This word is overused so much that it is as annoying as the Head-On TV
commerial...

Frankly I hate those Head-On commercials too--they give me a
headache.

This word is overused so much that it is as annoying as the Head-On TV
commerial...

The most over used phrase is The big picture. It was used about 8 times in
an hour a couple of days ago by different people, closely followed by in
work, by the sound of it.

Dave Mayes <dmayes57@yahoo.com> writes:

Frankly I hate those Head-On commercials too--they give me a
headache.

And worse still, the shit doesn't work, according to a test report I
saw.

On Feb 13, 2:00pm, "Ercm" <n...@none.nnn> wrote:
This word is overused so much that it is as annoying as the Head-On TV
commerial...

I agree that anomaly is one of NASA's most overused words but what do
you expect from one of the government's premier scientific agencies?
I guess they could use the scientific term "bad day" a bit more to
describe what can happen when they have too many anomalies but "bad
day" is two words and the term "bad day" understates in an informal
sort of way the less complex and easily understood scientific term
CATASTROPHE.
snip

I agree with the overuse criticism.  But compounding the problem is
the fact that the meaning of the term "anomaly" is often misunderstood
within NASA.  The word is often used (misused) as a synonym for
"abnormal", "problem" or "failure".  But the pure form of the word
does not inherently connote any negativity.  It simply indicates a
deviation from the nominal.  I'll repeat:

- An anomaly is simply a deviation from the nominal.

And this points toward the fact that an even more overused and
frequently misunderstood word at NASA is "nominal".  This word is
commonly used as a synonym for "normal" or having "no problem".  But
"nominal" does not necessarily indicate something that is positive.
Here's what it actually means:

- Nominal is simply a condition as it has been defined, good or bad.

A synonym for nominal would be "named" (akin to the word
"nominated").  A situation is defined, and then when it is
subsequently executed without deviation, the condition is "nominal".
Looking at the root "nom-", we can see that the two words "nominal"
and "anomaly" share the same root.  One means "that which is named",
the other meaning "not that which is named" (negated by the prefix
"a-", similar to how the words "typical" and "atypical" are related).
So we can see that:

- The words "anomaly" and "nominal" are antonyms.

They are each other's opposites.  This might seem like splitting
hairs, but there is a distinct advantage to using these strictly
accurate definitions.  This question serves to illustrate:

What does "nominal RTLS" mean?

There are experts at NASA who see this as a contradiction in terms,
because they think of "nominal" as "good" and an abort as "bad".  But
it is actually a perfectly accurate term.  A nominal RTLS is simply an
RTLS that conforms to whatever was defined (named) as an RTLS.  To
illustrate further, it is possible to set out to simulate an RTLS,
have something happen that was not planned (such as a planned engine
failure not happening) and then instead of flying an RTLS you end up
flying a perfect ascent trajectory.

This perfect ascent would be *an anomaly*.  It was a deviation from
what was planned and expected.

These certainly aren't the only two words that are misused at NASA.
And the distinction here is more subtle than other words that are
egregiously misused (like misusing a word in a way that reveals a
failure to comprehend fundamental physics).  But anomaly/nominal are
important words with specific meanings that can be more effective when
used properly.

...and going back to the original point, can be *even more* effective
when avoiding these words when not needed at all.  But for those times
when these words are the best choice for clear, concise communication,
here is a plug for using them properly!

~ CT

On Feb 20, 9:29 am, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:





I agree with the overuse criticism. But compounding the problem is
the fact that the meaning of the term "anomaly" is often misunderstood
within NASA. The word is often used (misused) as a synonym for
"abnormal", "problem" or "failure". But the pure form of the word
does not inherently connote any negativity. It simply indicates a
deviation from the nominal. I'll repeat:

- An anomaly is simply a deviation from the nominal.

And this points toward the fact that an even more overused and
frequently misunderstood word at NASA is "nominal". This word is
commonly used as a synonym for "normal" or having "no problem". But
"nominal" does not necessarily indicate something that is positive.
Here's what it actually means:

- Nominal is simply a condition as it has been defined, good or bad.

A synonym for nominal would be "named" (akin to the word
"nominated"). A situation is defined, and then when it is
subsequently executed without deviation, the condition is "nominal".
Looking at the root "nom-", we can see that the two words "nominal"
and "anomaly" share the same root. One means "that which is named",
the other meaning "not that which is named" (negated by the prefix
"a-", similar to how the words "typical" and "atypical" are related).
So we can see that:

- The words "anomaly" and "nominal" are antonyms.

