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John Jones
Posted: Thu May 29, 2008 4:11 pm
Joined: 26 Oct 2004 Posts: 4263
There can be no negation of a single object or variable. There is no
legitimate proposition of the sort "not-x", or "not a car" or "a
non-car". Such expressions always imply a class to which, in this case,
the car belongs, such as the class of machines or red objects. Let us
make a rule: Rule 1) Negation moves an object or variable from one group
to another group, such as moving a car from a group of red cars to a
group of differently coloured cars.

However, this leads to an asymmetry between a proposition and its
negation, for while a red car is one colour, its colour negation could
be any number of colours.

We can resolve this asymmetry by marking out another rule: Rule 2)
Negation, in moving objects from one group to another, drops the
particular case. Thus "not a red car" or more awkwardly, "a non-red car"
stipulates no more than that the car that is this colour is now that
colour. The particular colour, in this case red, drops out of
consideration.

Objection: If we describe negation in this way - voiding the particular
case, then we lose information (the fact that it was a "red" car) even
if, granted, it is at the expense of gaining symmetry between
propositions and their negations. Responding to that, we can fall back
on rule 1: singular terms cannot be negated except where such terms
entertain a suppressed property. So in this case, if we want to retain
the fact that the coloured car we have negated is red, then we must
stipulate a group to which the term red belongs. In this case, we cannot
say that the group to which red belongs is the group of cars. For then
the negation refers to car and not red - "a red non-car", rather than
the original proposition "a non-red car".
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MoeBlee...
Posted: Thu May 29, 2008 4:11 pm
Guest
On May 29, 2:11 pm, John Jones <jonescard... at (no spam) aol.com> wrote:

Quote:
Let us
make a rule

No, let's not make any of your harebrained rules.

MoeBlee
...
Posted: Thu May 29, 2008 4:11 pm
Guest
On 29 May, 22:11, John Jones <jonescard... at (no spam) aol.com> wrote:
Quote:
There can be no negation of a single object or variable. There is no
legitimate proposition of the sort "not-x", or "not a car" or "a
non-car". Such expressions always imply a class to which, in this case,
the car belongs, such as the class of machines or red objects.


You might take 'NOT' as predicating the complement of a set or class.

Then I guess you need a distinction:

-- sets = Universe of entities (e.g. cars: "any/all cars",
enumerable);

-- classes = Universe of attributes (e.g. red: "any/all *things* red",
potential);

== atom = Any (singleton?) intersection between sets and classes,
itself its own singleton class-set under identity.(?)

An atom becomes sort of pure symbol: an unpredicated symbol retains
the whole potential across the entire domain. This is another form of
the empty-prevalence:

Empty = (unpredicated-X) = Universe

NOT-Empty = NOT-(unpredicated-X) = NOT-Universe

We do not lose any information, we rather stipulate a limit, the limit
being expressed by negating the universal notion, and the universal
symbol with it.

Informally, that limit might read: you can predicate those x's that
belong to the universe of discourse, with its given symbols and
postulated attributes. The rest is (just) not within that universe...

-LV


Let us
Quote:
make a rule: Rule 1) Negation moves an object or variable from one group
to another group, such as moving a car from a group of red cars to a
group of differently coloured cars.

However, this leads to an asymmetry between a proposition and its
negation, for while a red car is one colour, its colour negation could
be any number of colours.

We can resolve this asymmetry by marking out another rule: Rule 2)
Negation, in moving objects from one group to another, drops the
particular case. Thus "not a red car" or more awkwardly, "a non-red car"
stipulates no more than that the car that is this colour is now that
colour. The particular colour, in this case red, drops out of
consideration.

Objection: If we describe negation in this way - voiding the particular
case, then we lose information (the fact that it was a "red" car) even
if, granted, it is at the expense of gaining symmetry between
propositions and their negations. Responding to that, we can fall back
on rule 1: singular terms cannot be negated except where such terms
entertain a suppressed property. So in this case, if we want to retain
the fact that the coloured car we have negated is red, then we must
stipulate a group to which the term red belongs. In this case, we cannot
say that the group to which red belongs is the group of cars. For then
the negation refers to car and not red - "a red non-car", rather than
the original proposition "a non-red car".
MoeBlee...
Posted: Thu May 29, 2008 4:11 pm
Guest
On May 29, 2:38 pm, John Jones <jonescard... at (no spam) aol.com> wrote:
Quote:
MoeBlee wrote:
On May 29, 2:11 pm, John Jones <jonescard... at (no spam) aol.com> wrote:

Let us
make a rule

No, let's not make any of your harebrained rules.

