Lester Zick wrote:
On Tue, 10 Jun 2008 21:59:22 +0100, John Jones <jonescardiff at (no spam) aol.com
wrote:

Lester Zick wrote:
On Thu, 29 May 2008 22:41:19 +0100, John Jones <jonescardiff at (no spam) aol.com
wrote:

Lester Zick wrote:
On Wed, 21 May 2008 23:18:09 +0100, John Jones <jonescardiff at (no spam) aol.com
wrote:

Lester Zick wrote:
On Fri, 16 May 2008 20:46:20 +0100, John Jones <jonescardiff at (no spam) aol.com
wrote:

Lester Zick wrote:
A Curious Question
~v~~

Is there anything which is not predicated of "not"?

~v~~
Any object you care to mention is not predicated of not.
Would you care to mention some and explain to us exactly how they're
not predicated of not?
'Not' is not predicated of any o bject,
It's "not"?

~v~~
Yes, it's not. I'm fine with that.
Except that you've just predicated "not" of "not".

~v~~
Yes. That's fine. 'Predicate' is ambiguous. It can mean property,
reference, association, grammatical or otherwise, or simply
juxtaposition; god knows what else. Don't use the word.

"Predicate" is no more ambiguous than its definition and I choose to
define it in terms of propertie to which a "thing" is subject. If you
choose to define "predicate" or anything else ambiguously, then of
course it will be ambiguous. There are no absolute definitions of
things floating around space, only definitions of "things" mutually
consistent with other "things" in a common reference frame, and
"subject" and "predicate" as I define them are perfectly consistent
and unambiguous in that regard. Nor can you appeal to definitions used
by others to insist that I have to use their definitions and that my
usage is ambiguous because the combination of all their various
definitions is.

~v~~

'Predicated not of not' - predicate looks like a juxtaposition to me.

On Tue, 10 Jun 2008 21:55:50 +0100, John Jones <jonescard... at (no spam) aol.com
wrote:

Why do you think there are so many philosophies floating around, none
of which are demonstrably correct and most of which are demonstrably
incorrect? Simply because no one has been able to achieve a
demonstrably true mechanical reduction of "actual meaning and
properties" to grammar and language". So philosophers just run off at
the mouth with their catalogs of "actual meanings and properties"
whose truth their language and grammar are useless to demonstrate.

Yes, you are talking about 'transcendent' objects and ideas - these have
no worldly basis.

But philosophers' stones do? Pure nonsense. No wonder philosophers
have stones: they need them to assert the categorical nonsense whose
truth they can't demonstrate.

~v~~
of course Lester in the modern simplicity of this mechanised world