They are each other's opposites. This might seem like splitting
hairs, but there is a distinct advantage to using these strictly
accurate definitions. This question serves to illustrate:

What does "nominal RTLS" mean?

There are experts at NASA who see this as a contradiction in terms,
because they think of "nominal" as "good" and an abort as "bad". But
it is actually a perfectly accurate term. A nominal RTLS is simply an
RTLS that conforms to whatever was defined (named) as an RTLS. To
illustrate further, it is possible to set out to simulate an RTLS,
have something happen that was not planned (such as a planned engine
failure not happening) and then instead of flying an RTLS you end up
flying a perfect ascent trajectory.

This perfect ascent would be *an anomaly*. It was a deviation from
what was planned and expected.

These certainly aren't the only two words that are misused at NASA.
And the distinction here is more subtle than other words that are
egregiously misused (like misusing a word in a way that reveals a
failure to comprehend fundamental physics). But anomaly/nominal are
important words with specific meanings that can be more effective when
used properly.

...and going back to the original point, can be *even more* effective
when avoiding these words when not needed at all. But for those times
when these words are the best choice for clear, concise communication,
here is a plug for using them properly!

~ CT

Using proper grammatical analysis then, NASA obviously treated O-ring
erosion prior to 51-L as "nominal," and rightly so in my opinion. You
may (and probably do) disagree with me about that. I'll let you tell
refresh my memory, rather than searching the archives.

On the other hand, launching a shuttle off Pad B for the first time
with neither a Wet Countdown Demonstration Test nor a Flight Readiness
Test could not possibly have been considered "nominal." Similarly,
waiving virtually countless more Launch Commit Criteria (many of them
verbally) than on any previous flight (or on any flight following, for
that matter) could not possibly have been considered "nominal."

Yet we don't hear much (if anything at all) about the latter -- that
unfathomable if not unforgiveable once-in-a-bloody-moon 51-L launch
anomaly -- unless it's on occasion, and from me. What redundantly
drowns out all other discussion is the repititious use of "anomalous"
to describe what Mulloy and his peers considered the "nominal"
behavior of the O-rings (based on their past performance).

In my opinion, the biggest offender in this regard was William Rogers
(corporate Lockheed's attorney), who was given authority by Reagan to
preside over the Challenger hearings, who promised to recuse himself
if anything came up concerning Lockheed, and who never did. He got a
big bang (chuckle) out of poking fun at NASA over its rather nominal
"anomaly." I'm sure you'll have a Lockheed-type reply of some sort,
CT; but I assure you, I can take the heat.

On Feb 20, 1:43 pm, "max...@mission51l.com" <max...@mission51l.com
wrote:





On Feb 20, 9:29 am, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:

I agree with the overuse criticism.  But compounding the problem is
the fact that the meaning of the term "anomaly" is often misunderstood
within NASA.  The word is often used (misused) as a synonym for
"abnormal", "problem" or "failure".  But the pure form of the word
does not inherently connote any negativity.  It simply indicates a
deviation from the nominal.  I'll repeat:

- An anomaly is simply a deviation from the nominal.

And this points toward the fact that an even more overused and
frequently misunderstood word at NASA is "nominal".  This word is
commonly used as a synonym for "normal" or having "no problem".  But
"nominal" does not necessarily indicate something that is positive.
Here's what it actually means:

- Nominal is simply a condition as it has been defined, good or bad.

A synonym for nominal would be "named" (akin to the word
"nominated").  A situation is defined, and then when it is
subsequently executed without deviation, the condition is "nominal".
Looking at the root "nom-", we can see that the two words "nominal"
and "anomaly" share the same root.  One means "that which is named",
the other meaning "not that which is named" (negated by the prefix
"a-", similar to how the words "typical" and "atypical" are related).
So we can see that:

- The words "anomaly" and "nominal" are antonyms.

They are each other's opposites.  This might seem like splitting
hairs, but there is a distinct advantage to using these strictly
accurate definitions.  This question serves to illustrate:

What does "nominal RTLS" mean?

