On 17 Apr., 13:40, David C. Ullrich <dullr...@sprynet.com> wrote:

There is nothing other than an "existent object" that _can_ be
the value of a variable. The present King of France cannot
be the value of a variable, because there is no such thing as
the present king of France.

"Thus, what Russell wants to avoid is admitting mysterious
non-existent entities into his ontology. "

This comes as a great relief to me, in re how I think of Russel.

On 18 Apr., 13:14, holden_o...@yahoo.ca wrote:

It seems odd to me to say, everything exists and the set of everything
does not exist.

On 17 Apr., 13:40, David C. Ullrich <dullr...@sprynet.com> wrote:

There is nothing other than an "existent object" that _can_ be
the value of a variable. The present King of France cannot
be the value of a variable, because there is no such thing as
the present king of France.

If you quantify over a Meinongian domain of intentional objects, a
nonexistent object may be the value of a variable.


"Thus, what Russell wants to avoid is admitting mysterious
non-existent entities into his ontology. "

This comes as a great relief to me, in re how I think of Russel.

"Note that Russell has got Meinong wrong. Meinong does not claim that
the objects in question have /any/ form of being. What Russell is
arguing against is his own earlier view! This does, indeed, offend our
sense of reality. The claim that the realm of being, the totality of
what is, contains chimeras and similar objects, /is/ an affront to
one's sensibility. We /know/ that there aren't any chimeras. But this
is neither Meinong's view nor that of noneism.
One could try to rework the point into an objection to noneism: One
might try putting the point like this: in reality, there is no
Pegasus, no Father Christmas, and no other non-existent object. But
this is something the noneist agrees with! There is, i.e. exists, no
such thing. Yet some objects do not exist. What someone who wishes to
pursue this line of objection has to say is that it is just plain
false that some objects do not exist: all objects are existent
objects. But now the inadequacy of the objection is manifest: it
clearly begs the question. The noneist's very claim is that some
objects do not exist: one can refer to them, quantify over them, etc.
These objects are just not actual. The objection, then, simply
collapses into a statement of actualist dogma."

(Priest, Graham. /Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of
Intentionality/. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. p. 107+)

On 21 Apr., 12:27, David C. Ullrich <dullr...@sprynet.com> wrote:
On Sun, 20 Apr 2008 16:23:48 -0700 (PDT), Paul Holbach

I take it that Father Christmas is an example of such a non-existent
object? It seems simply incoherent to agree on the one hand that
there is no such thing as FC but to maintain nonetheless that FC
is an example of something.

"The noneist's very claim is that some
objects do not exist: one can refer to them, quantify over them, etc.
These objects are just not actual. The objection, then, simply
collapses into a statement of actualist dogma."

(Priest, Graham. /Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of
Intentionality/. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. p. 107+)

Ok, I suppose that this proves that there are serious philosophers
who deny that everything exists. But I don't see anything that
looks to me like evidence that denying this makes any sense.

If it's not true that everything exists then one should be able
to give an example of a non-existent thing. But whatever
that example is, since there is no such thing it doesn't
seem to _me_ like much of an example. I don't see how
that's "dogmatic"...

On 21 Apr., 12:32, David C. Ullrich <dullr...@sprynet.com> wrote:

I can't think of a sentence involving "the present king of France"
that _is_ true. And we all agree that there is no such thing
as the present king of France. Given all that, why in the world
would we want to speak of the present king of France as some
sort of object that just happens not to exist?

On 17 Apr., 13:40, David C. Ullrich <dullr...@sprynet.com> wrote:

There is nothing other than an "existent object" that _can_ be
the value of a variable. The present King of France cannot
be the value of a variable, because there is no such thing as
the present king of France.

If you quantify over a Meinongian domain of intentional objects, a
nonexistent object may be the value of a variable.


"Thus, what Russell wants to avoid is admitting mysterious
non-existent entities into his ontology. "

This comes as a great relief to me, in re how I think of Russel.

"Note that Russell has got Meinong wrong. Meinong does not claim that
the objects in question have /any/ form of being. What Russell is
arguing against is his own earlier view! This does, indeed, offend our
sense of reality. The claim that the realm of being, the totality of
what is, contains chimeras and similar objects, /is/ an affront to
one's sensibility. We /know/ that there aren't any chimeras. But this
is neither Meinong's view nor that of noneism.
One could try to rework the point into an objection to noneism: One
might try putting the point like this: in reality, there is no
Pegasus, no Father Christmas, and no other non-existent object. But
this is something the noneist agrees with! There is, i.e. exists, no
such thing. Yet some objects do not exist.

