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| Science Forum Index » Medicine - Lyme Forum » WWIII On The Table; French Diversion of Iranian... |
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| Mort Zuckerman... |
 Posted: Sat Oct 31, 2009 12:12 am |
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Subject: WWIII On The Table; French Diversion of Iranian Uranium
*Intended* to be Intolerable
Date: Oct 31, 2009 6:11 AM
Excellent.
In this game Russia holds all
the cards. I think they called
it Securing the Realm:
http://www.iasps.org/strat1.htm
"We can blackmail Congress with the stolen weapons information, which
we did and do:"
"Mr. Netanyahu can highlight his desire to cooperate more closely with
the United States on anti-missile defense in order to remove the
threat of blackmail which even a weak and distant army can pose to
either state. Not only would such cooperation on missile defense
counter a tangible physical threat to Israel’s survival, but it would
broaden Israel’s base of support among many in the United States
Congress who may know little about Israel, but care very much about
missile defense ($$ Ka-Ching). Such broad support could be helpful in
the effort to move the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem."
Blackmail, Weapons Thefts:
http://amconmag.com/article/2009/nov/01/00006/
"move the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem."
???
http://www.actionlyme.org
=========================
http://original.antiwar.com/prather/2009/10/30/on-the-eve-of-wwiii/
On the Eve of WWIII?
by Gordon Prather, October 31, 2009
Email This | Print This | Share This | Comment | Antiwar Forum
Can you believe it? We may be on the eve of World War III because a
research reactor near Tehran – that mostly produces radioactive
isotopes for use in medicine, and is subject to a Safeguards Agreement
with the International Atomic Energy Agency – will need refueling in a
year or so.
How could that need result in WWIII?
Well, thereby hangs a tale.
With respect to the Tehran Research Reactor, the Iranians have
essentially three options.
[1] The Iranians want to purchase replacement fuel – which is uranium
with the U-235 isotope enriched to about 20% – as they did in 1992
(from Argentina). But, because of the U.S. and UN imposed sanctions on
Iran, it seems unlikely that Argentina or any other HEU producing
nation would or could sell Iran the needed fuel.
[2] The Iranians could modify their existing IAEA-Safeguarded uranium-
enrichment cascades – currently configured so as to produce enriched-
uranium with the U-235 isotope enriched to less than 5% – to IAEA-
Safeguarded cascades capable of producing 20% U-235. But the Iranians
don’t want to do that because it would be "uneconomic." Besides, if
the Likudniks seem hell-bent on destroying Iran’s LEU cascades, just
imagine how they would react to Iran having HEU cascades.
[3] The Iranians could just shut down the Tehran Research Reactor and
get out of the medical isotope business, at least temporarily. After
all, the much larger 40 MW natural-uranium fueled, heavy water
moderated, reactor under construction at Arak, will be operational not
long after TRR runs out of fuel, capable of producing not only a
significant fraction of the world’s medical isotopes, but will
inevitably produce significant quantities of weapons-grade Plutonium
in its spent natural-uranium fuel, as well. You can perhaps imagine
what the Likudniks think about that option.
Fortunately, Mohamed ElBaradei – the outgoing Director-General of the
IAEA Secretariat – has proposed a fourth option.
Iran would ship most of its uranium (already enriched to about 4%
U-235 for contingent use in the Russian-built 1000 MWe nuclear power
plant soon to begin operation at Bushehr) to Russia, where it would be
further enriched to about 20% U-235.
The proposed agreement would call for Russia to "sub-contract" the
production of the highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel elements, to a
French entity.
The problem is that the French have now demanded that all the Iranian
HEU be shipped to them from Russia at one time, not in batches, and
the Iranians – understandably, on the basis of their past experience
with Eurodif and the French – have reportedly declined to agree to
that.
Why have the French taken that position? Well, it seems they believe
that if the Iranians are allowed to send their LEU to Russia and their
HEU, thence, to France in batches, the Israelis will feel that they
will have no alternative but to attack and destroy the IAEA-
Safeguarded facilities at Natanz, Arak and elsewhere.
