The gist of the paper (Self-Representation in Nervous Systems by
Patricia S. Churchland, 10.1126/science.1070564) is to find grounds for
demonstrating that everything in this world has a material carrier, even
such an ephemeral thing as 'soul'. Patricia states: Descartes '?famously
concluded that the essential self--the self one means when one thinks,
"I exist"--is a nonphysical, conscious thing.'
As I see it, she barks up the wrong tree.
The issue is not whether 'soul' is physical or non-physical, but a
matter of what set of methods to apply in the quest: either used in the
so called 'scientific' type of research (e.g. Galilei's paper on
velocity), or theology-like speculation where proponents openly claim
they operate based on beliefs, or ?.. We can put aside for now the
problem of how the so called scientific approach is different from a
religious one (i.e. per the number of beliefs/axioms each of them is
based on).
I interpret Descartes' vision as an appeal to use a different
approach to research 'soul' (by the way, this word as a term has a long
history), an approach different from the 'scientific' one. Now,
different in what way?
Being a formidable materialist myself, I am
begging to allow me to think of a special reality inhibited by notions,
ideas, concepts, and the like. We already have it de facto: this is the
area where we operate with all the ideas. The next step is to realize
what it is that we use. And here comes a problem, which creates the
first one we address: it lies in the correlation between the mechanism
ideas are communicated to other people and the way they appear to the
communicator.
From the communicator's frame/stand: s/he just substitutes
whatever there is in his/her mind for symbols derived from any kind of
language, be it Maths, oral or written natural language, sign language,
actions, pictures, etc. The way these symbols are applied is directed by
the intentions (short/long term objectives) of the communicator.
The
thing is, that so far I do not see any restriction on connecting ANY
symbol to ANY idea; this means, that anything is possible: we can call
'a candy' 'a sweet', use 'soul' instead of 'mind', claim to be
materialists when we are not even sure what this means. This is to say,
that biologically our mind does not have a way to verify how true to the
real world an idea is before we relate it to a symbol of communication.
Quite recently, about 200-300 years ago, the human society developed the
notion of science to install some kind of a verification process, which
Karl Popper does not approve of. Anyway, this vision worked for at least
200 years and drove humanity into the technology era.
Further progress
has stalled, as we need some new visions to develop Humanities to the
same extent as Sciences are; and I mean such disciplines as politics,
finance, cognitive science, managing human resources, solving community
social problems, etc. This is why we have to answer these questions:
- what is the world of ideas?
- How the methods to handle it differ from the so called 'scientific'
ones?
- What is the verification process in this 'ideal' world?

As a conclusion:
In her effort to stand for materialism Patricia S. Churchland directs
her research in cognition onto brain as a physical object, which is O.K.
as soon as she is a biologist. The bad news is that she does not pay
attention to the difference between a physical object and a concept;
having confused an object with a concept she rejects the idea of
handling these two different thing differently accusing Descartes of
being an idealist. As I see it, the conflict materialism/idealism is
irrelevant in this case if we think of a different reality with laws of
its own where we can handle concepts.
regards
mike

The gist of the paper (Self-Representation in Nervous Systems by
Patricia S. Churchland, 10.1126/science.1070564) is to find grounds for
demonstrating that everything in this world has a material carrier, even
such an ephemeral thing as 'soul'. Patricia states: Descartes '…famously
concluded that the essential self--the self one means when one thinks,
"I exist"--is a nonphysical, conscious thing.'
As I see it, she barks up the wrong tree.
The issue is not whether 'soul' is physical or non-physical, but a
matter of what set of methods to apply in the quest: either used in the
so called 'scientific' type of research (e.g. Galilei's paper on
velocity), or theology-like speculation where proponents openly claim
they operate based on beliefs, or ?.. We can put aside for now the
problem of how the so called scientific approach is different from a
religious one (i.e. per the number of beliefs/axioms each of them is
based on).
I interpret Descartes' vision as an appeal to use a different
approach to research 'soul' (by the way, this word as a term has a long
history), an approach different from the 'scientific' one. Now,
different in what way?
Being a formidable materialist myself, I am
begging to allow me to think of a special reality inhibited by notions,
ideas, concepts, and the like. We already have it de facto: this is the
area where we operate with all the ideas. The next step is to realize
what it is that we use. And here comes a problem, which creates the
first one we address: it lies in the correlation between the mechanism
ideas are communicated to other people and the way they appear to the
communicator.
From the communicator's frame/stand: s/he just substitutes
whatever there is in his/her mind for symbols derived from any kind of
language, be it Maths, oral or written natural language, sign language,
actions, pictures, etc. The way these symbols are applied is directed by
the intentions (short/long term objectives) of the communicator.
The
thing is, that so far I do not see any restriction on connecting ANY
symbol to ANY idea; this means, that anything is possible: we can call
'a candy' 'a sweet', use 'soul' instead of 'mind', claim to be
materialists when we are not even sure what this means. This is to say,
that biologically our mind does not have a way to verify how true to the
real world an idea is before we relate it to a symbol of communication.
Quite recently, about 200-300 years ago, the human society developed the
notion of science to install some kind of a verification process, which
Karl Popper does not approve of. Anyway, this vision worked for at least
200 years and drove humanity into the technology era.
Further progress
has stalled, as we need some new visions to develop Humanities to the
same extent as Sciences are; and I mean such disciplines as politics,
finance, cognitive science, managing human resources, solving community
social problems, etc. This is why we have to answer these questions:
- what is the world of ideas?
- How the methods to handle it differ from the so called 'scientific'
ones?
- What is the verification process in this 'ideal' world?

As a conclusion:
In her effort to stand for materialism Patricia S. Churchland directs
her research in cognition onto brain as a physical object, which is O.K.
as soon as she is a biologist. The bad news is that she does not pay
attention to the difference between a physical object and a concept;
having confused an object with a concept she rejects the idea of
handling these two different thing differently accusing Descartes of
being an idealist. As I see it, the conflict materialism/idealism is
irrelevant in this case if we think of a different reality with laws of
its own where we can handle concepts.
regards
mike

As a conclusion:
In her effort to stand for materialism Patricia S. Churchland directs
her research in cognition onto brain as a physical object, which is O.K.
as soon as she is a biologist. The bad news is that she does not pay
attention to the difference between a physical object and a concept;
having confused an object with a concept she rejects the idea of
handling these two different thing differently accusing Descartes of
being an idealist. As I see it, the conflict materialism/idealism is
irrelevant in this case if we think of a different reality with laws of
its own where we can handle concepts.

The gist of the paper (Self-Representation in Nervous Systems by
Patricia S. Churchland, 10.1126/science.1070564) is to find grounds for
demonstrating that everything in this world has a material carrier, even
such an ephemeral thing as 'soul'. Patricia states: Descartes '.famously
concluded that the essential self--the self one means when one thinks,
"I exist"--is a nonphysical, conscious thing.'
As I see it, she barks up the wrong tree.
The issue is not whether 'soul' is physical or non-physical, but a
matter of what set of methods to apply in the quest: either used in the
so called 'scientific' type of research (e.g. Galilei's paper on
velocity), or theology-like speculation where proponents openly claim
they operate based on beliefs, or ?.. We can put aside for now the
problem of how the so called scientific approach is different from a
religious one (i.e. per the number of beliefs/axioms each of them is
based on).
I interpret Descartes' vision as an appeal to use a different
approach to research 'soul' (by the way, this word as a term has a long
history), an approach different from the 'scientific' one. Now,
different in what way?
Being a formidable materialist myself, I am
begging to allow me to think of a special reality inhibited by notions,
ideas, concepts, and the like. We already have it de facto: this is the
area where we operate with all the ideas. The next step is to realize
what it is that we use. And here comes a problem, which creates the
first one we address: it lies in the correlation between the mechanism
ideas are communicated to other people and the way they appear to the
communicator.
From the communicator's frame/stand: s/he just substitutes
whatever there is in his/her mind for symbols derived from any kind of
language, be it Maths, oral or written natural language, sign language,
actions, pictures, etc. The way these symbols are applied is directed by
the intentions (short/long term objectives) of the communicator.
The
thing is, that so far I do not see any restriction on connecting ANY
symbol to ANY idea; this means, that anything is possible: we can call
'a candy' 'a sweet', use 'soul' instead of 'mind', claim to be
materialists when we are not even sure what this means. This is to say,
that biologically our mind does not have a way to verify how true to the
real world an idea is before we relate it to a symbol of communication.
Quite recently, about 200-300 years ago, the human society developed the
notion of science to install some kind of a verification process, which
Karl Popper does not approve of. Anyway, this vision worked for at least
200 years and drove humanity into the technology era.
Further progress
has stalled, as we need some new visions to develop Humanities to the
same extent as Sciences are; and I mean such disciplines as politics,
finance, cognitive science, managing human resources, solving community
social problems, etc. This is why we have to answer these questions:
- what is the world of ideas?
- How the methods to handle it differ from the so called 'scientific'
ones?
- What is the verification process in this 'ideal' world?

As a conclusion:
In her effort to stand for materialism Patricia S. Churchland directs
her research in cognition onto brain as a physical object, which is O.K.
as soon as she is a biologist. The bad news is that she does not pay
attention to the difference between a physical object and a concept;
having confused an object with a concept she rejects the idea of
handling these two different thing differently accusing Descartes of
being an idealist. As I see it, the conflict materialism/idealism is
irrelevant in this case if we think of a different reality with laws of
its own where we can handle concepts.
regards
mike

Michael,
Excellent subject. The simple question raised is whether or not one can
apply physical characteristics to the 'soul'.

Michael,
Excellent subject. The simple question raised is whether or not one can
apply physical characteristics to the 'soul'.

has stalled, as we need some new visions to develop Humanities to the
same extent as Sciences are; and I mean such disciplines as politics,
finance, cognitive science, managing human resources, solving community
social problems, etc. This is why we have to answer these questions:

Hi Mike,

I'm afraid I did not understand the thrust of your post. Here's why:

The issue is not whether 'soul' is physical or non-physical

I believe this is exactly what Descartes was talking about in _Discourse
on Method_, that soul (==mind, by the way) is non-physical.


Being a formidable materialist myself, I am begging to allow me to think
of a special reality inhibited by notions, ideas, concepts, and the
like. We already have it de facto: this is the area where we operate
with all the ideas.

In other words, you're a Platonist? Believing in the reality of mental
forms, the brain being the organ for observing that reality?


the conflict materialism/idealism is irrelevant in this case if we think
of a different reality with laws of its own where we can handle
concepts.

Let me see if I get this. You're saying concepts really aren't Platonic
ideals, but rather are material objects. Except, we have to reconceive of
what we mean by "material," say with new laws of physics. Is that what
you're driving at?

Anthony

Michael,
Excellent subject. The simple question raised is whether or not one can
apply physical characteristics to the 'soul'. Or physical as in terms of
what we know it to mean, and I think the scientific community can somewhat
agree on what it means for an object to have physical qualities (i.e.
weight, volume, mass or whatever). To be able to directly prove that the
soul has any of these characteristics would be to crack the code dividing
scientists, philosophers and theologians since the beginning of critical
study. My question to you is, if you don't plan on explaining the
characteristics of the soul through scientific principles, than how do you
plan on explaining it? You made mention of "theology-like speculation"
and
"a special reality inhibited by notions". What does this mean? Before
you
attempt to quantify the soul you ought to resolve the method you plan to
employ. Anything short of pure scientific or logical reason will fail
unless you are appealing to the religious community or left wing
socialists.
Personally, I do not believe the "soul" has any traditional physical
characteristics in and of itself or we would have found them by now.
Simply
stated, I believe the soul or mind is a process executed within the
confines
of the brain and that is where our scientific ability to understand stops.
Considering we understand less than 10% of the brain we have hit a solid
wall behind which many answers probably exist. Perhaps we should
concentrate more on the physical brain and less on 'alternative methods of
study'. I'm all for diversity, but let's face it, the answers to the
brain
lie inside the brain. I look forward to further discussion of this topic
Michael.

Ian




"Michael" <chumakindel@rogers.com> wrote in message
news:Xns941A5221CF14Bchumakindelrogerscom@66.185.95.104...

The gist of the paper (Self-Representation in Nervous Systems by
Patricia S. Churchland, 10.1126/science.1070564) is to find grounds for
demonstrating that everything in this world has a material carrier, even
such an ephemeral thing as 'soul'. Patricia states: Descartes '…famously
concluded that the essential self--the self one means when one thinks,
"I exist"--is a nonphysical, conscious thing.'
As I see it, she barks up the wrong tree.
The issue is not whether 'soul' is physical or non-physical, but a
matter of what set of methods to apply in the quest: either used in the
so called 'scientific' type of research (e.g. Galilei's paper on
velocity), or theology-like speculation where proponents openly claim
they operate based on beliefs, or ?.. We can put aside for now the
problem of how the so called scientific approach is different from a
religious one (i.e. per the number of beliefs/axioms each of them is
based on).
I interpret Descartes' vision as an appeal to use a different
approach to research 'soul' (by the way, this word as a term has a long
history), an approach different from the 'scientific' one. Now,
different in what way?
Being a formidable materialist myself, I am
begging to allow me to think of a special reality inhibited by notions,
ideas, concepts, and the like. We already have it de facto: this is the
area where we operate with all the ideas. The next step is to realize
what it is that we use. And here comes a problem, which creates the
first one we address: it lies in the correlation between the mechanism
ideas are communicated to other people and the way they appear to the
communicator.
From the communicator's frame/stand: s/he just substitutes
whatever there is in his/her mind for symbols derived from any kind of
language, be it Maths, oral or written natural language, sign language,
actions, pictures, etc. The way these symbols are applied is directed by
the intentions (short/long term objectives) of the communicator.
The
thing is, that so far I do not see any restriction on connecting ANY
symbol to ANY idea; this means, that anything is possible: we can call
'a candy' 'a sweet', use 'soul' instead of 'mind', claim to be
materialists when we are not even sure what this means. This is to say,
that biologically our mind does not have a way to verify how true to the
real world an idea is before we relate it to a symbol of communication.
Quite recently, about 200-300 years ago, the human society developed the
notion of science to install some kind of a verification process, which
Karl Popper does not approve of. Anyway, this vision worked for at least
200 years and drove humanity into the technology era.
Further progress
has stalled, as we need some new visions to develop Humanities to the
same extent as Sciences are; and I mean such disciplines as politics,
finance, cognitive science, managing human resources, solving community
social problems, etc. This is why we have to answer these questions:
- what is the world of ideas?
- How the methods to handle it differ from the so called 'scientific'
ones?
- What is the verification process in this 'ideal' world?

As a conclusion:
In her effort to stand for materialism Patricia S. Churchland directs
her research in cognition onto brain as a physical object, which is O.K.
as soon as she is a biologist. The bad news is that she does not pay
attention to the difference between a physical object and a concept;
having confused an object with a concept she rejects the idea of
handling these two different thing differently accusing Descartes of
being an idealist. As I see it, the conflict materialism/idealism is
irrelevant in this case if we think of a different reality with laws of
its own where we can handle concepts.
regards
mike

As a conclusion:
In her effort to stand for materialism Patricia S. Churchland directs
her research in cognition onto brain as a physical object, which is O.K.
as soon as she is a biologist. The bad news is that she does not pay
attention to the difference between a physical object and a concept;
having confused an object with a concept she rejects the idea of
handling these two different thing differently accusing Descartes of
being an idealist. As I see it, the conflict materialism/idealism is
irrelevant in this case if we think of a different reality with laws of
its own where we can handle concepts.
regards
mike

I interpret Descartes' vision as an appeal to use a different approach
to research 'soul' (by the way, this word as a term has a long history),
an approach different from the 'scientific' one.

we need some new visions to develop Humanities to the same extent as
Sciences are; and I mean such disciplines as politics, finance, cognitive
science, managing human resources, solving community social problems, etc.

The bad news is that she does not pay attention
to the difference between a physical object and a concept;
havi`ng confused an object with a concept
she rejects the idea of handling these two different thing differently
accusing Descartes of being an idealist.

As I see it, the conflict materialism/idealism is irrelevant in this case
if we think of a different reality with laws of its own where we can handle
concepts.