One approach to dealing with the specific qualities of our experiences
is to view them as totally relational. Colors, as a mode of perception,
refer only to themselves (other colors). As such, even coming up
with analogies as to what it's like to see a color would seem tough,
and reasonably so.

An example of this line of thought is below:

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/marcusarvan.html

(You have to scroll down a page to see the article.)

"Yellow, I will hold, is just one thing and not another; it is
not red, not green, etc.; that is all the intrinsic, ineffable,
directly apprehensible (but not private) subjective content it
has."

It's easy to see how black and white, being bipolar, can be viewed
in this way. Black is no intensity of light, blinding white light is too
much intensity, and all shades of white and gray and black lie
somewhere in-between.

According to this theory, colors get their richness in that they have
many poles. Yellow is not green, red, blue, etc, so it is richer in that
it contains more information, seen as distinctions of what it is not.
White doesn't need these distinctions since it's a neutral color.

Colors are also not on the surface of any object or a colored part of
the brain. One can imagine a relation framework of nodes, maybe a
square being red, a circle a being green, and a star being blue, other
colors being blendings of these shapes, and intensity being the
firing rates of the neurons involved. Each "mental pixel" has a shape
to code what color it is, and shapes are easy for us to grasp.

It's admittedly a crude example, but it turns colors into positive
traits. The mode of any sense, what is different about seeing a
color as opposed to hearing a sound, comes from the makeup of
the method of representation. You could hardly fault an AI program
with some very low-level diagnostic sense confessing that "ones look
oney, zeros look zeroy, and they both look numbery"; in fact, this is
probably exactly what sort of statement those who created it would
be hoping for. So colors looked colory and are not like anything
else since they are a unique and arbitrary method of representation.

The problem I have is with the notion of something being thought
of as purely a negation of something else of the same kind. Is "Not in
NYC" a place? It does explain why it's impossible to relate what it is
like to see a color; it's not like anything, really, since it's just a
marker
for what it's not. What I'm concerned with is this is just some sort of
verbal slight of hand to get the problem to go away. Colors must
have some sort of positive representation, even if it is just a crude one
like above. It's not like you can get a troubling number to go away
simply by putting a negative sign in front of it.

--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY

One approach to dealing with the specific qualities of our experiences
is to view them as totally relational. Colors, as a mode of perception,
refer only to themselves (other colors). As such, even coming up
with analogies as to what it's like to see a color would seem tough,
and reasonably so.

An example of this line of thought is below:

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/marcusarvan.html

(You have to scroll down a page to see the article.)

"Yellow, I will hold, is just one thing and not another; it is
not red, not green, etc.; that is all the intrinsic, ineffable,
directly apprehensible (but not private) subjective content it
has."

It's easy to see how black and white, being bipolar, can be viewed
in this way. Black is no intensity of light, blinding white light is too
much intensity, and all shades of white and gray and black lie
somewhere in-between.

According to this theory, colors get their richness in that they have
many poles. Yellow is not green, red, blue, etc, so it is richer in that
it contains more information, seen as distinctions of what it is not.
White doesn't need these distinctions since it's a neutral color.

Colors are also not on the surface of any object or a colored part of
the brain. One can imagine a relation framework of nodes, maybe a
square being red, a circle a being green, and a star being blue, other
colors being blendings of these shapes, and intensity being the
firing rates of the neurons involved. Each "mental pixel" has a shape
to code what color it is, and shapes are easy for us to grasp.

It's admittedly a crude example, but it turns colors into positive
traits. The mode of any sense, what is different about seeing a
color as opposed to hearing a sound, comes from the makeup of
the method of representation. You could hardly fault an AI program
with some very low-level diagnostic sense confessing that "ones look
oney, zeros look zeroy, and they both look numbery"; in fact, this is
probably exactly what sort of statement those who created it would
be hoping for. So colors looked colory and are not like anything
else since they are a unique and arbitrary method of representation.

The problem I have is with the notion of something being thought
of as purely a negation of something else of the same kind. Is "Not in
NYC" a place? It does explain why it's impossible to relate what it is
like to see a color; it's not like anything, really, since it's just a marker
for what it's not. What I'm concerned with is this is just some sort of
verbal slight of hand to get the problem to go away. Colors must
have some sort of positive representation, even if it is just a crude one
like above. It's not like you can get a troubling number to go away
simply by putting a negative sign in front of it.

so...if colors refer only to themselves, why does certain
music evoke
specific images of blends of color?

(nothing to do with
ms software)

"Craig Franck" <craig.franck@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:<0b2Db.41$UF5.34@nwrdny01.gnilink.net>...
One approach to dealing with the specific qualities of
our experiences
is to view them as totally relational. Colors, as a mode
of perception,
refer only to themselves (other colors). As such, even
coming up
with analogies as to what it's like to see a color would
seem tough,
and reasonably so.

An example of this line of thought is below:

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/marcusarvan.html

(You have to scroll down a page to see the article.)

"Yellow, I will hold, is just one thing and not
another; it is
not red, not green, etc.; that is all the
intrinsic, ineffable,
directly apprehensible (but not private)
subjective content it
has."

It's easy to see how black and white, being bipolar, can
be viewed
in this way. Black is no intensity of light, blinding
white light is too
much intensity, and all shades of white and gray and
black lie
somewhere in-between.

According to this theory, colors get their richness in
that they have
many poles. Yellow is not green, red, blue, etc, so it
is richer in that
it contains more information, seen as distinctions of
what it is not.
White doesn't need these distinctions since it's a
neutral color.

Colors are also not on the surface of any object or a
colored part of
the brain. One can imagine a relation framework of
nodes, maybe a
square being red, a circle a being green, and a star
being blue, other
colors being blendings of these shapes, and intensity
being the
firing rates of the neurons involved. Each "mental
pixel" has a shape
to code what color it is, and shapes are easy for us to
grasp.

It's admittedly a crude example, but it turns colors
into positive
traits. The mode of any sense, what is different about
seeing a
color as opposed to hearing a sound, comes from the
makeup of
the method of representation. You could hardly fault an
AI program
with some very low-level diagnostic sense confessing
that "ones look
oney, zeros look zeroy, and they both look numbery"; in
fact, this is
probably exactly what sort of statement those who
created it would
be hoping for. So colors looked colory and are not like
anything
else since they are a unique and arbitrary method of
representation.

The problem I have is with the notion of something being
thought
of as purely a negation of something else of the same
kind. Is "Not in
NYC" a place? It does explain why it's impossible to
relate what it is
like to see a color; it's not like anything, really,
since it's just a marker
for what it's not. What I'm concerned with is this is
just some sort of
verbal slight of hand to get the problem to go away.
Colors must
have some sort of positive representation, even if it is
just a crude one
like above. It's not like you can get a troubling number
to go away
simply by putting a negative sign in front of it.

One approach to dealing with the specific qualities of our experiences
is to view them as totally relational. Colors, as a mode of perception,
refer only to themselves (other colors). As such, even coming up
with analogies as to what it's like to see a color would seem tough,
and reasonably so.

An example of this line of thought is below:

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/marcusarvan.html

(You have to scroll down a page to see the article.)

"Yellow, I will hold, is just one thing and not another; it is
not red, not green, etc.; that is all the intrinsic, ineffable,
directly apprehensible (but not private) subjective content it
has."

It's easy to see how black and white, being bipolar, can be viewed
in this way. Black is no intensity of light, blinding white light is too
much intensity, and all shades of white and gray and black lie
somewhere in-between.

According to this theory, colors get their richness in that they have
many poles. Yellow is not green, red, blue, etc, so it is richer in that
it contains more information, seen as distinctions of what it is not.
White doesn't need these distinctions since it's a neutral color.

Colors are also not on the surface of any object or a colored part of
the brain. One can imagine a relation framework of nodes, maybe a
square being red, a circle a being green, and a star being blue, other
colors being blendings of these shapes, and intensity being the
firing rates of the neurons involved. Each "mental pixel" has a shape
to code what color it is, and shapes are easy for us to grasp.

It's admittedly a crude example, but it turns colors into positive
traits. The mode of any sense, what is different about seeing a
color as opposed to hearing a sound, comes from the makeup of
the method of representation. You could hardly fault an AI program
with some very low-level diagnostic sense confessing that "ones look
oney, zeros look zeroy, and they both look numbery"; in fact, this is
probably exactly what sort of statement those who created it would
be hoping for. So colors looked colory and are not like anything
else since they are a unique and arbitrary method of representation.

The problem I have is with the notion of something being thought
of as purely a negation of something else of the same kind. Is "Not in
NYC" a place? It does explain why it's impossible to relate what it is
like to see a color; it's not like anything, really, since it's just a
marker
for what it's not. What I'm concerned with is this is just some sort of
verbal slight of hand to get the problem to go away. Colors must
have some sort of positive representation, even if it is just a crude one
like above. It's not like you can get a troubling number to go away
simply by putting a negative sign in front of it.

--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY

One approach to dealing with the specific qualities of our experiences
is to view them as totally relational. Colors, as a mode of perception,
refer only to themselves (other colors). As such, even coming up
with analogies as to what it's like to see a color would seem tough,
and reasonably so.