What do you do here mobly? I mean really? troll, snipe and run?

Snipe at cranks and poseurs sometimes, yes. Also, I post in a varieity
of other ways, including answering questions and helping out with
questions, asking questions thereby making good use of the generosity
of the experts here who are kind in sharing their knowledge,
discussing various mathematical and philosophical matters, and
refuting cranks.

Quote:
you must
be the local pain in the arse

I don't doubt that cranks and poseurs find me a pain.

Quote:
who thinks he has a stake in the
neignbourhood.

I've never indicated any special concern or sense of that kind.

MoeBlee
John Jones
Posted: Thu May 29, 2008 4:38 pm
Joined: 26 Oct 2004 Posts: 4263
MoeBlee wrote:
Quote:
On May 29, 2:11 pm, John Jones <jonescard... at (no spam) aol.com> wrote:

Let us
make a rule

No, let's not make any of your harebrained rules.

MoeBlee


What do you do here mobly? I mean really? troll, snipe and run? you must
be the local pain in the arse who thinks he has a stake in the
neignbourhood.
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Jan Burse...
Posted: Thu May 29, 2008 5:32 pm
Guest
John Jones schrieb:

Quote:
Let us make a rule:

And this might make sense and might not make sense.
There is no definite answer to the "problem" of
negation.

Negation is often tight to the comprehension that
is available. For example in ZFC we do not find
a definition of the complement of a set.

Rather we can use the ZFC comprehension to arrive
at a set y \ x for every set x and every set y.
Namely the following is a legal comprehension
in ZFC:

{ z in y | ~(z in x) }

But y \ x is a relative complement, and not an
absolute complement. Now having a relative
complement is not the end of the story.

Other theories offer other forms of complement
just by having another form of comprehension.
Examples:

- In von Neumann set theory, where comprehension
over sets generally gives classes and is allowed,
we find that the unrestricted complement of a set
does exist, but it is a class. Thus

{ z | ~(z in x) }

gives a class.

- In theories with recursive comprehension, nowadays
found in reverse mathematics, we find the
unrestricted complement of a set exists,
when the set is a recursive. Thus

{ z | ~(z in x) }

will be also recursive.

So:

Quote:
There is no legitimate proposition of the sort
"not-x", or "not a car" or "a non-car". Such
expressions always imply a class to which,

Wrong, wrong...


Etc..
John Jones
Posted: Sat May 31, 2008 3:08 pm
Joined: 26 Oct 2004 Posts: 4263
julio at (no spam) diegidio.name wrote:
Quote:
On 29 May, 22:11, John Jones <jonescard... at (no spam) aol.com> wrote:
There can be no negation of a single object or variable. There is no
legitimate proposition of the sort "not-x", or "not a car" or "a
non-car". Such expressions always imply a class to which, in this case,
the car belongs, such as the class of machines or red objects.


You might take 'NOT' as predicating the complement of a set or class.

OK. I might remove the reference to complement.

Quote:
Then I guess you need a distinction:

-- sets = Universe of entities (e.g. cars: "any/all cars",
enumerable);

-- classes = Universe of attributes (e.g. red: "any/all *things* red",
potential);

== atom = Any (singleton?) intersection between sets and classes,
itself its own singleton class-set under identity.(?)

I'm not sure about the efficacy of the model of an 'intersection'. An
intersection of lines creates a point, but I can't see that as a working
model for sets. I also have difficulty in seeing how sets are 'related'.
A set of cutlery and a set of knives are not related by virtue of being
sets.

Quote:
An atom becomes sort of pure symbol: an unpredicated symbol retains
the whole potential across the entire domain. This is another form of
the empty-prevalence:

By symbol we could mean the criteria for being a certain object whether
or not that object exists. But a symbol always delivers a meaning, by
definition, so ...

Quote:
Empty = (unpredicated-X) = Universe

Empty could be of course a synonym for no objects, or it could more
awkwardly be a synonym for the manifesting conditions of objects.

Quote:
NOT-Empty = NOT-(unpredicated-X) = NOT-Universe

We do not lose any information, we rather stipulate a limit, the limit
being expressed by negating the universal notion, and the universal
symbol with it.

Informally, that limit might read: you can predicate those x's that
belong to the universe of discourse, with its given symbols and
postulated attributes. The rest is (just) not within that universe...

-LV
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John Jones
Posted: Sat May 31, 2008 3:14 pm
Joined: 26 Oct 2004 Posts: 4263
William Elliot wrote:
Quote:
On Thu, 29 May 2008, John Jones wrote:

There can be no negation of a single object or variable. There is no
legitimate proposition of the sort "not-x", or "not a car" or "a
non-car".

You're absolutely right onward. 'not' is not a uniary
logical operator but a binary logical operator. For example,
Obama not Hillary.

I would take that as a description of negation if we want to keep the
particular case. But I was saying that negation is not really about
particular cases but is about moving from one group to another, or
identifying another group. We don't need particular's to do that and
asserting a binary structure doesn't convey the fcat that we have moved
from one structure to another.

Quote:
However, this leads to an asymmetry between a proposition and its
negation, for while a red car is one colour, its colour negation could
be any number of colours.

Greatly so, there is vastly much more in the not what ever, than in the
whatever, which is just a mere whatever and not the everything else.

----
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Wonderer...
Posted: Sat May 31, 2008 10:22 pm
Guest
William Elliot <marsh at (no spam) hevanet.remove.com> wrote:

Quote:
You're absolutely right onward. 'not' is not a uniary
logical operator but a binary logical operator. For example,
Obama not Hillary.


Interesting comment. Let's assume a discussion between two
interlocutors A and B:

A: Who are you going to vote for?
B: Obama, not Hillary.

It could look like 'not' is acting as a binary operator. But I'm not
persuaded that that's the case. Certainly in formal logics 'not' is
defined as a unary operator (is there an exception?). But even in
natural language "Obama, not Hillary" has no meaning out of context.
And when we add meaningful context, then the appearance of being a
binary-operator seems to fade away.

For example, in the context above, "Obama, not Hillary" means:

I'm voting for Obama and I'm not voting for Hillary.

So when we give it meaning (and thus make it truth valuable) it seems
we find that 'not' operates in a fashion consistent with its defined
role in classical logics. In short, it's acting as a unary' operator
applied to the statement: "Voting for Hillary." No? ~Wonderer
Wonderer...
Posted: Sat May 31, 2008 11:15 pm
Guest
Wonderer <iam at (no spam) here.now> wrote:

Quote:
William Elliot <marsh at (no spam) hevanet.remove.com> wrote:

You're absolutely right onward. 'not' is not a uniary
logical operator but a binary logical operator. For example,
Obama not Hillary.


Interesting comment. Let's assume a discussion between two
interlocutors A and B:

A: Who are you going to vote for?
B: Obama, not Hillary.

It could look like 'not' is acting as a binary operator. But I'm not
persuaded that that's the case. Certainly in formal logics 'not' is
defined as a unary operator (is there an exception?). But even in
natural language "Obama, not Hillary" has no meaning out of context.
And when we add meaningful context, then the appearance of being a
binary-operator seems to fade away.

For example, in the context above, "Obama, not Hillary" means:

I'm voting for Obama and I'm not voting for Hillary.

So when we give it meaning (and thus make it truth valuable) it seems
we find that 'not' operates in a fashion consistent with its defined
role in classical logics. In short, it's acting as a unary' operator
applied to the statement: "Voting for Hillary." No? ~Wonderer

Actually I think the 'not' applies to the binary operator:

Votes(b,obama) & -(Votes(b,hillary))

Where Votes(x,y) means: "x votes for y."

So in the voting example above, "Obama, not Hillary," the 'not' is not
a binary but a unary operator applied to the suppressed binary
operator 'Votes'. So, again, I'm not persuaded that 'not' is not a
unary operator. ~Wonderer
Wonderer...
Posted: Sun Jun 01, 2008 10:08 pm
Guest
John Jones <jonescardiff at (no spam) aol.com> wrote:
Quote:

The significance of action of a negation will not be found in any mooted
binary or unary property. This fails to distinguish between, or makes
equivalent, x and not-x. The signifcance of a negation is that its an
action, moving from one group to another.