What someone who wishes to
pursue this line of objection has to say is that it is just plain
false that some objects do not exist: all objects are existent
objects. But now the inadequacy of the objection is manifest: it
clearly begs the question.

The noneist's very claim is that some
objects do not exist: one can refer to them, quantify over them, etc.
These objects are just not actual. The objection, then, simply
collapses into a statement of actualist dogma."

(Priest, Graham. /Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of
Intentionality/. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. p. 107+)

On 21 Apr., 12:43, David C. Ullrich <dullr...@sprynet.com> wrote:

Whatever an "object of thought" is, it is not an object. One's
thoughts "about" an "object of thought" are objects.

Seems to me that the unwarranted assumption that if one has a
thought that seems to be "about" something then there must in
some sense _be_ something that the thought is actually about
may be the source of the problem.

On 15 Apr., 13:34, David C. Ullrich <dullr...@sprynet.com> wrote:

If we are going to talk about the present king of France, why do
we not say that he satisfies the predicate "is the king of a country"?

There is the so-called Characterization Principle (as formulated in
Graham Priest's "Logic: A Very Short Introduction", p. 30):

(CP) ixc_xP is true in a situation just if, in that situation, there
is a unique object, a, satisfying c_x, and aP.

Example:
"The present king of France is a king of a country" is true iff there
is a unique object, a, that satisfies the conditions of being a
present king of France and of being a king of a country. But since
there is no such unique object satisfying both of these conditions, it
is not true that the present king of France satisfies the predicate
"is a king of a country."

On 21 Apr., 12:48, David C. Ullrich <dullr...@sprynet.com> wrote:

But I still say that everything exists - nothing anyone's said
here has seemed to me to be anything like a valid refutation
of that.

On 14 Apr., 15:36, David C. Ullrich <dullr...@sprynet.com> wrote:

A predicate is supposed to divide the universe into two classes,
the things that satisfy the predicate and the things that don't.
Existence doesn't do this, because _everything_ exists!

If you're right, then "is self-identical" isn't a predicate either.

Yes, everything exists. If you want to claim otherwise you
have to prove the existence of something that does not exist,
and that's going to be hard.

If "Everything exists" means "Every object (of thought) exists", then
it is not the case that everything exists. For example, Pegasus
doesn't.

The way language is used it often sounds like it's talking about
things that do not exist, but that's just a problem with the way
language is used.

We do not only often sound like we're talking about nonexistent
objects, we actually do often talk about and refer to nonexistent
objects.

On 14 Apr., 15:36, David C. Ullrich <dullr...@sprynet.com> wrote:

A predicate is supposed to divide the universe into two classes,
the things that satisfy the predicate and the things that don't.
Existence doesn't do this, because _everything_ exists!

"[T]he standard prima facie objections to treating 'existence' as a
predicate have been effectively disposed of. Whether deeper
interpretational objections are forthcoming or not, none have been put
forward so far. [...] Thus there can be no objection to an attempt to
find a formal counterpart to the phrase 'a exists'."

(Hintikka, Jaakko, "Existential presuppositions and their
elimination," pp. 23-44
in Models for Modalities: Selected Essays, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1969. p.
29)

In free logic there is an impeccable first-order existence predicate:
"E!x"
(This is not to be confused with "E!x(...)" in classical logic: "There
is exactly one thing x such that ...")

On Sun, 20 Apr 2008 15:58:28 -0700 (PDT), Paul Holbach
paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote:

On 15 Apr., 13:34, David C. Ullrich <dullr...@sprynet.com> wrote:

If we are going to talk about the present king of France, why do
we not say that he satisfies the predicate "is the king of a country"?

There is the so-called Characterization Principle (as formulated in
Graham Priest's "Logic: A Very Short Introduction", p. 30):

(CP) ixc_xP is true in a situation just if, in that situation, there
is a unique object, a, satisfying c_x, and aP.

Example:
"The present king of France is a king of a country" is true iff there
is a unique object, a, that satisfies the conditions of being a
present king of France and of being a king of a country. But since
there is no such unique object satisfying both of these conditions, it
is not true that the present king of France satisfies the predicate
"is a king of a country."

Um. Of course I agree that "the present king of France is a king
of a country" is false, for exactly this reason.

You missed the
"if we're going to talk about..."

I can't think of a sentence involving "the present king of France"
that _is_ true. And we all agree that there is no such thing
as the present king of France. Given all that, why in the world
would we want to speak of the present king of France as some
sort of object that just happens not to exist?

David C. Ullrich

On 16 huhti, 17:24, LauLuna <laureanol...@yahoo.es> wrote:





On Apr 14, 7:44 pm, holden_o...@yahoo.ca wrote:

On Apr 14, 9:56 am, LauLuna <laureanol...@yahoo.es> wrote:

On Apr 14, 2:01 pm, sanchopanch...@web.de wrote:

On 14 Apr., 10:54, holden_o...@yahoo.ca wrote:

On Apr 14, 4:47 am, sanchopanch...@web.de wrote:

Hello,

I have read somewhere that "existence" wouldn't be a predicate in the
way e.g. "having a leg" is a predicate. Does anyone have a good and
actual reference on that or liks me to tell why?

Thanks,
S.

Existence is a predicate but, it is not a primary predicate such as
"having a leg".

x exists =df EF(Fx).
Gx -> x exists. If there is a primary predicate that x has, then, x
exists.

Thanks for the answer. I would be very pleased if you give me a
reference for such things like "primary predicate".
Thanks you,
S-- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

I'm not sure holden's definition of exists is the best. Formally,
satisfying a predicate is not enough for existing. Supose that the
second order predicate

EF (Fx)

were equivalent to the existence predicate.

Since F is any predicate, we can take F = ~EP (Px)

Then, if that characterization of existence is correct, all
nonexistent objects (such as the square circle) would satisfy F; hence
they would exist.

I said that F, G, etc. are primary predicates (properties).
Compound predicates such as ~EP(Px) are not properties (primary
predicates).

I think it preferable:

x exists =: Ey (y=x)

Within the context of FOPL x=x or Ey(x=y) or will work.
But in that case, because Ax(x=x) is an axiom, everything exists is a
theorem,
as David Ullrich said.

As for existence as a very special kind of predicate, I'd say the
discussion goes back at least to Kant's assessment of the ontological
argument in the KrV. If we can include existence in the essence of an
object, we can trivially prove its existence. If we can include
existence in a concept as a any other feature, such as having wings or
being rational, we could prove the existence of whatever.

We prove the existence of x by asserting that it has at least one
property.
If x has the property F, then x exists.

We can prove nothing by simply asserting. But I repeat, representing
existence by predicate possession is inconsistent unless there are a
clear definition of what predicates serve for the prurpose and what
not. For example, you suggest the predicate 'x=x' does not do the job
either.

Isn`t x=x a two place relation? So it is satisfied by some pairs of
objects (namely (a,a) and some not (a,b): a=/y. Therefore it does
divide the pairs of objects of the proper universe in two distinct
classes.-

But I still say that everything exists - nothing anyone's said
here has seemed to me to be anything like a valid refutation
of that.

On 21 Apr., 12:27, David C. Ullrich <dullr...@sprynet.com> wrote:
On Sun, 20 Apr 2008 16:23:48 -0700 (PDT), Paul Holbach

I take it that Father Christmas is an example of such a non-existent
object? It seems simply incoherent to agree on the one hand that
there is no such thing as FC but to maintain nonetheless that FC
is an example of something.

Father Christmas is at least an example of some object of thought, of
some intentional object.
Of course, anything that has a name (proper noun or definite
description) is an object (of thought).

"The noneist's very claim is that some
objects do not exist: one can refer to them, quantify over them, etc.
These objects are just not actual. The objection, then, simply
collapses into a statement of actualist dogma."

(Priest, Graham. /Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of
Intentionality/. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. p. 107+)

Ok, I suppose that this proves that there are serious philosophers
who deny that everything exists. But I don't see anything that
looks to me like evidence that denying this makes any sense.

There are several possible positions:

"There is a wide-spread conservative view on objects, which says that
any object is an actual object. In other words, the adjective ‘actual’
is redundant, for it excludes no object. From this it follows that non-
actual possible objects are not objects, that is, they are nothing.
Thus on this view, the adjective ‘possible’ is equivalent to ‘actual’
when applied to objects and (ii) is false. This makes the notion of a
possible object, or equivalently the notion of an actual object,
uninteresting.

The notion of an object is the basic notion and does
all the work. There is another conservative view on objects, which
does not deal in actuality or possibility directly. It deals in
existence instead. It is the view that any object is an existing
object. On this view, the following analog of (ii) is false: Not every
object is an existing object, that is, some object is a non-existing
object. This view makes the notion of an existing object equivalent to
that of an object; existence adds nothing to objecthood. If we combine
talk of actuality and talk of existence, we obtain four alternative
conservative views with varying degrees of conservatism:

(1) Any object is an actual existing object;

(2) Any object is an actual object, that is, it is either an
actual existing object or an actual non-existing object;

(3) Any object is an existing object, that is, it is either an
actual existing object or a non-actual existing object;

(4) Any object that is actual is an existing object;

(5) Any object that exists is an actual object.

