
shell. (This should not be taken to indicate that such differences are
literally lines, planes, or spheres.)

Further a difference between three dimensional differences not only
eliminates what lies outside the shell, it also eliminates what's
inside the shell common to both. This is why category 4 differences
are anomalous: they produce a result which does not contain any
reference to the basis for the difference.

Lower level categorical differences do not do this. They just expand
into additional spatial dimensions. At category 4 however there are
spatial dimensional constraints which prevent this and eliminate all
reference to whatever ontological mechanism exists for the taking of
differences.

Thus the result of category 4 differences is abstract from the
ontological circumstances of the organismic mechanics giving rise to
the difference and we can know the information contained in that
difference in its own right for the first time. This is what it means
to be conscious, that we are conscious of the information in the form
of differences per se because they are no longer mixed up with all the
mechanics and circumstances driving the taking of differences in
ontological terms.

Now is this to suggest that no further differences are possible? No.
What it means however is that we have no unambiguous basis for the
taking of further differences and we can only take differences between
one category 4 shell and another.

In other words the ontological reference for the taking of differences
has been eliminated. There is no longer any unambiguous interface I
for the taking of further differences between shells and we are left
to take further differences strictly between the shells themselves.
And unfortunately there is no way to determine how those differences
are to be taken. There is no further [(A - I) - (C - I)] possible in
this sense because the I has disappeared. And we are left to reason
about category 4 information such as (A - C) in abstract terms alone.


Regards - Lester

"Lester Zick" <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:3fafac4f.32165679@netnews.att.net...
On Mon, 03 Nov 2003 15:35:35 GMT, lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net
(Lester Zick) in sci.cognitive wrote:

On Wed, 29 Oct 2003 15:58:38 GMT, lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net
(Lester Zick) in sci.cognitive wrote:


Differential Cognition

We have adduced several considerations that need to be addressed and
resolved by any mechanical explanation for cognition:

The apparently finite nature of cognitive envelopes

The non direct, non copy nature of cognitive information

The interface between mind and brain.

Now there is only one mechanism that can be used to explain all of
these considerations as they pertain to cognition: the mechanism of
differences. In other words what we are looking at at the root of
cognition is a mechanical determinism whose basic mechanism is
differences and whose effect is what I call differential cognition.

Let's examine the implications of differences as a mechanism in the
context of the issues raised above.

For one thing the notion of differences as the basic cognitive
mechanism limits the scope of cognition. In other words it implies
some finite envelope within which cognition occurs. For even if we
assumed unlimited scope for external material sensations, differences
between material circumstances will be finite and limited in scope to
differences between them.

In addition the idea of differences as the basic element of cognition
explains the hybrid nature of information. Whatever the difference
between material circumstances may be is not only finite, it is also
neither antecedent circumstance. It is hybrid in nature because it
only represents the difference between material circumstances and thus
is neither circumstance in itself.

Thus we are no longer dealing with copy theory. Copies represent
material artifiacts of the objects copied. Differences between
material artifacts however do not. Because they only represent
differences between artifacts and not the artifacts themselves.

This means that information in cognitive terms assumes something more
than physical significance alone. It assumes logical as well as
material characteristics. Information is no longer just material or
physical in this sense despite residing in the brain because it
represents the difference between material circumstances. This is why
it is information and the reason it assumes logical properties in
addition to physical significance as a material circumstance in its
own right.

Thus cognitive information represents the logical interface between
material circumstances because it is the difference between them. It
is of both and yet is neither. And this is where the mind arises as a
distinct phenomenon as the seat of information and the interface
between material circumstances in logical rather than material terms.

This is why we don't see the operation of cognition in objective terms
in our minds. We only see the final result, the information produced
by cognition. Cognition mechanizes the process of taking differences
in subjective terms.

This is the reason the process is not objective. The subjective merely
represents material circumstances in themselves whereas the
information produced by the operation of cognition is objective
because it represents neither material circumstance from which it is
drawn, only the difference between them.

Yet neither is the objective information produced by cognition a
direct manifestation of any external object. It only corresponds to
the difference between material circumstances. And it is for this
combination of reasons that it assumes logical significance and
produces mental implications not evident in purely material
interactions generally.

Material interactions in general represent the conventional
implications of equal and opposite reactions studied by physics in
empirical terms. And we can study differences in such terms as well.
However what we cannot do is get at the logical implications of
objective differences without reference to the material circumstances
in terms of which the differences are taken.

This is why materialism represents an inappropriate methodology for
the study of mental circumstances and interactions. It is the logical
implications of those circumstances and interactions and antecedents
that matter for the mind and not simply their material circumstances.



Schematic Considerations

Differences lend themselves to schematic interpretation. They are in
fact the fundamental operation of reality in logical terms. In purely
material terms we are faced with a continuum of equal and opposite
interactions. However in cognitive terms of what we can know of
reality we have no choice but to rely on differential information.

Of course we have sensations and these are denoted by upper case
letters. And the operation between sensations that renders differences
is denoted by the minus sign. We do not have any further exact idea of
what this operation amounts to or how it is mechanized in various
cognitive contexts. But we know it produces differences between
sensations and reflects whatever differences amount to in such
contexts.

Thus as between certain sensations A and C we have a schematic
representation (A - C) correponding to the difference between the two
sensations. Now we might proceed in this way to interpret various
differences. However we assume instead that there is some cognitive
interface present in ontological contexts - that is in the context of
beings - that is used as the basis for the mechanization of
differences generally.

This cognitive interface within beings is denoted by an uppercase I
and the mechanization of differences between circumstances represented
schematically by expressions like (A - I), (C - I), etc. instead of
the previous (A - C) and so on. In effect we are presuming there is a
determinable inside and outside to cognitive beings reflected in the
use of a common interface for the taking of differences. There are
several reasons for this alternate approach which will become apparent
as the implications of cognitive differences are explored.

So what we have in the context of differential cognition are series of
differences such as (A - I), (C - I) and so on and we need to ask what
the implications of such differences are in mechanical terms. One
thing that should be apparent at the outset is that the minus
operation is directional in nature. Thus (A - I) represents
fundamentally different information from (I - A).

A second consideration is that the result is segmented in terms of the
difference. In other words the result only represents some finite part
of the initial sensations according to the difference between them and
the identity or what is common to both is not reflected in the
difference.

Now this needs some clarification. We need not assume that initial
sensations are unlimited in material scope. In fact there is no way to
know this one way or the other in such basic terms. Nor is there any
reason to assume that the result represents binary information. What
we can know is that the result represents some finite, limited, or
delimited segment of the original sensations according to the
difference between them.

The same would be true even if we are considering successive
differences. The difference between finite segments is also a finite
segment. What we find in this regard is that information is not only
derived in terms of differences between basic sensations, it is also
subject to recursion in terms of differences between information. Thus
we have the implications of differences like (A - I) - (C - I) to
consider as well.

One other consideration concerns the material implications of the
interface. We cannot simply assume that I represents exactly the same
cognitive interface under all conditions. Functionally it remains
identical. However its actual circumstances change because there are
material reactions between things like A and I or C and I to consider
as differences are taken.

Thus we lose not only the identity between A and I in the course of
taking differences, we also lose the exact same interface for the
taking of differences. And this will have significant implications in
the course of further taking of differences and compounding the taking
of differences in terms of one another.


Further Considerations

Let's suppose we have a series of differences like (A - I), (C - I),
etc. and wish to determine what the ontological implications of such
differences may be. Of course we have no idea what things like A and C
actually are in themselves in absolute terms. All we know is that we
have residuary differences between A and I on the one hand and C and I
on the other.

Now in conventional terms there is some interaction between A and I
and C and I in the course of mechanizing the differences between them.
We don't actually know what the interactions amount to but we assume
they are material interactions according to the definition of A, C,
and I as material circumstances. The results of the differences are
logical and ontological results of material circumstances like A, C,
and I, but the circumstances themselves are only material in nature.

However we cannot infer that the I interface represents exactly the
same material circumstance in both cases because the interaction
between A and I as the result of taking the difference between them
changes something about I. Consequently the successive difference
between C and I will not be between exactly the same I and we cannot
just factor out the interface I by taking the difference between A and
I on the one hand and C and I on the other. There is some difference
but exactly what that difference amounts remains ambiguous.