Indeed, nobody should be under the delusion that logical operators
and definitions capture the rich complexity of concepts, meaning, and
expressions in natural language (NL). The if-then operator for example
only captures a fragment of what "if...then" means in NL, and may even
violate some of our natural intuitions for such an 'operator'.

But I don't see you're view of negation as moving members of one set
to another as exactly contrary to logical negation. For example, the
definition of 'not' in type theory is a function that maps statements
to their negation. In type theory 'not' is an expression of type
<t,t>, which is a type of expression that if applied to an expression
of type t (type t expressions are truth valuable statements) results
in an expression of type t. And <t,t> is a function. ~Wonderer
Wonderer...
Posted: Sun Jun 01, 2008 11:41 pm
Guest
William Elliot <marsh at (no spam) rdrop.remove.com> wrote:

Quote:
But even in natural language "Obama, not Hillary" has no meaning out of
context.

Bah, "Food, not bombs!"

But we understand a meaning for "Food, not bombs!" because we
recognize it as a popular slogan for those who *want* food, not bombs.
But it could also mean:

Speaker A: What should we stop producing?
Speaker B: Food, not bombs!

So I suggest that what you're pointing to is modeled with lambda
abstraction over sets of entities and binary operators such that we'd
abstract upward from statement 1 to 3 as such:

1. Wants(a,food) & -(Wants(a,bombs)) = "a wants food and not bombs."

2. lambda.Y(lambda.x( Y(x,food) & -(Y(x,bombs))))

= "food and not bombs"

3. lambda.X(lambda.Y(lambda.x( Y(x,food) X -(Y(x,bombs)))))

= "food not bombs"

So 3 is then the meaning of "Food, not bombs." And in given contexts
listeners who understand that expression understand which members of
the sets over which we've abstracted are arguments in that
three-parameter function in line 3. That would in fact define what it
means to understand any "x not y" statement. ~Wonderer
John Jones
Posted: Tue Jun 03, 2008 1:49 pm
Joined: 26 Oct 2004 Posts: 4263
Wonderer wrote:
Quote:
John Jones <jonescardiff at (no spam) aol.com> wrote:
The significance of action of a negation will not be found in any mooted
binary or unary property. This fails to distinguish between, or makes
equivalent, x and not-x. The signifcance of a negation is that its an
action, moving from one group to another.

Indeed, nobody should be under the delusion that logical operators
and definitions capture the rich complexity of concepts, meaning, and
expressions in natural language (NL). The if-then operator for example
only captures a fragment of what "if...then" means in NL, and may even
violate some of our natural intuitions for such an 'operator'.

But I don't see you're view of negation as moving members of one set
to another as exactly contrary to logical negation. For example, the
definition of 'not' in type theory is a function that maps statements
to their negation.

Doesn't this definition assume as known what is still in contention? If
a definition of 'not' maps functions to their negation, we still require
a description of negation. So I can't see that as helpful.

In type theory 'not' is an expression of type
Quote:
t,t>, which is a type of expression that if applied to an expression
of type t (type t expressions are truth valuable statements) results
in an expression of type t. And <t,t> is a function. ~Wonderer

Again, if the glyph <..,..> means negation, I still require a definition
of negation.
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...
Posted: Thu Jun 05, 2008 1:11 pm
Guest
On 31 May, 21:08, John Jones <jonescard... at (no spam) aol.com> wrote:
Quote:
ju... at (no spam) diegidio.name wrote:
On 29 May, 22:11, John Jones <jonescard... at (no spam) aol.com> wrote:
There can be no negation of a single object or variable. There is no
legitimate proposition of the sort "not-x", or "not a car" or "a
non-car". Such expressions always imply a class to which, in this case,
the car belongs, such as the class of machines or red objects.

You might take 'NOT' as predicating the complement of a set or class.

OK. I might remove the reference to complement.


You are rather dropping my argument there. Anyway what I meant might
have been better said with reference to the definition of
complementation and the implied notion of universal reference domain:
~A = U \ A.


Quote:

Then I guess you need a distinction:

-- sets = Universe of entities (e.g. cars: "any/all cars",
enumerable);

-- classes = Universe of attributes (e.g. red: "any/all *things* red",
potential);

== atom = Any (singleton?) intersection between sets and classes,
itself its own singleton class-set under identity.(?)