(1) is a stronger claim than the other four. (2) and (3) are stronger
than (4) and (5). (1)-(3) give characterizations of all objects,
whereas (4) and (5) are more limited in scope. When the verb ‘exists’
is understood with the most comprehensive domain of discourse, (5) is
known as actualism. If the domain of discourse for ‘exists’ is
stipulated to consist only of actual objects, (5) is trivial and
compatible with possibilism, the position which says that some object
is outside the domain consisting of all actual objects; cf. (ii). Most
of those who advertise their positions as actualist hold not only (5)
with the most comprehensive domain of discourse in mind but also (1),
and therefore (2)-(4) as well. There are some theorists who hold (5),
or at least do not deny (5), but deny (1). They do so by denying (3),
that is, by maintaining that some object is a non-existing object.
Such a view is one version of Meinongianism."

( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-objects )

If it's not true that everything exists then one should be able
to give an example of a non-existent thing. But whatever
that example is, since there is no such thing it doesn't
seem to _me_ like much of an example. I don't see how
that's "dogmatic"...

"A nonexistent object is something that does not exist. Some examples
often cited are: Zeus, Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes, Vulcan, the perpetual
motion machine, the golden mountain, the fountain of youth, the round
square, etc.

Some important philosophers have thought that the very
concept of a nonexistent object is contradictory (Hume) or logically
ill-formed (Kant, Frege), while others (Leibniz, Meinong, the Russell
of Principles of Mathematics) have embraced it wholeheartedly."

( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects )

I presume you agree with what David Lewis writes:

"In short: we dispense with existence—but heed what this means and
what it does not. Of course we do not dispense with the word 'exist'
as one of our pronunciations for the quantifier. Neither do we
dispense with a trivially universal predicate of existence,
automatically satisfied by absolutely everything. But if 'existence'
is understood so that it can be a substantive thesis that only some of
the things there are exist—or, for that matter, so that it can be a
substantive thesis that everything exists—we will have none of it."

(Lewis, David. "Noneism or Allism." in Papers in Metaphysics and
Epistemology, 152-163. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. p.
162+)

Remark: Priest, who has developed Routley's Noneism further, does not
say that /there are/ things which do not exist.

"For the noneist to exist and to be are /exactly/ the same thing.
Holmes does not exist; Holmes is not. There exists/is nothing that is
Sherlock Holmes." (p. 108)

"One must precisely not read 'SxA(x)' as 'There exists something, x,
such that A(x)'. Assuming that existence and being are the same thing,
one should not even read it as 'There is something, x, such that
A(x)'. The reading 'Something, x, is such that A(x)' will do nicely.
This is why I have changed the symbolism: the temptation to read 'E'
as 'there exists/is' is just too great. [...] Thus, 'Sx(Px & Qx)' is:
'some x is such that x is a P and x is a Q'. Or more simply: 'some Ps
are Qs'. One can still continue to read 'AxA(x)' as 'Every x is (or
all xs are) such that A(x)'. Thus 'Ax(Px -> Qx)' is: 'every x is such
that if it is a P it is a Q'. Or more
simply: 'all Ps are Qs'. If one wishes to express the more orthodox
interpretation of quantifiers, one can (and has to) do this by
deploying the existence predicate.

[...] The admission of non-existent objects is meinongianism, or, as I
shall call it, noneism.
And let me stress, as [Routley/Sylvan] did, that non-existent objects
do not have some inferior mode of being, such as 'subsistence'. They
have no mode of being whatever. They do not exist in any sense of that
word (at the world in question, of course--they may, or may not, exist
at others; they may not even exist at any world)." (p. 13+)

"The noneist strategy is a very natural one. Thus, for example, when
one fears something, one has a direct phenomenological experience of a
relation to the object of the fear. And the phenomenology is quite
independent of whether or not the object actually exists.

What more
appropriate, then, to suppose that objects may exist or not, and that
their existential status is irrelevant to whether or not they can be
the target of an intentional state?

The noneist generosity extends,
note, just as much to impossible objects as possible objects. For one
can
think of the greatest prime number just as much one can think of the
smallest. And one can seek both a proof of Goldbach's conjecture and a
proof of its negation--though one of these cannot exist. An
intentional predicate, then, is a relation that may be towards non-
being." (p. 57/8)

(Priest, Graham. /Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metayphysics of
Intentionality/. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.)