In this respect we can infer that a difference like (A - I) - (C - I)
does not correspond exactly to a difference like (A - C). It
corresponds to some further difference but we cannot definitely say
what because the middle interface term I is unknowable.

This means that an organism mechanized solely in such terms is logical
and ontological in nature. But there is no strictly definable content
to its being apart from the sequence of interactions corresponding to
the series of differences. It simply reacts from one difference to
another. Yet the sequence of interactions despite reflecting material
interactions is termed an action as opposed to material interactions
because the sequence involves an undefined middle term in the
interface between A and I on the one hand and C and I on the other.

Based on such considerations it is a relatively straightforward matter
to define terms like information, logical, ontological, perceptual,
cognitive, conscious, etc. in analytically definitive terms by means
of differences and differences among differences.

Differences like (A - I) or (C - I) represent material differences in
this sense. The result of a difference is information.

Isolated differences are logical in this respect but they are not
ontological because they only entail equal and opposite reactions
characteristic of material interactions generally. And these can be
and are studied by the physical sciences because they occupy only the
one dimension characteristic of equal and opposite reactions.

On the other hand if we take differences among material differences
such as [(A - I) - (C - I)] we are no longer dealing just with logical
information. We are dealing with information of ontological scope
because we are no longer talking about equal and opposite reactions in
linear terms.

In other words each piece of information entails a one dimensional
equal and opposite reaction. But the combination does not necessarily
because the equal and opposite reactions pertinent to each can lie in
different directions and will define a plane. Thus we are no longer
looking at information defining a material circumstance in relation to
another material circumstance. We are instead looking at an immaterial
or nonmaterial difference between material differences. And the result
is not only logical but ontological as well for this reason.

Immaterial Differences

There are many serious minded students of science who scoff at the
notion of immaterial or nonmaterial effects who see everything
knowable in definitive terms as being material in origin and nature.
This doctrine is known as materialism and is considered by its
adherents as being the only basis for the study of science in general.

However advocates of materialism don't really know how to define what
is material except through the empirical methods peculiar to physics
and physical sciences generally, a doctrine know as empiricism. In
other words if we can see, feel, hear things or study things by
methods we can see, feel, hear, etc. through the senses, they are
considered material in nature and are suitable subjects for empirical
analysis and form an appropriate basis for science and scientific
knowledge. Otherwise not.

But what the adherents of materialism and empiricism fail to realize
is that their definition for material is purely ostensible. It has no
analytical significance whatsoever because it defines material things
not in terms of properties but in terms of consequences: because they
produce certain kinds of interactions under given conditions.

This just isn't good enough for science. This isn't a definition: it's
a supposition. In other words a guess. It presumes that all the
consequences of material things are either sensate or can be known and
studied by methods which are sensate. And it leads to the further
supposition that science is what studies things by sensate methods
rather than the idea that science is what studies things in systematic
terms suitable to the subject studied.

I define material phenomena in terms of differences instead - which
applies to all phenomena across the board. In other words a material
phenomenon is one defined in terms of a single difference. And higher
orders of immaterial phenomena are defined by higher orders of
differences compounded in terms of material differences. And they are
immaterial because they do not just react in terms of isolatable equal
and opposite reactions suitable for study by empirical methods of the
natural sciences.

This is exactly why the empirical methods of the physical sciences are
suitable for the study of material interactions but not immaterial
interactons. Physics could study a symphony in empirical terms but
only those aspects like sheet music, pen, and ink which are material
in nature. It cannot study the composition itself because that is not
material in nature. It is immaterial.


Categorical Differences

Thus we are left to decide what to make of a categorical hierarchy of
differences among differences in ontological terms.

1 - Material Differences -

(A - I)

2 - Differences among Material Differences -

[(A - I) - (C - I)]

3 - Differences among Differences in Material Differences

{[(A - I) - (C - I)] - [(E - I) - (G -I)]}

4 - And Differences among such Differences.


Now category 1 phenomena are defined as material in nature because
their interactions are one dimensional and result in equal and
opposite reactions. The higher level categorical differences however
do not just result in equal and opposite reactions. Their reactions
are thus termed actions instead because they do not just react in
material terms but in terms of the compounded difference among
material differences. And their actions are considered ontological in
nature for this reason.

So category 2 differences among material differences are fundamentally
different in nature from material phenomena. And for lack of a better
alternative I consider category 2 phenomena to be perceptual in
nature. They have the ability to react or move among material
differences.

Category 3 differences are what I call cognitive in nature because
they are compounded of differences between perceptual differences.
Thus category 3 phenomena have the ability to move among perceptual
states and posses locomotion.

Category 4 differences result in what I call voluntary cognition. That
is they are able to move among cognitive states and change the form of
their cognition for that reason. And they also possess a variety of
additional characteristics peculiar to this category for an unusual
reason.

If we recognize the one dimensional nature of material interactions
and the two dimensional nature of category 2 differences among
material differences then category 3 cognitive phenomena will be three
dimensional in nature as representing the difference between
coincidental two dimensional differences.

However with category 4 differences among cognitive differences we
appear to run into an unusual constraint. The three spatial dimensions
are already occupied by category 3 differences. Thus differences
between category 3 differences cannot simply spread into another
spatial dimension. And what results from those differences is a shell.

This has several important consequences. A shell is an anomalous
structure in dimensional terms. We can commensurate a line to a plane
and a plane to a sphere but we cannot commensurate any of these to a
shell. (This should not be taken to indicate that such differences are
literally lines, planes, or spheres.)

Further a difference between three dimensional differences not only
eliminates what lies outside the shell, it also eliminates what's
inside the shell common to both. This is why category 4 differences
are anomalous: they produce a result which does not contain any
reference to the basis for the difference.

Lower level categorical differences do not do this. They just expand
into additional spatial dimensions. At category 4 however there are
spatial dimensional constraints which prevent this and eliminate all
reference to whatever ontological mechanism exists for the taking of
differences.

Thus the result of category 4 differences is abstract from the
ontological circumstances of the organismic mechanics giving rise to
the difference and we can know the information contained in that
difference in its own right for the first time. This is what it means
to be conscious, that we are conscious of the information in the form
of differences per se because they are no longer mixed up with all the
mechanics and circumstances driving the taking of differences in
ontological terms.

Now is this to suggest that no further differences are possible? No.
What it means however is that we have no unambiguous basis for the
taking of further differences and we can only take differences between
one category 4 shell and another.

In other words the ontological reference for the taking of differences
has been eliminated. There is no longer any unambiguous interface I
for the taking of further differences between shells and we are left
to take further differences strictly between the shells themselves.
And unfortunately there is no way to determine how those differences
are to be taken. There is no further [(A - I) - (C - I)] possible in
this sense because the I has disappeared. And we are left to reason
about category 4 information such as (A - C) in abstract terms alone.


Regards - Lester


I understand that "differential cognition" is your attempt at ontological
purity, but it seems to odd to ignore all the known mechanisms that sort
input from our visual cortex. The visual machinery that does edge detection,
motion detection, even figure-ground discrimination is exactly the sort of
thing you seek. Does ontological purity keep you from reading up on the
biology of the Brain? I mean it does keep you options open vis-a-vis
alternate-unknown cognitive platforms, its just painful to watch you
struggle at such an ambitious project, seemingly without having the benefit
of the latest information on the actual mechanics of the only platforms of
cognition we can easily observe, biological brains.
Then again I'm sure I just read you saying that your idea's haven't changed
in over 20 years. So its a cinch you haven't read Steven Pinkers recent
book: Blank Slate, and I'd wager that you haven't read anything of Gerald
Edelman or Giulio Tononi either...

Anyway, I'm not down on your project, just curious why you ignore biology?

-- Bob

Well, Bob, I appreciate your interest. I don't want to ignore biology

On Mon, 10 Nov 2003 15:17:49 -0500, "bOb's hEAd" <commi2@canada.com
in sci.cognitive wrote:
snip
I doubt that biology and neuroscience will ever be able to show us
abstract information in the brain. It's just not in their ken. They'll
see patterns of neural activity and associate them with some special
activity. But there will be little or no comprehension of what it is
that is being associated and why.

