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Science Forum Index » Cognitive Science Forum » critical review of neurophilosophy
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| Mike |
 Posted: Sun Oct 19, 2003 10:19 pm |
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Guest
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The gist of the paper (Self-Representation in Nervous Systems by Patricia S.
Churchland, 10.1126/science.1070564) is to find grounds for demonstrating
that everything in this world
has a material carrier, even such an ephemeral thing as 'soul'.
Patricia states: Descartes ':famously concluded that
the essential self--the self one means when one thinks, "I exist"--is
a nonphysical, conscious thing.'
As I see it, she barks up the wrong tree.
The issue is not whether 'soul' is physical or non-physical, but a matter of
what set of methods to apply in the quest: either used in the so called
'scientific'
type of research (e.g. Galileo's paper on velocity), or theology-like
speculation
where proponents openly claim they operate based on beliefs, or ?..
We can put aside for now the problem of how the so called scientific
approach is different from a religious one (i.e. per the number of
beliefs/axioms
each of them is based on).
I interpret Descartes' vision as an appeal to use a different approach to
research 'soul' (by the way, this word as a term has a long history), an
approach
different from the 'scientific' one. Now, different in what way?
Being a formidable materialist myself, I am begging to allow me to think of
a special reality inhibited by notions, ideas, concepts, and the like.
We already have it de facto: this is the area where we operate with all the
ideas. The next step is to realize what it is that we use.
And here comes a problem, which creates the first one we address: it lies in
the correlation between the mechanism ideas are communicated to other people
and the way they appear to the communicator.
From the communicator's frame/stand: s/he just substitutes whatever there is
in his/her mind for symbols derived from any kind of language, be it Math,
oral
or written natural language, sign language, actions, pictures, etc. The way
these
symbols are applied is directed by the intentions (short/long term
objectives)
of the communicator.
The thing is, that so far I do not see any restriction on connecting ANY
symbol to ANY idea; this means, that anything is possible: we can call 'a
candy'
'a sweet', use 'soul' instead of 'mind', claim to be materialists when we
are not
even sure what this means. This is to say, that biologically our mind does
not
have a way to verify how true to the real world an idea is before we relate
it to a
symbol of communication. Quite recently, about 200-300 years ago, the human
society developed the notion of science to install some kind of a
verification
process, which Karl Popper does not approve of.
Anyway, this vision worked for at least 200 years and drove humanity into
the technology era.
Further progress has stalled, as we need some new visions to develop
Humanities
to the same extent as Sciences are; and I mean such disciplines as
politics,
finance, cognitive science, managing human resources, solving community
social
problems, etc.
This is why we have to answer these questions:
- what is the world of ideas?
- How the methods to handle it differ from the so called 'scientific
' ones?
- What is the verification process in this 'ideal' world?
As a conclusion:
In her effort to stand for materialism Patricia S. Churchland directs her
research in cognition onto brain as a physical object, which is O.K. as soon
as
she is a biologist.
The bad news is that she does not pay attention to the difference between a
physical object and a concept; having confused an object with a concept
she rejects the idea of handling these two different things differently
accusing Descartes of being an idealist. As I see it, the conflict
materialism/idealism is irrelevant in this cas if we think of a different
reality
with laws of its own where we can handle concepts.
regards
Mike |
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| Wolf Kirchmeir |
| Posted: Tue Oct 21, 2003 1:36 pm |
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On Mon, 20 Oct 2003 04:19:06 GMT, Mike wrote:
Quote: In her effort to stand for materialism Patricia S. Churchland directs her
research in cognition onto brain as a physical object, which is O.K. as soon
as
she is a biologist.
AFAIK, Churchland is a philosopher.
--
Wolf Kirchmeir, Blind River ON Canada
"Nature does not deal in rewards or punishments, but only in consequences."
(Robert Ingersoll) |
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| David Longley |
| Posted: Wed Oct 22, 2003 1:03 pm |
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In message <jbysxveflzcngvpbpna.hn4s8f2.pminews@news1.sympatico.ca>,
Wolf Kirchmeir <wwolfkir@sympatico.can> writes
Quote: On Mon, 20 Oct 2003 04:19:06 GMT, Mike wrote:
In her effort to stand for materialism Patricia S. Churchland directs her
research in cognition onto brain as a physical object, which is O.K. as soon
as
she is a biologist.
AFAIK, Churchland is a philosopher.
There are two of them, Paul and Patricia. They are both philosophers
(eliminative materialists). Patricia says (in her "Neurophilosophy")
that she grew tired of contemporary philosophy in the mid 70s and looked
to the newly emerging neuroscience(s). She, her husband and Dennett are
influenced by Quine's naturalised epistemology - if you understand that,
it will explain why these philosophers consider what they are doing
legitimate empirical albeit theoretical research. The fact that they
don't have substantial first hand experience in lab work is a *little*
disconcerting I agree - it appears 'predatory'..
--
David Longley |
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| Mike |
| Posted: Fri Oct 24, 2003 12:41 am |
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thanx for the info, David, I did not know that
Mike
"David Longley" <David@longley.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:q0jBybEcStl$Ew7d@longley.demon.co.uk...
Quote: In message <jbysxveflzcngvpbpna.hn4s8f2.pminews@news1.sympatico.ca>,
Wolf Kirchmeir <wwolfkir@sympatico.can> writes
On Mon, 20 Oct 2003 04:19:06 GMT, Mike wrote:
In her effort to stand for materialism Patricia S. Churchland directs
her
research in cognition onto brain as a physical object, which is O.K. as
soon
as
she is a biologist.
AFAIK, Churchland is a philosopher.
There are two of them, Paul and Patricia. They are both philosophers
(eliminative materialists). Patricia says (in her "Neurophilosophy")
that she grew tired of contemporary philosophy in the mid 70s and looked
to the newly emerging neuroscience(s). She, her husband and Dennett are
influenced by Quine's naturalised epistemology - if you understand that,
it will explain why these philosophers consider what they are doing
legitimate empirical albeit theoretical research. The fact that they
don't have substantial first hand experience in lab work is a *little*
disconcerting I agree - it appears 'predatory'..
--
David Longley |
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| David Longley |
| Posted: Sat Oct 25, 2003 11:34 am |
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Guest
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In message
<3Q3mb.19281$3f.8483@twister01.bloor.is.net.cable.rogers.com>, Mike
<chumakin@rogers.com> writes
Quote: thanx for the info, David, I did not know that
Mike
"David Longley" <David@longley.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:q0jBybEcStl$Ew7d@longley.demon.co.uk...
In message <jbysxveflzcngvpbpna.hn4s8f2.pminews@news1.sympatico.ca>,
Wolf Kirchmeir <wwolfkir@sympatico.can> writes
On Mon, 20 Oct 2003 04:19:06 GMT, Mike wrote:
In her effort to stand for materialism Patricia S. Churchland directs
her
research in cognition onto brain as a physical object, which is O.K. as
soon
as
she is a biologist.
AFAIK, Churchland is a philosopher.
There are two of them, Paul and Patricia. They are both philosophers
(eliminative materialists). Patricia says (in her "Neurophilosophy")
that she grew tired of contemporary philosophy in the mid 70s and looked
to the newly emerging neuroscience(s). She, her husband and Dennett are
influenced by Quine's naturalised epistemology - if you understand that,
it will explain why these philosophers consider what they are doing
legitimate empirical albeit theoretical research. The fact that they
don't have substantial first hand experience in lab work is a *little*
disconcerting I agree - it appears 'predatory'..
--
David Longley
I guess I should have scare quoted "appears" as it's more often the case
that lab technicians and students do much of the real benchwork in
research. However, that early postgraduate/post doc 'hands on period'
is, I think, a must for anyone who is going to get seriously involved in
neuroscience and what it has to say in relation to behaviour. Sadly many
of these authors have little experience in psychology either.
My experience is that researchers who do substantial work make modest
claims for their achievements and look rather warily at those who make
out they have any answers which would interest most of the public <g>...
but there is a great demand these days to publish, more than ever given
the available journals and democratization of education, and competition
for funding tends to generate "just so" grant proposals..
Sadly its often pretty hard to find much more than such stories in the
never ending stream of popular science books and textbooks which seem to
be sweeping to and from our bookshop shelves these days - there should
be a public mental health warning on the covers "Reading this can
severely distort your conception of what science and research is like"!.
Sadly, some of the above guys can be taken as an example of what can
happen to the unwary or unprepared.
--
David Longley |
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