zinnic wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
zinnic wrote:
Now explain to me the nature of a contentless consciousness.

No such thing.

So concede it is true that consciousness (ideas)) affects behaviour.

Consciousness is the existence of content, and consequently the notion
of contentless consciousness is a contradiction. Do you really conclude
from this that the *existence* of this content somehow interacts with the
content itself, thereby modulating its unfolding? Really?

"andy-k" wrote:
zinnic wrote:
So concede it is true that consciousness (ideas)) affects behaviour.

Consciousness is the existence of content, and consequently the
notion of contentless consciousness is a contradiction. Do you
really conclude from this that the *existence* of this content
somehow interacts with the content itself, thereby modulating its
unfolding? Really?

Silly! Consciousness is its content! We are agreed. It simply remains
for you to admit that it is true that consciousness affects behaviour.

Else retract your statement "Me" is an idea, like "tomorrow" is an
idea. "Tomorrow" affects behavior, like "me" affects behavior. "Me"
and "tomorrow" are aspects of the *contents* of consciousness."

In the absence of "Me" and "ideas" there is no container called
consciousness!.

On Apr 16, 2:49 pm, J Jones <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote:
Ed wrote:
On Apr 14, 4:13 pm, J Jones <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote:
Ed wrote:
Free will is not dependent on full consciousness of all mental
processes. We are not conscious of the processes by which we recall a
memory
Which 'processes' are we conscious of?
I am conscious of thinking about typing this post, as well as deciding
which words to use. Doing those things seems like a process. When I
solve an arithmetic problem I'm conscious of that process. When I
hurt, I decide what to do about it, take an aspirin or just lay down
and try to ignore it. So I'm conscious of the process that impels one
of those actions.
Where ordinary language would use the word "decide", it seems as if I
am conscious of the processes that accompany that.
What sort of processes are we not conscious of in remembering?- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

Example:
I see an actor on TV, my wife asks "What's that actor's name?". I
can't immediately remember; I stand there for a while and at first
nothing comes, suddenly the name pops into consciousness and I say
"That's John Mills!"
While I'm standing there silent some kind of activity is going on
looking for John Mill's name, perhaps checking associations, perhaps
testing various names to see if they "fit". All of that activity is a
process of which I am not conscious.

If asked, I could not say which
names were checked and rejected, the whole process took place outside
of my consciousness.

I suspect, but am not sure, that similar processes are going on even
when memory appears to be instantaneous. There is a "winnowing" that
we are not aware of.

So the kinds of processes seem to be the processes where there is a
"narrowing down" of the possible answers.

Another process is forgetting. I notice that, over time, I forget
certain things. I forget the date that a certain event occurred,
although I knew it at the time. I am not conscious of whatever
process "erases" that datum.

Ed wrote:
On Apr 16, 2:49 pm, J Jones <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote:
Ed wrote:
On Apr 14, 4:13 pm, J Jones <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote:
Ed wrote:
Free will is not dependent on full consciousness of all mental
processes.  We are not conscious of the processes by which we recall a
memory
Which 'processes' are we conscious of?
I am conscious of thinking about typing this post, as well as deciding
which words to use.  Doing those things seems like a process.  When I
solve an arithmetic problem I'm conscious of that process.  When I
hurt, I decide what to do about it, take an aspirin or just lay down
and try to ignore it.  So I'm conscious of the process that impels one
of those actions.
Where ordinary language would use the word "decide", it seems as if I
am conscious of the processes that accompany that.
What sort of processes are we not conscious of in remembering?- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

Example:
I see an actor on TV, my wife asks "What's that actor's name?".  I
can't immediately remember; I stand there for a while and at first
nothing comes, suddenly the name pops into consciousness and I say
"That's John Mills!"
While I'm standing there silent some kind of activity is going on
looking for John Mill's name, perhaps checking associations, perhaps
testing various names to see if they "fit".  All of that activity is a
process of which I am not conscious.  

That means that you must be surprised when you remember anything,
because it comes unexpectedly.

If asked, I could not say which
names were checked and rejected, the whole process took place outside
of my consciousness.

Would you have the same difficulty in describing processes you were
aware of?

No, if, for example I think how best to phrase this post I could

I suspect, but am not sure, that similar processes are going on even
when memory appears to be instantaneous.  There is a "winnowing" that
we are not aware of.