How would most of the world react to that?
Well, take the wanton destruction of Arak, an IAEA-Safeguarded medical-
isotope production facility.
Radioisotope Molydenum-99, is a "daughter" product of the fission of
Uranium-235, when used as a "target," in the reactor. Moly-99 promptly
decays to another radioisotope, Technetium-99, which is used as a
"tracer" in tens of thousands of medical procedures every day in the
United States.
Canada has just announced it is getting out of the medical isotope
business. Hence, the principal source for that Moly-99 – and hence,
for Tc-99, the short-lived tracer – will probably be Russia. And,
perhaps in a few years, Iran.
Why does that matter? Moly-99 has a decay half-life of only 67 hours.
If you make a batch of Moly-99, after 67 hours, half of it is gone.
And since the half-life of the daughter, Tc-99, is so much shorter –
only 6 hours – when half of your Moly-99 supply is gone, so,
essentially, is half of your Tc-99 tracer. That means that nuclear
medical men need a freshly brewed batch of Moly-99 ever week or so.
Now it is very desirable for a radioactive tracer to have a short half-
life. The Tc-99 is injected into the patient shortly before the
medical procedure begins and by the time the procedure is over half of
it has decayed away. In a few days time, the Tc-99 radioactivity
remaining in the patient is practically undetectable.
Since it has such a short half-life, it is necessary that Tc-99 be
produced only shortly before it is actually needed. Moly-99
continually produces Tc-99 by beta-decay, which means that "mother"
and "daughter" are different chemical elements and can easily be
separated chemically.
Moly-99 is one of the most likely isotopes to be produced in
Uranium-235 fission. In the most economic production process, highly
enriched uranium (HEU) – 93.5 percent Uranium-235 – is plated on a
target and irradiated in a nuclear reactor.
The United States has attempted to completely eliminate the use of HEU
by the private sector.
The Schumer Amendment to the Energy Policy Act of 1992 resulted in –
among other things – restrictions on exports of our HEU to Moly-99
producers. Our Nuclear Regulatory Commission is prohibited from
issuing a license for the export of HEU to Moly-99 producers unless,
a) there are no LEU targets available and the Moly-99 producer
promises that whenever LEU targets do become available that, b) he
will switch to them.
But guess what. The recovery of Moly-99 from LEU targets effectively
involves the reprocessing of "spent fuel," and most medical-isotope
producers are reluctant to get involved in the associated regulatory
mess. Even in their March 23, 2005 confidential offer to the French-
Brits-Germans – ostensibly then negotiating on behalf of the European
Union – the Iranians, among other things, offered to voluntarily
restrict certain of their inalienable rights, including foregoing the
reprocessing of spent fuel and the recovery of plutonium, there-from.
So, now we have the French – with some alleged EU support – refusing
to allow the "batch" production of replacement fuel for the TRR. Which
probably means the Iranians will just shut down that IAEA-Safeguarded
medical-isotope producing facility in a year or so.
Worse, the Iranians will not only keep all the LEU they have thus far
produced at their IAEA-Safeguarded facilities, but will produce more,
if the Israelis don’t attack and destroy them.
Worse still, if the Israelis attack and destroy the IAEA-Safeguarded
natural-uranium fueled, heavy-water moderated, medical-isotope
producing reactor nearing completion at Arak, that may be, as far as
the rest of the world is concerned, the straw that broke the camel’s
back. Who knows, we may even have World War III on our hands.
"[Real] scientists are *fiercely* independent. That's the good
news."-- NIH's Top Fool, Anthony Fauci |
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| Richard... |
| Posted: Sat Oct 31, 2009 1:09 am |
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On Oct 31, 4:12 am, Mort Zuckerman <morph... at (no spam) yahoo.com> spammed:
WTF does this have to do with
sci.military.naval.lyme.wingnuts.whackjobs?
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