An example of this line of thought is below:

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/marcusarvan.html

(You have to scroll down a page to see the article.)

"Yellow, I will hold, is just one thing and not another; it is
not red, not green, etc.; that is all the intrinsic, ineffable,
directly apprehensible (but not private) subjective content it
has."

"Craig Franck" <craig.franck@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:0b2Db.41$UF5.34@nwrdny01.gnilink.net...

Temporal Extension and Intension is difference from spacial Extension and
Intension but both do the do sinualtaniously.

"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:vts10kel52je1b@corp.supernews.com...

"Craig Franck" <craig.franck@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:0b2Db.41$UF5.34@nwrdny01.gnilink.net...

Temporal Extension and Intension is difference from spacial Extension and
Intension but both do the do sinualtaniously.

Surely this is wrong. An area must have a sufficient extension to be
visible.
It is said that certain frogs can detect a single light quanta. I leave it
to others to explain whether this amount of light would activate the cones
of the observer.

"Craig Franck" <craig.franck@verizon.net> wrote in message news:<0b2Db.41$UF5.34@nwrdny01.gnilink.net>...
Departing only briefly to comment on that page: It makes an
interesting case that a traditional(?) description of qualia may be
flawed; i.e., "qualia... [as] properties of a subject's mental states
that are (1) ineffable (2) intrinsic (3) private (4) directly or
immediately apprehensible in consciousness".

But while this suggests that I should avoid using a possibly
contaminated term, it does nothing to alter my opinion that experience
does not resemble the electrical or chemical activity it corresponds
to. Which is the enigma of the subject to me (that and whatever
physical property binds scattered experiences together in the brain).

_~*~_Emma_~*~_

"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:vts10kel52je1b@corp.supernews.com...

"Craig Franck" <craig.franck@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:0b2Db.41$UF5.34@nwrdny01.gnilink.net...

Temporal Extension and Intension is difference from spacial Extension
and
Intension but both do the do sinualtaniously.

Surely this is wrong. An area must have a sufficient extension to be
visible.

It is said that certain frogs can detect a single light quanta. I leave it
to others to explain whether this amount of light would activate the cones
of the observer.

in article 3fde7612_1@news.iprimus.com.au, Tony Thomas at
verdigris@iprimus.com.au wrote on 12/15/03 6:37 PM:


"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:vts10kel52je1b@corp.supernews.com...

"Craig Franck" <craig.franck@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:0b2Db.41$UF5.34@nwrdny01.gnilink.net...

Temporal Extension and Intension is difference from spacial Extension
and
Intension but both do the do sinualtaniously.

Surely this is wrong. An area must have a sufficient extension to be
visible.
It is said that certain frogs can detect a single light quanta. I leave
it
to others to explain whether this amount of light would activate the
cones
of the observer.


Humans too can detect single photons - even when they're not there. The
photopigment rhodopsin changes shape when it absorbs a photon -
photoisomerization. This change alters the flow of electrical current in
and
around the pigment molecule, leading to graded changes in the electrical
potential between the inside and outside of the photorecepor cell. The
overall response is a logarithmic function of the number of photons
absorbed. Rhodopsin also changes shape spontaneously at a rate that
increases as a function of temperature - thermal isomerization. Dark
noise.
False positives. There is a tradeoff, in visual psychophysical experiments
in which observers report when they see a dim flash, between missing real
events and reporting noise events. One can (and Aho et. al. did) vary the
temperature of frogs and toads, (cold blooded vertebrates) and show that
dark noise thresholds estimated from behavioral criteria varies with
temperature exactly as predicted from measurements on the activation
energy
of the spontaneous event rate in photoreceptors. (Aho, Donner, Hyden,
Larsen, and Reuter (1988) Low retinal noise in animals with low body
temperature allows high visual sensitivity, Nature 334, 348-350.

-- Michael

Thanks Michael.

I wonder how experimenters establish that frogs see anything, especially
since the frogs might be seeing something that is not there.

"Michael Olea" <oleaj@sbcglobal.net> wrote in message
news:BC0477B1.2CE4%oleaj@sbcglobal.net...
in article 3fde7612_1@news.iprimus.com.au, Tony Thomas at
verdigris@iprimus.com.au wrote on 12/15/03 6:37 PM:


"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:vts10kel52je1b@corp.supernews.com...

"Craig Franck" <craig.franck@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:0b2Db.41$UF5.34@nwrdny01.gnilink.net...

Temporal Extension and Intension is difference from spacial Extension
and
Intension but both do the do sinualtaniously.

Surely this is wrong. An area must have a sufficient extension to be
visible.
It is said that certain frogs can detect a single light quanta. I leave
it
to others to explain whether this amount of light would activate the
cones
of the observer.


Humans too can detect single photons - even when they're not there. The
photopigment rhodopsin changes shape when it absorbs a photon -
photoisomerization. This change alters the flow of electrical current in
and
around the pigment molecule, leading to graded changes in the electrical
potential between the inside and outside of the photorecepor cell. The
overall response is a logarithmic function of the number of photons
absorbed. Rhodopsin also changes shape spontaneously at a rate that
increases as a function of temperature - thermal isomerization. Dark
noise.
False positives. There is a tradeoff, in visual psychophysical experiments
in which observers report when they see a dim flash, between missing real
events and reporting noise events. One can (and Aho et. al. did) vary the
temperature of frogs and toads, (cold blooded vertebrates) and show that
dark noise thresholds estimated from behavioral criteria varies with
temperature exactly as predicted from measurements on the activation
energy
of the spontaneous event rate in photoreceptors. (Aho, Donner, Hyden,
Larsen, and Reuter (1988) Low retinal noise in animals with low body
temperature allows high visual sensitivity, Nature 334, 348-350.

-- Michael

in article 3fdfe270$1_1@news.iprimus.com.au, Tony Thomas at
verdigris@iprimus.com.au wrote on 12/16/03 8:58 PM:

Thanks Michael.

I wonder how experimenters establish that frogs see anything, especially
since the frogs might be seeing something that is not there.

I wondered the same thing. In particular, I was embarrassed to refer to
"thresholds estimated from behavioral criteria" without describing said
criteria. I was trusting Rieke et. al.'s (Spikes: Exploring The Neural Code)
account of Aho et. al. Did not sit well, so I googled:
"Low retinal noise in animals with low body...". It turned up 11 hits, all
of them good ones, including the original paper. Unfortunately only the
abstract is free - I was not curious enough to send my book budget deeper
into the red to download the whole paper just to find out what exactly is
meant here by "behavioral criteria". I'm sure, though, it is some well
founded observable - maybe they stick out their tongues. All this, by the
way, is scoptopic vision - rods, not cones. Cone "dark noise" turns up in
some of the 11 hits - seems like 2 out of 3 are roughly similar in thermaly
induced spontaneous photon-like events to rods.

There is another experimental tack - rather than, or in addition to,
studying the behavioral response of whole organisms record action potentials
directly from retinal ganglion cells and compare results. Both lead to the
same conclusion - single photons can be detected.

-- Michael

On Wed, 17 Dec 2003 06:13:45 GMT, Michael Olea <oleaj@sbcglobal.net> wrote:

in article 3fdfe270$1_1@news.iprimus.com.au, Tony Thomas at
verdigris@iprimus.com.au wrote on 12/16/03 8:58 PM:

Thanks Michael.

I wonder how experimenters establish that frogs see anything, especially
since the frogs might be seeing something that is not there.

I wondered the same thing. In particular, I was embarrassed to refer to
"thresholds estimated from behavioral criteria" without describing said
criteria. I was trusting Rieke et. al.'s (Spikes: Exploring The Neural Code)
account of Aho et. al. Did not sit well, so I googled:
"Low retinal noise in animals with low body...". It turned up 11 hits, all
of them good ones, including the original paper. Unfortunately only the
abstract is free - I was not curious enough to send my book budget deeper
into the red to download the whole paper just to find out what exactly is
meant here by "behavioral criteria". I'm sure, though, it is some well
founded observable - maybe they stick out their tongues. All this, by the
way, is scoptopic vision - rods, not cones. Cone "dark noise" turns up in
some of the 11 hits - seems like 2 out of 3 are roughly similar in thermaly
induced spontaneous photon-like events to rods.

There is another experimental tack - rather than, or in addition to,
studying the behavioral response of whole organisms record action potentials
directly from retinal ganglion cells and compare results. Both lead to the
same conclusion - single photons can be detected.

-- Michael


I once heard that frog cognition only responds to
visible motions (spiders too), not unchanging backgrounds.
Did you find anything about that?

Departing only briefly to comment on that page: It makes an
interesting case that a traditional(?) description of qualia may be
flawed; i.e., "qualia... [as] properties of a subject's mental states
that are (1) ineffable (2) intrinsic (3) private (4) directly or
immediately apprehensible in consciousness".

But while this suggests that I should avoid using a possibly
contaminated term, it does nothing to alter my opinion that experience
does not resemble the electrical or chemical activity it corresponds
to. Which is the enigma of the subject to me (that and whatever
physical property binds scattered experiences together in the brain).