The term 'process' is misleading as it can refer to a material
substrate. But by definition we are unaware of a material substrate. So
it isn't that we are in some way 'causally' unaware.

So the kinds of processes seem to be the processes where there is a
"narrowing down" of the possible answers.

Another process is forgetting.  I notice that, over time, I forget
certain things.  I forget the date that a certain event occurred,
although I knew it at the time.  I am not conscious of whatever
process "erases" that datum.

I don't know what is meant by process here. If I forget something then
there is something I forgot. There isn't any 'process' associated with
that forgotten something, nor would talk of a 'process' seem pertinent
to the experience in any other way.

- Show quoted text -

From Wikipedia: "A process is a naturally occurring
or designed sequence of changes of properties
or attributes of an object or system."

Ed wrote:
From Wikipedia: "A process is a naturally occurring
or designed sequence of changes of properties
or attributes of an object or system."

This is interesting. What does that object or system
consist of in the absence of its properties?

Ed wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
Ed wrote:
From Wikipedia: "A process is a naturally occurring
or designed sequence of changes of properties
or attributes of an object or system."

This is interesting. What does that object or system
consist of in the absence of its properties?

Yes.  It's kind of like the old saw abut the boat which has rotten
planks replaced one after another until, eventually all the boards in
the boat have been replaced; is it still the same boat?  If so what is
a boat?

An object or system is never without properties; we would never call
it an object or system if it had no properties at all.  So we start
with something, the process changes it, and we end with something
different.

Minor quibble -- I would have said that "the process" simply *is* the
changes that the system undergoes, rather than something that changes
the system. I guess this is the point I was making with my comment copied
above -- the 'thing' (or system) consists of those properties (qualities,
attributes, whatever we want to call them) that remain constant for the
period over which other associated properties change (the 'process').
But when we give a name to such a system, the name may persist even
when *all* constitutive properties have changed (as in the "Ship of Theseus"
example that you allude to above). The very act of naming misleads us into
thinking that there is a thing that *possesses* those properties (hence the
name 'properties'). This, as I understand it, is the difference between
substance-based metaphysics ("things are real, even devoid of the properties
they might have") and process-based metaphysics. I see a connection here
with the philosophy of Heraclitus ("you can't step into the same river
twice") and also of Wittgenstein (things that share a name share a "family
resemblance" rather than some "essential attribute").

There have been many discusions of how one singles out "a" system or
object from the Universe at large, but here lets just assume we know
how to distinguish an object or system.

Mixing ingredients and baking a cake is a process.  At the beginning
we have not one object or system but several, the ingredients. After
the process we have a new object (we choose to regard it so), the
cake.

In the context of the discussion we start with a brain/body in one
state and end with a brain/body in a different state.  I call the
sequence of events relevant to that change a process.  Actually, of
course, the brain/body is changing in a multiplicity of ways, so I
would say there are a multiplicity of processes going on.

Or rather that the set of attributes undergoing change may be divided into
several different subsets, each of which we distinguish as a separate
'process'?
Sure! Except we know that there are many interdependencies between

- Show quoted text -

"andy-k" wrote:
Ed wrote:
From Wikipedia: "A process is a naturally occurring
or designed sequence of changes of properties
or attributes of an object or system."

This is interesting. What does that object or system
consist of in the absence of its properties?

Yes. It's kind of like the old saw abut the boat which has rotten
planks replaced one after another until, eventually all the boards in
the boat have been replaced; is it still the same boat? If so what is
a boat?

An object or system is never without properties; we would never call
it an object or system if it had no properties at all. So we start
with something, the process changes it, and we end with something
different.

There have been many discusions of how one singles out "a" system or
object from the Universe at large, but here lets just assume we know
how to distinguish an object or system.

Mixing ingredients and baking a cake is a process. At the beginning
we have not one object or system but several, the ingredients. After
the process we have a new object (we choose to regard it so), the
cake.

In the context of the discussion we start with a brain/body in one
state and end with a brain/body in a different state. I call the
sequence of events relevant to that change a process. Actually, of
course, the brain/body is changing in a multiplicity of ways, so I
would say there are a multiplicity of processes going on.