I'm not sure about the efficacy of the model of an 'intersection'. An
intersection of lines creates a point, but I can't see that as a working
model for sets.


I indeed mean intersection between sets (maybe also called
disjunction?): A /\ B. The concept of "class" is very near to that of
"set" in all theories I am aware of.


Quote:
I also have difficulty in seeing how sets are 'related'.
A set of cutlery and a set of knives are not related by virtue of being
sets.


First, all sets are sets, and that's a relation of coformality. Then,
between cutlery and knives hold relations of many obvious kinds in
quite common universes of discourse.


Quote:

An atom becomes sort of pure symbol: an unpredicated symbol retains
the whole potential across the entire domain. This is another form of
the empty-prevalence:

By symbol we could mean the criteria for being a certain object whether
or not that object exists. But a symbol always delivers a meaning, by
definition, so ...

Empty = (unpredicated-X) = Universe

Empty could be of course a synonym for no objects, or it could more
awkwardly be a synonym for the manifesting conditions of objects.

NOT-Empty = NOT-(unpredicated-X) = NOT-Universe


Maybe the other way round:

NOT-Empty = NOT-(unpredicated-X) = Universe
Empty = unpredicated-X = NOT-Universe

-LV


Quote:

We do not lose any information, we rather stipulate a limit, the limit
being expressed by negating the universal notion, and the universal
symbol with it.

Informally, that limit might read: you can predicate those x's that
belong to the universe of discourse, with its given symbols and
postulated attributes. The rest is (just) not within that universe...

-LV-
...
Posted: Thu Jun 05, 2008 2:05 pm
Guest
On 6 Jun, 00:11, ju... at (no spam) diegidio.name wrote:
Quote:
On 31 May, 21:08, John Jones <jonescard... at (no spam) aol.com> wrote:

ju... at (no spam) diegidio.name wrote:
On 29 May, 22:11, John Jones <jonescard... at (no spam) aol.com> wrote:
There can be no negation of a single object or variable. There is no
legitimate proposition of the sort "not-x", or "not a car" or "a
non-car". Such expressions always imply a class to which, in this case,
the car belongs, such as the class of machines or red objects.

You might take 'NOT' as predicating the complement of a set or class.

OK. I might remove the reference to complement.

You are rather dropping my argument there. Anyway what I meant might
have been better said with reference to the definition of
complementation and the implied notion of universal reference domain:
~A = U \ A.

Then I guess you need a distinction:

-- sets = Universe of entities (e.g. cars: "any/all cars",
enumerable);

-- classes = Universe of attributes (e.g. red: "any/all *things* red",
potential);

== atom = Any (singleton?) intersection between sets and classes,
itself its own singleton class-set under identity.(?)

I'm not sure about the efficacy of the model of an 'intersection'. An
intersection of lines creates a point, but I can't see that as a working
model for sets.

I indeed mean intersection between sets (maybe also called
disjunction?): A /\ B. The concept of "class" is very near to that of
"set" in all theories I am aware of.

I also have difficulty in seeing how sets are 'related'.
A set of cutlery and a set of knives are not related by virtue of being
sets.

First, all sets are sets, and that's a relation of coformality. Then,
between cutlery and knives hold relations of many obvious kinds in
quite common universes of discourse.


Although, I had to peek up my dictionary to say that...

A great one to me is Strawson, "Introduction to Logical Theory".

-LV


Quote:

An atom becomes sort of pure symbol: an unpredicated symbol retains
the whole potential across the entire domain. This is another form of
the empty-prevalence:

By symbol we could mean the criteria for being a certain object whether
or not that object exists. But a symbol always delivers a meaning, by
definition, so ...

Empty = (unpredicated-X) = Universe

Empty could be of course a synonym for no objects, or it could more
awkwardly be a synonym for the manifesting conditions of objects.

NOT-Empty = NOT-(unpredicated-X) = NOT-Universe

Maybe the other way round:

NOT-Empty = NOT-(unpredicated-X) = Universe
Empty = unpredicated-X = NOT-Universe

-LV

We do not lose any information, we rather stipulate a limit, the limit
being expressed by negating the universal notion, and the universal
symbol with it.

Informally, that limit might read: you can predicate those x's that
belong to the universe of discourse, with its given symbols and
postulated attributes. The rest is (just) not within that universe...

-LV
 
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