Let me pose a question. Are hammer, nails, and lumber more important
than blueprints? Is a carpenter's 3-4-5 right triangle more important
than Euclid's geometry? Now if you have to build a wooden house in the
next couple of months I daresay the former would be more important.
But if you want to understand the nature of geometry and geometric
considerations and applications in general I think the latter would
have to be. In any event I hope this puts the problem in perspective
from my point of view.

I don't think there is a lot more to be said on the subject apart from
ancillary observations. At least this pretty much wraps up my
commentary on the subject of differential cognition. I've said what I
have to say and it's time to move on to other problems. The books you
cite remind me of several I read years ago on topics like relativity
and quantum mechanics. Very interesting but they just don't have quite
the right spin on things. But once again thanks for the interest.


Regards - Lester

Edelman takes all this in as good data, but he faults Pinker for assuming
the existence of an internal "mentalese" language. Edelman observes that
this is both unnecessary and wrong in that it begs the question about
"where" exactly this mentaleese gets "decoded". Its the homunculus fallacy
all over again.

On 16 Nov 2003 23:42:13 -0800, jhn_hbr@yahoo.com (John Huber) in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

Now category 1 phenomena are defined as material in nature because
their interactions are one dimensional and result in equal and
opposite reactions. The higher level categorical differences however
do not just result in equal and opposite reactions. Their reactions
are thus termed actions instead because they do not just react in
material terms but in terms of the compounded difference among
material differences. And their actions are considered ontological in
nature for this reason.

So category 2 differences among material differences are fundamentally
different in nature from material phenomena. And for lack of a better
alternative I consider category 2 phenomena to be perceptual in
nature. They have the ability to react or move among material
differences.

Category 3 differences are what I call cognitive in nature because
they are compounded of differences between perceptual differences.
Thus category 3 phenomena have the ability to move among perceptual
states and posses locomotion.

Category 4 differences result in what I call voluntary cognition. That
is they are able to move among cognitive states and change the form of
their cognition for that reason. And they also possess a variety of
additional characteristics peculiar to this category for an unusual
reason.

Hi Lester,
It would help if you could provide an example here. Theory without
example is psuedoscience.

Hi John - I'll certainly be glad to provide examples. But I'd like to
understand which examples you want. Just category 4 or for all of the
categories. Please bear in mind that the original essay ran to about
2500-3000 words so I didn't include every aspect imaginable.

"David Longley" <David@longley.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:ArJ$bNEatqu$Ew20@longley.demon.co.uk...


You need to read more carefully what Glen Sizemore and I have actually
said in this newsgroup. You should be more careful about the inferences
and attributions you make.

You should be more careful about what you call nonsense.


Read the two sentences above *carefully*.

C1 differences are material in nature reflecting equal and opposite
reactions like body A collides with B and each reacts to the other in
terms of the differences between them and not to the similarities. C1
level phenomena are thus material in nature and are said to react as
opposed to acting.


C2 differences among material differences result in what I term
perceptual level beings like plants. The term perceptual here is
appropriated simply to reflect the ability of plants to move and
reorient themselves - without the idea of deliberate locomotion - akin
to how perceptual organs in higher level animals move and act.

C3 differences among c2 difference entail the ability for locomotion
by reacting from one c2 perceptual circumstance to another according
to the differences between them and are said to possess voluntary
locomotion for this reason. They are also said to possess involuntary
cognition in this sense.

C4 differences among c3 differences represent the category of
conscious being in which isolated c3 differences already occupy the
three spatial dimensions so differences between them result in a shell
structure from which the brain interface is common to both and is
eliminated in taking the difference.

Thus with c4 differences organisms exhibit voluntary thought, abstract
knowledge, self consciousness, and what I characterize as free will
because the I interface for the taking of differences is no longer
present and the results only reflect objective differences exclusive
of ontological circumstances pertinent to the taking of differences.
There are a lot of things to be said with respect to c4 differences
but I will leave it here for the present except to say that humans are
apparently the only organisms with c4 mechanics - for a variety of
reasons which I won't go into here.