"andy-k" wrote:
Or rather that the set of attributes undergoing change may be
divided into several different subsets, each of which we distinguish
as a separate 'process'?

Sure! Except we know that there are many interdependencies between
all the changes, so many that any mapping of that kind may change when
we have more data on how the body/brain/mind actually works, on a
cellular level.

Ed wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
Or rather that the set of attributes undergoing change may be
divided into several different subsets, each of which we distinguish
as a separate 'process'?

Sure!  Except we know that there are many interdependencies between
all the changes, so many that any mapping of that kind may change when
we have more data on how the body/brain/mind actually works, on a
cellular level.

Yes, the different processes are subsets of the larger set, so the processes
arise in mutual relationship and inter-dependence.

All of your arguments are mathmatical in nature.

"thinking ahead" is just purely stupid.

ahead of what? whats thinking?

doing something that does not involve "thinking"
should be considered to be "ahead".

like a reaction.

thinking is not ahead. thinking is behind.

ps - sorry to be rude.

zinnic wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
zinnic wrote:
So concede it is true that consciousness (ideas)) affects behaviour.

Consciousness is the existence of content, and consequently the
notion of contentless consciousness is a contradiction. Do you
really conclude from this that the *existence* of this content
somehow interacts with the content itself, thereby modulating its
unfolding? Really?

Silly! Consciousness is its content! We are agreed. It simply remains
for you to admit that it is true that consciousness affects behaviour.

So you agree that it's silly to conclude that the *existence*
of this content somehow interacts with the content itself,
thereby modulating its unfolding (i.e. it's silly to conclude
that consciousness affects behavior)?

Else retract your statement "Me" is an idea, like "tomorrow" is an
idea. "Tomorrow" affects behavior, like "me" affects behavior. "Me"
and "tomorrow" are aspects of the *contents* of consciousness."

"Me" is an idea, like "tomorrow" is an idea. "Tomorrow"
affects behavior, like "me" affects behavior. "Me" and
"tomorrow" are aspects of the *contents* of consciousness.

In the absence of "Me" and "ideas" there is no container called
consciousness!.

Consciousness is not a container -- we use the word to allude to
the fact of the very existence of what there is consciousness *of*.
Furthermore, the category of "ideas" (including the idea of "me")
is not the only category into which the content of consciousness
may be placed, so the "absence of 'me' and 'ideas'" does not
logically entail the absence of consciousness.

"andy-k" wrote:
zinnic wrote:
In the absence of "Me" and "ideas" there is no container called
consciousness!.

Consciousness is not a container -- we use the word to allude to
the fact of the very existence of what there is consciousness *of*.
Furthermore, the category of "ideas" (including the idea of "me")
is not the only category into which the content of consciousness
may be placed, so the "absence of 'me' and 'ideas'" does not
logically entail the absence of consciousness.

And as far as I know does not logically entail an increase in the
price of grapes in winter!

zinnic wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
zinnic wrote:
In the absence of "Me" and "ideas" there is no container called
consciousness!.

Consciousness is not a container -- we use the word to allude to
the fact of the very existence of what there is consciousness *of*.
Furthermore, the category of "ideas" (including the idea of "me")
is not the only category into which the content of consciousness
may be placed, so the "absence of 'me' and 'ideas'" does not
logically entail the absence of consciousness.

And as far as I know does not logically entail an increase in the
price of grapes in winter!

In the absence of ideas there would be notion of trade at all, so it is
meaningless to talk about the price of grapes in the absence of ideas.

zinnic wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
zinnic wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
zinnic wrote:
In the absence of "Me" and "ideas" there is no container called
consciousness!.

Consciousness is not a container -- we use the word to allude to
the fact of the very existence of what there is consciousness *of*.
Furthermore, the category of "ideas" (including the idea of "me")
is not the only category into which the content of consciousness
may be placed, so the "absence of 'me' and 'ideas'" does not
logically entail the absence of consciousness.

And as far as I know does not logically entail an increase in the
price of grapes in winter!

In the absence of ideas there would be notion of trade at all, so it
is meaningless to talk about the price of grapes in the absence of
ideas.

That is exactly the point I was making! Congratulations!

Thank you. It may clarify the issue for you if I build on your analogy:
an absence of grapes does not logically entail an absence of fruit.- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -