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Science Forum Index » Anthropology Forum » Chieftancy & Security in Nigeria (Long)
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| Dan Clore |
 Posted: Mon Nov 03, 2003 12:43 pm |
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Vanguard Nigeria
Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria
By Chimaroke Nnamani
Sunday, November 02, 2003
....an overview of non-centralised East/West Niger Igbo
Governor Chimaroke Nnamani of Enugu State, in this
contribution to the National Conference on Chieftaincy and
Security in Nigeria, dedicated to the 40th anniversary of
the ascension to the throne of His Royal Highness, the Emir
of Kano, Alhaji (Dr.) Ado Bayero delved into history to
highlight the political system of the Igbo, people of the
South Eastern parts of Nigeria.
Long before this time, I have had the beckoning to grace
this great city of Kano, if only to once again behold the
great historical significances upon which the vast culture
of rulership and cohesion has taken place for well over a
thousand years now.
Of course, Kano is a lure, an attraction and a compelling
invitation to a trip in history. It is a reminder of the
greatness of our country, both in vast material as well as
abundant human resources. It is a pointer to the diffusion
of entrepreneurial potentials of every part of Nigeria and
indeed among every community of Nigerians.
Indeed, the cosmopolitan proficiency of Kano and the near
polyglot status remain remarkable indexes to measure its
possibilities vis-à-vis the boisterousness of the people,
who though are ruled by one of the longest monarchies in the
land, continue to reveal a certain class of dynamism and
growth in all spheres of life.
Of course, it cannot be treated lightly that Kano, as a
vastly significant national territory remains one single
international centre which has held attractions for
centuries of inter-continental initiatives in commerce,
diplomacy, territorial expansion, military enterprise and
more. It therefore, cannot be surprising that the
anniversary of the Kano Monarchy decided to pursue the
course of honour through a broadening of knowledge as in
this elaborate seminar to mark forty years on the saddle. If
this is not the first of its kind, it is the first I have
had the privilege of taking a part in. The gesture itself is
suggestive of intention to pursue that which outlives
generations and which will bring about an enhancement of the
system.
Indeed, it is a commendable trip in statesmanship for the
Monarchy in Kano to seek to broaden the knowledge of the
citizenry on such knotty issue as chieftaincy and security.
There is no contesting the fact that these are matters
demanding resolution but which must be treated with utmost
care and maturity. This is so because whereas it is easy to
ascertain security roles for chieftaincies in centralized
politics in Nigeria, it is not that easy in such diffuse
polities where definite and irreversible class defining
structures are absent and where rank is not permanent as it
is open to all.
And whereas it is easy to view centrality of authorities as
running in tandem with swift and more effective patterns of
social coercion, the prevalence of traditional order of
consensus compel consultation in the less central polities,
revealing its own promises in presenting a local version of
democracy which would aid our joining the more global arena
of pluralism.
To that effect, I consider the topic assigned me to divest
in two main dominant factors. One is *chieftaincy* while the
other is *security*. And for the typical *non-centralised
polity*, it can, arguably, be difficult to quickly situate
the possibilities of a cohesive, non-coercive, social
control mechanism at confirmation, which is completely
diffused, *non-centralised* or even unknowingly democratic.
*
Postulations holding the possibilities of efficacy of
single-source authority as replicable scenarios in places as
multi-faceted as a majority of the Igbo areas of Nigeria can
even be contested, if perceived as incongruous. And for the
newcomer or visitor, it is certainly difficult to discern
such factors of social relations upon which a semblance of
central frame for security is built.
Indeed such visitor may not have had the right mind
penetration or sufficient observation to appreciate the
dynamics, which keep the society running. He thus may be
circumscribed to pursuing an interpretation of the patterns
of the society on the outlines of centralized and charted
incidences of statecraft. It is even more complex for an
observer who may not have trained his mind in the
observation of such evolutionary trends, some of which
present diffusive tendencies manifest in political incidents
tending to multiplicity and attenuation in potency.
Consequently a semblance of culture, to him erroneously
stands as one and the same, but in fact, the trends are
vigorously disparate.
But in reality, African societies have witnessed their own
fair share of continuous changes, with each phase of
development representing a temporary or transient movement
in the historical and dialectical continuum.
Lately, it has become necessary to compare societies, with
reference to some particular aspects or parts of the whole
social system with reference, for example, to the economic
system, the political system, or even kinship patterns. In
most cases, sparing incidents or even accidents of history
bring about very narrow interpretations by a vocal few who
mount a voluble but erroneous claim of insight into the
polity in question.
In African Political Systems (1940), edited by M. Fortes and
E.E. Evans-Pritchard, two broad categories of polities are
identified. One is the *institutionalized (centralized)
political structure* in which cleavages of wealth, privilege
and status correspond to the distribution of power and
authority. The other is the *segmentary lineage system*,
which lacks centralized authority but, of course, wherein
there are such systems where there are no sharp or marked
divisions of rank, status or wealth. The latter model has
been variously characterized as *stateless or acephalous
societies*. But instead of considering such noncentralised
polities as *anarchical*, we sometimes view them as chaotic
and therefore ungovernable. In a way, since such societies
are not narrowed into a straight rulership pattern,
permitting unquestioning exploitation, they are termed
ungovernable. But, perhaps to avoid running away with the
charge of being impolitic, the conveners of this seminar,
politely tagged such a societal model -- *non-centralized*.
In dealing with political systems, we are inevitably dealing
with the structures and processes of the maintenance or
establishment of social order within a territorial unit.
*Centralized political systems* have had to deal with the
issue of a *centrally imposed social order* through the
instrumentality of organized exercise of *coercive
authority* by means of the use, threat or the possibility of
use, of physical force.
Thus, the centralized traditional African political systems
present little difficulty in this regard. The problematic,
however, is in dealing with such multiplicity of societies
as the so-called *"stateless", or "anarchic" or "acephalous"
politics*, which obviously lack the capacity to impose
social order by means of a pretension to the exercise of
*coercive authority*, including threat or possibility of use
of physical force. This is especially so, considering that
the absence of a *coercive authority* did not in any case
eliminate altogether the overwhelming potential for
conflicts and disputes or the resolutions of these, even in
*non—centralised polities*.
In order to put the issues in clear perspective, we have to
establish here that the challenge of the basic subject here
is in the matters of *chieftaincy and security*, while
conceptual puzzles arise from issues of context associated
with stereotypes. These are *"stateless," "acephalous",
"anarchical"* etc.
In the words of Walter Rodney (1980) ". . . the word
stateless is carelessly or even abusively used: but it does
describe those peoples who had no machinery of government
coercion and no concept of a political unit wider than . . .
the village. After all, if there is no class stratification
in a society, it follows that there is no state because the
state arose as an instrument to be used by a particular
class to control the rest of society in its own interests.
Generally speaking, one can consider the stateless societies
as among the older forms of socio-political organisaiton in
Africa, while the large states represented an evolution away
from communalism (non-centrality) -- sometimes to the point
of feudalism (centralised monarchy)."
*
Elsewhere, *'acephalous'* may be employed in describing the
political structure in a simple society, such as a
territorial community, which is united by the rule of law,
but lacking a distinct head, without a leader. It can also
be societies in which the largest political unit embraces a
group of people, all of whom are united to one another by
ties of kinship, in such a manner that political relations
are coterminous with kinship relations and the political
structure and kinship organization arc completely fused.
There are societies in which a lineage structure is the
framework of the political system thereby being a precise
co-ordination between the two, in such a way that they are
consistent with each other, though each remains distinct and
autonomous in its own sphere.
Harold Barclay (1982) characterizes *"anarchical"* or
*"anarchic"* in the sense of societies, which do not accept
the idea of authority as natural. In fact, it does not quite
appear to occur to them. To that effect, "Anarchy is the
condition of society in which there is no ruler; a society
without government and without the state . . . it is
interesting to note here the similarity between anarchism
and the segmentary lineage system characteristic of many
anarchic polities, especially in Africa. In both cases, the
sum is composed of segments and each segment of subsegment.
In both cases, the most effective authority is in the
smallest unit, decreasing directly as one ascends to broader
levels of integration."
Although anthropologists have, over the past several
decades, documented, through their ethnographic research, in
innumerable stateless or acephalous societies throughout the
world and throughout time, this paper is not oblivious
nevertheless of the considerable reluctance to define these
societies as pure anarchies. Even amongst anthropologists,
there are those so imbued with their own cultural traditions
that they will go to any length to avoid recognizing these
systems for what they are. Since they contend that social
order can exist only in a situation of existence of state,
government and law, they stretch the meaning, nay
significance, of these terms to cover what is clearly not
government or state at all.
Peter Hammond (1964) had remarked in this regard:
"Even when the population is large, relatively dense, and
somewhat diversified, the absence of government does not
necessarily imply the presence of anarchy." By the same
token, it has been observed that, among students and
historians alike, about the most firmly held myth is the one
that no society can exist, least of all function, without
government. Its mythical corollary that every society must
have a head, an identifiable and visible one at that is also
pandemic among the aforesaid group. Thus, the myth of the
necessity of the state and of government continues to hold
decisively true for many. While this might seem inevitable
in today’s modern world, there is no disputing the fact that
the states and governments have not always existed in such
sense of pursuing absolute and definable centrality. In most
cases, there are many states that are, strictly speaking,
products of recent political history or results of colonial
political engineering or trade-offs.
*
Prof. M.A. Onwuejogwu, the renowned Nigerian anthropologist,
has questioned the classification of certain traditional
African societies as stateless, a position he shares with
scholars like Profs. Lambert Ejiofor and Ikenna Nzimiro.
Stoutly, they contend "suffice it to say at this juncture
that there is a general recognition in anthropological
surveys of a complex web of social organizations that fall
short of states, and more particularly that were lacking in
centralised political authority patterns, pronounced social
stratification and advanced role differentiation. Disputes
of intellectual nature could routinely attend the criteria
for the classification of these models but this can in no
way vitiate the substantive defining characteristics of the
system of social organisation that these represent."
They cannot be faulted in the ensuing truism of such
defining characteristics which include communal solidarity,
collective action, horizontal political structures placing
premium on leadership instead of authority, absence of role
specialization or class differentiation. etc. It is our
contention here that all of these features or a combination
of same constitute a representative pattern depicting
organisation and direction even as it never presented a
scenario of coercion or forcible pursuit of a one-sided view
of governance.
Scattered throughout the continent south of the Sahara,
Harold Barclay (1982) argues, "are dozens of anarchic
societies, some of which are the most populous of *all*
anarchic communities". Among these are a variety of
segmentary lineage systems that are autonomous and
self-managing. Social order is imposed and maintained by
means of equivalence and opposition; a template of diffusion
of power that thrives on a regulatory framework of diffuse
sanctions.
*An outline of a survey of these polities yields the Anuak,
Mandari, Dinka and Neur (in southern Sudan), the Konkomba
(northern Togo), the Lugbara (parts of Uganda and Congo DR),
Shona (Zimbabwe), the Tonga (Zambia), the Tallensi (Ghana),
the Igbo, Tiv (Nigeria) etc. The list is by no means
exhaustive. And at the same time, anarchical.*
The character of traditional Igbo social organization (west
or east Niger) is a highly contentious topic, and it will
probably remain so for a long time to come. Characterized
variously as a model of *"stateless" or "acephalous"*
society, and at other times as a quintessential *republican
polity*, the structure of the Igbo political economy, in its
intrinsic manifestation, is, increasingly, being refracted
as *"anarchic"* by social scientists. Not a few historians
and a sprinkle of anthropologists have continued to insist
that there, in fact, existed kingdoms in the Igbo
traditional setting.
*
The village -- a commune of sorts -- provides the fulcrum of
social existence and so underlines the context of Igbo
characteristic diffusion. Yes, the village delicately shapes
the Igbo world view, interaction patterns and social
relationships. The Igbo village setting evinces a complex
web of ties and bonds, of roles and responsibilities, of
complementarities and asymmetries, and of equivalence and
opposition. It is usually a tapestry of views, group and
individual aspirations bending to the yearnings of the
community assembly -- Oha na Eze. In this way, the society
continually strives towards equilibrium and consensus.
Lest we forget, the Igbo traditional society was, at all
material times, a living organism consisting of individuals
and groups, of segments of the extended family and the
lineage. Therefore, the diffuse way of living which we refer
to here can actually be located in the concrete realm: in
the people’s pronounced sense of social equality; in the
prevalence of horizontal political organization that
emphasized leadership in contradistinction to a vertical,
hierarchical and centralized political structure which
emphasized authority; in the unstructured, bonding together
of the village, the lineage and the extended thmily which
spontaneously expresses itself in collective action,
solidarity and diffusion of social sanctions, etc.
But whereas this formed the socio-political configuration of
a great bulk of the lgbo world, centrality of administration
was a reality and indeed prevalent in some noted Igbo kingdoms.
Among these were the Umuezechima group of clans of western
Igbo or what Ejiofor dubbed "Umuezechima Kingdoms", in
addition to the so-called "four Niger States" elaborated in
Prof. lkenna Nzimiro’s Studies in Igbo political systems (1972).
The nine village kingdoms of the Umuezechima clan include
"Onicha Ugbo, Onicha Ukwu, Onicha Olona, Obior, Obomkpa,
Ezi, lssele-Ukwu, lssele-Azagba, and Issele-Mkpituime.
Nzimiro’s four Niger States consisted of Oguta, Onitsha,
Ossomari and Aboh. Other parts of the traditional Igbo
society that established the equivalent of "village
kingdoms" were Nri, Arochukwu (East Niger) and Asaba and
Agbor (West Niger)".
Ejiofor therefore argued "The traditional Igbo systems may
he divided into two major types, namely, the democratic and
monarchical". He continued: "west of the Niger, village
kingdoms are the rule rather than the exception in Igbo
communities". Furthermore, he observed that even the
democratic model did have chiefs, but quickly added, "these
were at best symbolic heads of village groups . . . and
their primacy was honorific rather than jurisdictional". Of
this class of chiefs, G. I. Jones noted (in 1950) thus: ". .
.. chiefs of the type envisaged . . . as "strong chiefs"
(except) with a few exceptions (did) not exist in this
region. The people who are usually referred to as chiefs,
and there can be any number of them today, have no
executive, judicial or legislative powers vested solely in
their office."
Chief Obafemi Awolowo similarly observed that "save in very
few places there were no natural rulers in Eastern Nigeria
of the stature and jurisdiction of those in the North, West
or Midwest" (Benin areas).
But Lugard *"manufactured"* them, as wealthy and influential
persons were made *"natural rulers"* by warrant. On his
appointment, a warrant chief became the paramount for a
specified area, enjoying the same authority and privileges
and subject to the same limitations as a natural ruler in
the North or West or Midwest. Even this daring innovation
succeeded for well over a decade.
*
For the purposes of a holistic perspective to the contending
issues, I wish to call attention at this juncture to Prof.
Onwuejogwu’s seminal thoughts in this regard which led him
to classify the political system of the Igbo Culture Area
into three broad categories, namely, the *centralized,
gerontocratic and consensus or non-centralized models*.
According to this classification, the centralized model is
characterized by segmentary lineages, theocratic or secular
kingship, less differentiated Ozo or Eze title system and
age grades and associations, which could be located in Nri,
Onitsha, Aboh, Ogwashi-Uku, Issele-Uku, Oguta, Agbor and
Arochukwu.
The characteristics of the gerontocratic model include
segmentary lineages, chiefship or headship and sometimes,
hyper-gerontocracy, less differentiated Ozo or Eze title
system, hyper-age grades with key examples as Ibagwani,
Ibusa, llla, Okpanam, Asaba etc. The non-centralized model
with Owerri, Mbaise and Ngwa as classical examples contains
features such as segmentary lineages, age-grades,
undifferentiated Ozo or Eze title system, councils and
associations. These wield sound social muscles which when
applied can exert maximum weight and compel alteration or
proper conditioning of the individual and group.
Complex and dynamic as the evolutionary trend of Igbo social
control mechanism is, the archetypal political system
retains a strong element of the segmentary lineage system,
which is known as "Umunna", which in extension is as
politically potent as it is corrective of deviance.
The principal elements in the comparative differentiation of
political systems in traditional societies are the degree of
specialization in roles that enter into the political and
administrative spheres, the number of structural levels at
which authority is exercised in addition to the context and
changing patterns of the social relationship between those
who exercise authority -- be it horizontal or vertical --
and the rest over whom authority is exercised.
It is by appreciating that social diffusion with its
inherent *non-centrality* of features, that we can begin to
come to terms with the fact that although some Igbo
communities had managed to construct centralized,
monarchical systems prior to the earliest contact with the
white man, on the aggregate, such communities constituted a
minority, albeit a significant one at that.
*
Invariably, not one of these communities or kingdoms managed
to make the vital transition from communalism to *full-blown
centrality*. We speak of *centrality* in this sense as a
specific mode of statecraft, as well as a system of social
organization, including the control of deviant behaviours.
The point can hardly be overstated that the period of
transition from diffuse social system to a level of
*centrality* -- in those African societies that managed to
advance beyond non-centrality -- was one of state formation.
The roles of institutions such as the village general
assembly, with the village square (Obodo) as chambers, the
age grade society, coupled with those of the daughters’
assembly (Umuada), the masquerade society, the secret
society and the Ozo title society were intertwined,
complementary and inevitably mutually reinforced each other.
Their essence and vitality lay in their functionality,
reverence and sheer effectiveness in achieving social
cohesion and broad consensus. In many cases, they served the
diplomatic roles and effectively broke deadlocks for the
society to move forward. In some other cases, they interpret
the norms of the society and cry for enforcement of social
control to terminate deviancy. In fact, security in the
typical Igbo setting is matter for social control and
reordering.
In each case of course, each village was autonomous and
managed its own affairs in spheres as diverse as religion,
festivals, medicare, administration of justice, exercise of
sanctions, etc.
Inter-village relations were characterized by the formation
of federations of two or more villages especially in times
of war. The extended family system provided a second-tier
thread that held component units of the village together,
enabling them to share and fend for one another in both good
and difficult times.
The question now is this: In the event that it was largely
democratic, it was completely consensus, it was never
centered on any powerful monarch, how would such threatening
social conducts such as crime and other deviant acts be tackled?
According to Prof. Richard Okafor, social control can hardly
ever come to fruition in Igboland if it is a business of an
individual. It comes from established elements of culture,
which "protect precious tenets of the social environment
from erosion or degradation." And paradoxically, though
every Igbo community possesses highly individualized
citizenry, the aggregate life is fully shaped according to
the cherished traditions, hallowed secrets and revered
institutions that usually ensure that any member who
violates any of them is severely punished. The yam thief is
a yam thief, it does not matter who his kith and kin are, he
must be exiled. The murderer has murdered a life and must,
as determined by the degree of crime, face death or be exiled.
The most potent of Igbo social control systems, which also
underlined appropriate security measures, is the age-old
pattern of stigmatizing crime or any other deviant
behaviour. In the sub-cultures along the Anambra River,
Ojebeogene, Ugwunye and Ezedike clans in northern Igboland,
it is common to stigmatise crime by smear public parade
(inya ncha or ite unyi) forced on culprits. In the case of a
thief he is hoisted with the stolen item and paraded through
the village square where every person, in passing or on
invitation, inflicts his/her own form of insult to the culprit.
*
For such deviant behaviours as immorality, infidelity of the
wife (mind you, never of the husband), abortion, adultery,
etc, it is usually made public by specialist minstrels who
mock by mimicking such obscene conduct in socially
reprehensible ways.
In the various okumkpo festival scenes in Afikpo, they move
in a *conscious, planned, exaggerated manner, saying
unorthodox things; acting differently than they do*, and
lampooning miscreants and other deviants. That way, such
culprits are thoroughly discredited and stigmatized to the
extent that they may even leave the community for a long
period of time. In some cases as in some northern Igboland,
these are never said directly but insinuated in ways that
stigmatise families and kindred. Such may compel a family or
kindred to force or arrange safe passage of the culprit into
exile.
Indeed, the potency of social stigma is such in Igbo world
that families and kindred can pledge away any item,
including precious land, to stave off the stigma, if possible.
Where there is any semblance of central authority, its job
is made easier by this but such personages who are of
elevated social ranks in the land also pass through the same
beam of the searchlight of probity and are brought through
the same trial if found wanting.
The fact of Igbo justice system being a leveler rides the
belief that laws are derived from God (divine) and before
God, all men are equal. As pointed out by Okafor, F.U, such
belief formed the bases for consolidation of the diffuse
system, which prevented an undertaking of such phenomenal
structuring of the society for the benefit of some
privileged persons. Perhaps, such supremacy of divine laws
over man-made laws actually sustained long adherence to what
is adjudged right for the benefit of long-held traditions.
In reality, attendant upon the fact of Igbo laws being
*effective instrument of social harmony, moral rectitude and
political order*, natural laws, some of which are considered
divine injunctions, form the most potent foundation for well
being as they further underline the elements of
characteristics of man-made laws such as *reasonableness,
common good, sufficiency, legitimacy and harmony with
traditions*.
*
This foundation consolidates the security of the society
where the rules are made and known and where deviance is
interpreted as a burden of family and kindred.
And although the societal assembly (0ha Obodo, in the case
of the whole community or ama/ogbe in the case of village
wards) may represent a variegation of interests and
competitive factors, the possibility of positions running
counter to divine laws stands as checks or restraints to
would-be dominators. This prevents the emergence of a
one-sided pursuit or centrality of order of enactments,
which can confer undue privileges and create avenues for the
subversion of the society.
Indeed, Ndigbo see any form of pre-eminence in the village
assembly as an unbridled outspokenness, which must be
checked to prevent tyranny. According to Victor Uchendu,
"they are jealous of their legislative authority and are not
ready to surrender it to a small group of individuals." To
this effect, they consider the validity and security of
their social environment on the strength of divine
inspiration (not just the view of man) in the making of the
laws, which informs the pattern of proclaiming a law with
the ofo (signifying uprightness) depicting that every
contribution and indeed the law, have been reached according
to the custom of the land. It is like an oath to uphold the
laws of the land and never to be a part of any form of
subversion.
But whereas we can say that these sustained the primordial
polities, what obtains at the moment is at best an admixture
of the old values and new ways, most of which confuse the
modern man and induce excuses for violation of the laws.
Colonialism and indeed, post colonial African polities,
appeared confused about what should constitute their social
evolution and political order as in rising to the challenges
of complex security questions negating modern mechanisms for
restraining of the unbridled quest.
In the case of the modern Igbo societies, what with the
multiplicity of chieftaincies, the negation of the age old
social order which effectively informed character and
decency, has expectedly set the stage for an exercise of
such looming communality affirmation which checkmated
unbridled individual assertiveness.
To worsen matters, the stage set by Luggard himself, as in
appointing paramount chiefs just among the rich and
influential without regard to community feeling or
preference, seriously removed any form of credibility that
would have been due some of such emerging chieftaincies. In
some cases actually, Luggard just appointed such oppressive
middle men either involved in the hateful slave dealing
regime or the down-pricing of produces of which they (the
middle men) reaped bountifully.
*
But if we excuse Luggard on grounds of ignorance, (and for
the fact that his indirect rule system collapsed there in
his face), the manner of appointing some of the
chieftaincies by successive indigenous administrations
seriously altered community prestige and stabilizing
institutions. It has even been worsened by the failure of a
majority of these chiefs to appreciate their own peculiar
social environment. They rather sought an invention of the
pomp and grandeur of the empire situations in Oyo, Sokoto,
Kano, Benin and Borno, by initiating and indeed undertaking
expensive ceremonies as a replication of age-old panoplies.
This done in total negation of the true age-old Igbo
political and social scenario described by Isichei. "One of
the things that struck the first western visitors to
Igboland", observed the historian, "was the extent to which
democracy was truly practised".
According to her, "an early visitor to a Niger Igbo town
said that he felt he was in a free land, among a free
people". Elsewhere, another French visitor observed of the
people that indeed true liberty existed in Igboland,
although its name was not inscribed in any monument.
So, whereas it was true that the institutions of the old
order sustained the socio-political order of that era,
particularly with due respect to the belief system ordaining
ceaseless morality and rectitude, the current regime of
social order faces credibility question on account of
rejection of such restraining elements of the social
environment which attenuated excessive assertiveness. In
fact, it is in this area of excessive assertiveness, as
pointed out by Emenne, that a vitiation of the fabric of
social order was regrettably consummated.
But all is not lost. The chieftaincies have shown remarkable
abilities in building welters of information network for
government, such that security can be easily guaranteed with
movements and peculiar conducts duly interpreted by the
chieftains. This is even enhanced by the emergence of a new
and wealthy chieftaincy class with backgrounds in academics,
business, professions, law, medicine and the other callings,
who are capable of situating their social environments to
suit national security arrangements.
But in the event that it is finally appreciated that the
various chieftaincies have imbibed what it would take to
achieve social order, the deciding question now is on the
extent the nation state can tolerate the national variety as
to accommodate distinct polities in security of the
societies. If that is done, and if it is pursued, bearing in
mind that most of security issues rested on local factors
the fabric of which is defined in locality context, the
reversal of trends in deviant behaviours would have been
reached and for which we declare, as usual, in Enugu State:
To God be the Glory.
Governor Chimaroke Nnamani, Executive Governor of Enugu
State contributed this to the National Conference on
Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria, dedicated to the 40th
anniversary of the ascension to the throne of His Royal
Highness, the Emir of Kano, Alhaji (Dr.) Ado Bayero.
REACTIONS
Send your typewritten reactions with detailed address to
Editor, Vanguard Letters, PMB 1007, Apapa, Lagos.
E-mail:
mailto:letters@vanguardngr.com
--
Dan Clore
Now available: _The Unspeakable and Others_
http://www.wildsidepress.com/index2.htm
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1587154838/thedanclorenecro
Lord Weÿrdgliffe & Necronomicon Page:
http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/9879/
News for Anarchists & Activists:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo
"It's a political statement -- or, rather, an
*anti*-political statement. The symbol for *anarchy*!"
-- Batman, explaining the circle-A graffiti, in
_Detective Comics_ #608 |
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