There are experts at NASA who see this as a contradiction in terms,
because they think of "nominal" as "good" and an abort as "bad".  But
it is actually a perfectly accurate term.  A nominal RTLS is simply an
RTLS that conforms to whatever was defined (named) as an RTLS.  To
illustrate further, it is possible to set out to simulate an RTLS,
have something happen that was not planned (such as a planned engine
failure not happening) and then instead of flying an RTLS you end up
flying a perfect ascent trajectory.

This perfect ascent would be *an anomaly*.  It was a deviation from
what was planned and expected.

These certainly aren't the only two words that are misused at NASA.
And the distinction here is more subtle than other words that are
egregiously misused (like misusing a word in a way that reveals a
failure to comprehend fundamental physics).  But anomaly/nominal are
important words with specific meanings that can be more effective when
used properly.

...and going back to the original point, can be *even more* effective
when avoiding these words when not needed at all.  But for those times
when these words are the best choice for clear, concise communication,
here is a plug for using them properly!

~ CT

Using proper grammatical analysis then, NASA obviously treated O-ring
erosion prior to 51-L as "nominal," and rightly so in my opinion. You
may (and probably do) disagree with me about that. I'll let you tell
refresh my memory, rather than searching the archives.

On the other hand, launching a shuttle off Pad B for the first time
with neither a Wet Countdown Demonstration Test nor a Flight Readiness
Test could not possibly have been considered "nominal." Similarly,
waiving virtually countless more Launch Commit Criteria (many of them
verbally) than on any previous flight (or on any flight following, for
that matter) could not possibly have been considered "nominal."

Yet we don't hear much (if anything at all) about the latter -- that
unfathomable if not unforgiveable once-in-a-bloody-moon 51-L launch
anomaly -- unless it's on occasion, and from me. What redundantly
drowns out all other discussion is the repititious use of "anomalous"
to describe what Mulloy and his peers considered the "nominal"
behavior of the O-rings (based on their past performance).

In my opinion, the biggest offender in this regard was William Rogers
(corporate Lockheed's attorney), who was given authority by Reagan to
preside over the Challenger hearings, who promised to recuse himself
if anything came up concerning Lockheed, and who never did. He got a
big bang (chuckle) out of poking fun at NASA over its rather nominal
"anomaly." I'm sure you'll have a Lockheed-type reply of some sort,
CT; but I assure you, I can take the heat.

You will hear a reply because this is BS.  You are polluting another
thread with your slanted agenda

Launching off a new pad is not a basis for an FRF

and there were tanking tests

From Dave Mayes:> On Feb 13, 2:00pm, "Ercm" <n...@none.nnn> wrote:

I agree that anomaly is one of NASA's most overused words but what do
you expect from one of the government's premier scientific agencies?...

I agree with the overuse criticism.  But compounding the problem is
the fact that the meaning of the term "anomaly" is often misunderstood
within NASA.  The word is often used (misused) as a synonym for
"abnormal", "problem" or "failure".  But the pure form of the word
does not inherently connote any negativity.  It simply indicates a
deviation from the nominal.  I'll repeat:

- An anomaly is simply a deviation from the nominal.

Using proper grammatical analysis then, NASA obviously treated O-ring
erosion prior to 51-L as "nominal," and rightly so in my opinion. You
may (and probably do) disagree with me about that. I'll let you tell
refresh my memory, rather than searching the archives.

On the other hand, launching a shuttle off Pad B for the first time
with neither a Wet Countdown Demonstration Test nor a Flight Readiness
Test could not possibly have been considered "nominal." Similarly,
waiving virtually countless more Launch Commit Criteria (many of them
verbally) than on any previous flight (or on any flight following, for
that matter) could not possibly have been considered "nominal."

Yet we don't hear much (if anything at all) about the latter -- that
unfathomable if not unforgiveable once-in-a-bloody-moon 51-L launch
anomaly -- unless it's on occasion, and from me. What redundantly
drowns out all other discussion is the repititious use of "anomalous"
to describe what Mulloy and his peers considered the "nominal"
behavior of the O-rings (based on their past performance).

In my opinion, the biggest offender in this regard was William Rogers
(corporate Lockheed's attorney), who was given authority by Reagan to
preside over the Challenger hearings, who promised to recuse himself
if anything came up concerning Lockheed, and who never did. He got a
big bang (chuckle) out of poking fun at NASA over its rather nominal
"anomaly." I'm sure you'll have a Lockheed-type reply of some sort,
CT; but I assure you, I can take the heat.

From JTM (maxson@mission51l.com):

Using proper grammatical analysis then, NASA obviously treated O-ring
erosion prior to 51-L as "nominal," and rightly so in my opinion. You
may (and probably do) disagree with me about that. I'll let you tell
refresh my memory, rather than searching the archives.

I don't remember ever having commented here before on whether or not
the o-ring problem was seen as nominal. I can see your point. If
this condition had been defined as what to expect for a typical
launch, then yes, it would become the nominal. But it is not merely
the expectation of a result that makes it nominal. You would need to
define the aberrant condition before a term like "nominal O-ring
erosion" could have meaning. I am not aware of that ever having been
done.

Mike Mullane, however, is an astronaut who is quite outspoken in
publicly cautioning against the Normalization of Deviance. He
preaches 51L as his prime cautionary example. His view seems to fit
with what you are saying. I expect that he would agree with the view
that O-ring erosion was treated as a nominal condition. If not
formally defined, then in some psychological sense.

You would need to define the aberrant condition before a
term like "nominal O-ring erosion" could have meaning.  
I am not aware of that ever having been done.

You probably know me well enough to know that I am not a Lockheed
apologist (nor NASA, nor any other aerospace entity).

I call it like I see it, with a goal of seeking a perspective that is purged of
biases.

What is the *single* most important piece of data supporting
your conclusion as to the Challenger cause?

The evidence that convinced me was watching close-up video
of the SRB, both the black smoke at the pad and then the
blowtorch in flight.

Thanks. I don't consider asking questions (as to how you drew
your conclusions) to be debate. Correct me if I'm wrong. (Try
to consider me a Bob Schieffer asking these questions.)

Since the precise source (from which the black smoke at lift-off
originated) could not be determined because of loss of cameras,
how convinced would you rate yourself -- from that data alone?

(Let's say on a scale of 1 to 10. I'm taking your first observation
to be your answer, although I don't know of any close-up video
of the event you're describing. Perhaps you'll fill me in.)

[I asked only for a "single" conclusive piece of data, so I can't
consider two pieces in combination. Since I don't consider
clarifying comment to be debate, I should probably remind you
that contractors who received *film* frames (not video) of the
anamalous flare/plume were unable to determine (much less to
agree upon) the flare/flare's precise location.]

tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:
From JTM (max...@mission51l.com):

Using proper grammatical analysis then, NASA obviously treated O-ring
erosion prior to 51-L as "nominal," and rightly so in my opinion. You
may (and probably do) disagree with me about that. I'll let you tell
refresh my memory, rather than searching the archives.

I don't remember ever having commented here before on whether or not
the o-ring problem was seen as nominal.  I can see your point.  If
this condition had been defined as what to expect for a typical
launch, then yes, it would become the nominal.  But it is not merely
the expectation of a result that makes it nominal.  You would need to
define the aberrant condition before a term like "nominal O-ring
erosion" could have meaning.  I am not aware of that ever having been
done.

Mike Mullane, however, is an astronaut who is quite outspoken in
publicly cautioning against the Normalization of Deviance.  He
preaches 51L as his prime cautionary example.  His view seems to fit
with what you are saying.  I expect that he would agree with the view
that O-ring erosion was treated as a nominal condition.  If not
formally defined, then in some psychological sense.

I just found a quote from his website:

=======> Guarding against a "Normalization of Deviance"

Normalization of deviance is a long term phenomenon in which
individuals or teams repeatedly accept a lower standard of performance
until that lower standard becomes the "norm". Usually, the acceptance
of the lower standard occurs because the individual/team is under
pressure (budget, schedule, etc.) and perceives it will be too
difficult to adhere to the expected standard. Their intention may be
to revert back to the higher standard when this period of pressure
passes. However, by "getting away" with the deviation, it is likely
they will do the same thing when the same stressful circumstances
arise again. Over time, the individual/team fails to see their actions
as deviant.

Mullane uses the Challenger tragedy to make this point. Under
tremendous schedule and budget pressures and over multiple launches,
the NASA team accepted a lower standard of performance on the solid
rocket booster O-rings until that lower standard became the "norm". By
the dawn of Challenger, the NASA team had become so comfortable with
seeing occasional O-ring damage and getting away with it, the original
standard, in which ANY O-ring damage was defined as intolerable
deviance, was marginalized. Disaster resulted.
=======> (Fromhttp://www.mikemullane.com/speakingprograms.htm)

~ CT- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -