"Craig Franck" in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

True, but when the moon does it, it does strike you as an
illusion. My point was the illusion is caused by the moon
being place at the same distance from you as objects near
the horizon.

There may be some truth to this. But certainly the moon cannot be
placed by the mind in illusional terms anywhere near the terrestrial
horizon or it would appear huge.

"Lester Zick" wrote

"Craig Franck" in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

True, but when the moon does it, it does strike you as an
illusion. My point was the illusion is caused by the moon
being place at the same distance from you as objects near
the horizon.

There may be some truth to this. But certainly the moon cannot be
placed by the mind in illusional terms anywhere near the terrestrial
horizon or it would appear huge.

It only appears as small as it does because the mind has a hard
time gauging the size of astronomical objects. The sun and moon
look to be the same size even though the sun is much larger.
From how little its size increases, the moon is probably judged to
be the size of a terrestrial mountain.

I think the key to understanding this illusion is to consider that the
rendering of your visual field is about as computationally intense as
a 3D video game. When viewed as a guided hallucination, the fact
that we see things as close to how they are is pretty astounding,
but then the mapping function of world to representation has been
under strong environmental pressures for quite some time.

I'm not sure here what you mean by the phrase strong environmental

Hi Ray - I think I would agree that the illusion is an argument
for
cognition if not perhaps for free will. But would you set the
line
length in your newsreader to some value like 60 or so to avoid
having
to pan and scan your posts?

Hi Ray - I think I would agree that the illusion is an argument
for
cognition if not perhaps for free will. But would you set the
line
length in your newsreader to some value like 60 or so to avoid
having
to pan and scan your posts?


Your reader doesn't auto wordwrap? Eww.... but I've changed the
setting here anyway.

The illusion could also be simply that, by having evolved on a
spherical world, things on the ground that are visible must be in
some local neighbourhood of the viewer and are subconsciously
afforded "near" status. Distance categorization would take high
priority in organisms' minds because it is generally best to sort
survival threats based on proximity. So even if something is only
visually near the ground, like a low Moon, we can't help the
feeling that it is "near". It's not so much that the Moon looks
bigger, it that's we feel it is closer to us.

Ray

"Craig Franck" in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

I think the key to understanding this illusion is to consider that the
rendering of your visual field is about as computationally intense as
a 3D video game. When viewed as a guided hallucination, the fact
that we see things as close to how they are is pretty astounding,
but then the mapping function of world to representation has been
under strong environmental pressures for quite some time.

I'm not sure here what you mean by the phrase strong environmental
pressures.

I don't doubt that the process is pretty astounding. Just
take a couple of drinks and see what the result is on vision.

But I
think as I remarked to Michael that I prefer to consign the problem to
the X files for the time being.

"Lester Zick" wrote

"Craig Franck" in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

I think the key to understanding this illusion is to consider that the
rendering of your visual field is about as computationally intense as
a 3D video game. When viewed as a guided hallucination, the fact
that we see things as close to how they are is pretty astounding,
but then the mapping function of world to representation has been
under strong environmental pressures for quite some time.

I'm not sure here what you mean by the phrase strong environmental
pressures.

Natural selection. The problem with radical skepticism with
regards to our senses is nature abhors philosophical problems:
If we couldn't trust our senses to reveal reality, we wouldn't be
here. If there wasn't some reality external to ourselves before
we got here, we never would have got here.

I don't doubt that the process is pretty astounding. Just
take a couple of drinks and see what the result is on vision.

You seem to have a low tolerance for alcohol. :~)

But I
think as I remarked to Michael that I prefer to consign the problem to
the X files for the time being.

I only consign things to the X-Files if there's a chance I'll get
to meet Gillian Anderson. Otherwise, to quote Voltaire: "I have
always confined myself to doing my little best to make men less
foolish and more honorable."

Part of the problem with work on consciousness in the past
is everyone had been far too willing to look on it as something
beyond explanation or reason. Figuring out how vision works
solves 50% of the problem of conscious experience, especially
if its subjectivity comes from an integration of the senses with
some other representation.

I agree with the first part of what you say. However I don't think

The Lunar Paradox

The bottom line is that no explanation is completely adequate, and that this
illusion is a real mystery. Both Plait and Simanek seem agreed that a
plausible explanation involves the "sky illusion," which is that the sky
appears to us more like a bowl shape than a sphere. I.e., the zenith of the
sky seems much closer than the "corresponding point" on the horizon. Since
the moon looks the same size on the horizon as at the zenith, it also looks
larger on the horizon.

Anthony

The Lunar Paradox


http://www.badastronomy.com/

Particularly,
http://www.badastronomy.com/bad/misc/moonbig.html

Phil Plait is a professional astronomer and his book _Bad Astronomy_ is a
good read, for what it's worth. This page says it's not that we're
comparing the moon against foreground objects near the horizon. The book
says it's not that we're seeing the moon through more atmosphere (in fact,
Simanek's page below gives diagrams indicating the moon looks *smaller*
because of atmospheric effects, and on the horizon is also further away,
making it look smaller still -- heightening the paradox).

That page links to the following discussion, which goes into more detail:
http://www.lhup.edu/~dsimanek/3d/moonillu.htm

All of these links work in my browser at the time of writing, by the way!

The bottom line is that no explanation is completely adequate, and that
this
illusion is a real mystery. Both Plait and Simanek seem agreed that a
plausible explanation involves the "sky illusion," which is that the sky
appears to us more like a bowl shape than a sphere. I.e., the zenith of
the
sky seems much closer than the "corresponding point" on the horizon.
Since
the moon looks the same size on the horizon as at the zenith, it also
looks
larger on the horizon.

Anthony

AB: The bottom line is that no explanation is completely adequate, and that
this
illusion is a real mystery.

GS: Not really - at least not in one sense. The physicist's paper is
particularly bad (though I just skimmed it; for one thing, it confounds
empirical and conceptual issues) - its primary merit is in its treatment of
the obviously wrong view that the illusion is not optical. The MI is clearly
an example of a so-called "size constancy" and if one can talk about this
(at least in a general way) one can pretty much talk about the MI.

Look, seeing is behavior. Like many behavioral phenomena, its explanation
involves a description of the currently present stimuli and the animal's
past history. The usual mentalistic description of perceptual illusions is
some version of the metaphorical "The brain constructs a model of what is
out there using information from the environment and knowledge about the
world." And, of course, they would say that, at least to some extent, "the
knowledge is obtained from experience" (that tells you a lot, right?). Let's
build up to an explanation. Say we present, tachistoscopically, a black
valentine. People will probably report that it was red, or dark red, or
maybe purple (especially if we "draw attention to shape"). Why? Obviously
because of our history with red valentines. The response of "seeing red" is
partially under control of shape (we might give a Pavlovian explanation
here). If we crank up the viewing time past a few ms, of course, we get
enormous control by wavelength(s) of the light (or lack thereof). The MI is
no different, except that its explication is far more difficult than citing
a simple history of pairing red with a unique shape.

So there are really two sorts of questions. The first set are essentially
empirical questions. First, what sorts of circumstances produce the
illusion? This is basically what has been investigated already, of course,
and I think it is probably clear that a host of depth cues contribute in a
"family resemblance way." Most potent, however, is nearness to a horizon.
More difficult questions involve the sorts of histories that are necessary
to produce the illusion in nonhuman animals (the experiments wouldn't be
ethical with humans). These are enormously difficult experiments to do. I'll
return to this issue at a later date (hehehe).

The second set of questions are essentially philosophical or conceptual.
What does it mean, for example, to say that we construct a model from
information and knowledge? Does formulating the issue in this fashion say
anything more than "the illusion appears under X, Y, and Z conditions?" Does
formulating the issue in this fashion do anything about answering the "more
difficult questions?"

AB: The bottom line is that no explanation is completely adequate, and that
this
illusion is a real mystery.

GS: Not really - at least not in one sense. The physicist's paper is
particularly bad (though I just skimmed it; for one thing, it confounds
empirical and conceptual issues) - its primary merit is in its treatment of
the obviously wrong view that the illusion is not optical. The MI is
clearly
an example of a so-called "size constancy" and if one can talk about this
(at least in a general way) one can pretty much talk about the MI.

Look, seeing is behavior. Like many behavioral phenomena, its explanation
involves a description of the currently present stimuli and the animal's
past history. The usual mentalistic description of perceptual illusions is
some version of the metaphorical "The brain constructs a model of what is
out there using information from the environment and knowledge about the
world." And, of course, they would say that, at least to some extent, "the
knowledge is obtained from experience" (that tells you a lot, right?).
Let's
build up to an explanation. Say we present, tachistoscopically, a black
valentine. People will probably report that it was red, or dark red, or
maybe purple (especially if we "draw attention to shape"). Why? Obviously
because of our history with red valentines. The response of "seeing red" is
partially under control of shape (we might give a Pavlovian explanation
here). If we crank up the viewing time past a few ms, of course, we get
enormous control by wavelength(s) of the light (or lack thereof). The MI is
no different, except that its explication is far more difficult than citing
a simple history of pairing red with a unique shape.

So there are really two sorts of questions. The first set are essentially
empirical questions. First, what sorts of circumstances produce the
illusion? This is basically what has been investigated already, of course,
and I think it is probably clear that a host of depth cues contribute in a
"family resemblance way." Most potent, however, is nearness to a horizon.
More difficult questions involve the sorts of histories that are necessary
to produce the illusion in nonhuman animals (the experiments wouldn't be
ethical with humans). These are enormously difficult experiments to do.
I'll
return to this issue at a later date (hehehe).

The second set of questions are essentially philosophical or conceptual.
What does it mean, for example, to say that we construct a model from
information and knowledge? Does formulating the issue in this fashion say
anything more than "the illusion appears under X, Y, and Z conditions?"
Does
formulating the issue in this fashion do anything about answering the
"more>difficult questions?"

On Thu, 04 Dec 2003 20:19:01 GMT, "Glen M. Sizemore"
gmsizemore2@yahoo.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

AB: The bottom line is that no explanation is completely adequate, and
that
this
illusion is a real mystery.

GS: Not really - at least not in one sense. The physicist's paper is
particularly bad (though I just skimmed it; for one thing, it confounds
empirical and conceptual issues) - its primary merit is in its treatment
of
the obviously wrong view that the illusion is not optical. The MI is
clearly
an example of a so-called "size constancy" and if one can talk about this
(at least in a general way) one can pretty much talk about the MI.

Look, seeing is behavior. Like many behavioral phenomena, its explanation
involves a description of the currently present stimuli and the animal's
past history. The usual mentalistic description of perceptual illusions
is
some version of the metaphorical "The brain constructs a model of what is
out there using information from the environment and knowledge about the
world." And, of course, they would say that, at least to some extent,
"the
knowledge is obtained from experience" (that tells you a lot, right?).
Let's
build up to an explanation. Say we present, tachistoscopically, a black
valentine. People will probably report that it was red, or dark red, or
maybe purple (especially if we "draw attention to shape"). Why? Obviously
because of our history with red valentines. The response of "seeing red"
is
partially under control of shape (we might give a Pavlovian explanation
here). If we crank up the viewing time past a few ms, of course, we get
enormous control by wavelength(s) of the light (or lack thereof). The MI
is
no different, except that its explication is far more difficult than
citing
a simple history of pairing red with a unique shape.

So there are really two sorts of questions. The first set are essentially
empirical questions. First, what sorts of circumstances produce the
illusion? This is basically what has been investigated already, of
course,
and I think it is probably clear that a host of depth cues contribute in
a
"family resemblance way." Most potent, however, is nearness to a horizon.
More difficult questions involve the sorts of histories that are
necessary
to produce the illusion in nonhuman animals (the experiments wouldn't be
ethical with humans). These are enormously difficult experiments to do.
I'll
return to this issue at a later date (hehehe).

The second set of questions are essentially philosophical or conceptual.
What does it mean, for example, to say that we construct a model from
information and knowledge? Does formulating the issue in this fashion say
anything more than "the illusion appears under X, Y, and Z conditions?"
Does
formulating the issue in this fashion do anything about answering the
"more
difficult questions?"


So the explanation for the illusion is what? The answers to
philosophical or conceptual questions the faculties of which are
denied by the behaviorist? If you want to deny those faculties I
suggest you not appeal to them for explanations unless you mean when
behaviorists use such terms it's okay but when others use them they're
meaningless folk idioms.


Regards - Lester

AB: The bottom line is that no explanation is completely adequate, and
that
this
illusion is a real mystery.

GS: Not really - at least not in one sense. The physicist's paper is
particularly bad (though I just skimmed it; for one thing, it confounds
empirical and conceptual issues) - its primary merit is in its treatment
of
the obviously wrong view that the illusion is not optical. The MI is
clearly
an example of a so-called "size constancy" and if one can talk about this
(at least in a general way) one can pretty much talk about the MI.

Look, seeing is behavior. Like many behavioral phenomena, its explanation
involves a description of the currently present stimuli and the animal's
past history. The usual mentalistic description of perceptual illusions is
some version of the metaphorical "The brain constructs a model of what is
out there using information from the environment and knowledge about the
world." And, of course, they would say that, at least to some extent, "the
knowledge is obtained from experience" (that tells you a lot, right?).
Let's
build up to an explanation. Say we present, tachistoscopically, a black
valentine. People will probably report that it was red, or dark red, or
maybe purple (especially if we "draw attention to shape"). Why? Obviously
because of our history with red valentines. The response of "seeing red"
is
partially under control of shape (we might give a Pavlovian explanation
here). If we crank up the viewing time past a few ms, of course, we get
enormous control by wavelength(s) of the light (or lack thereof). The MI
is
no different, except that its explication is far more difficult than
citing
a simple history of pairing red with a unique shape.

So there are really two sorts of questions. The first set are essentially
empirical questions. First, what sorts of circumstances produce the
illusion? This is basically what has been investigated already, of course,
and I think it is probably clear that a host of depth cues contribute in a
"family resemblance way." Most potent, however, is nearness to a horizon.
More difficult questions involve the sorts of histories that are necessary
to produce the illusion in nonhuman animals (the experiments wouldn't be
ethical with humans). These are enormously difficult experiments to do.
I'll
return to this issue at a later date (hehehe).

The second set of questions are essentially philosophical or conceptual.
What does it mean, for example, to say that we construct a model from
information and knowledge? Does formulating the issue in this fashion say
anything more than "the illusion appears under X, Y, and Z conditions?"
Does
formulating the issue in this fashion do anything about answering the
"more
difficult questions?"

Respectfully,

Glen

"Anthony Bucci" <abucci@cs.brandeis.edu> wrote in message
news:Pine.LNX.4.44.0312032053230.26631-100000@astyanax.cs.brandeis.edu...
The Lunar Paradox


http://www.badastronomy.com/

Particularly,
http://www.badastronomy.com/bad/misc/moonbig.html

Phil Plait is a professional astronomer and his book _Bad Astronomy_ is
a
good read, for what it's worth. This page says it's not that we're
comparing the moon against foreground objects near the horizon. The
book
says it's not that we're seeing the moon through more atmosphere (in
fact,
Simanek's page below gives diagrams indicating the moon looks *smaller*
because of atmospheric effects, and on the horizon is also further away,
making it look smaller still -- heightening the paradox).

That page links to the following discussion, which goes into more
detail:
http://www.lhup.edu/~dsimanek/3d/moonillu.htm

All of these links work in my browser at the time of writing, by the
way!

The bottom line is that no explanation is completely adequate, and that
this
illusion is a real mystery. Both Plait and Simanek seem agreed that a
plausible explanation involves the "sky illusion," which is that the sky
appears to us more like a bowl shape than a sphere. I.e., the zenith of
the
sky seems much closer than the "corresponding point" on the horizon.
Since
the moon looks the same size on the horizon as at the zenith, it also
looks
larger on the horizon.

Anthony

AB: The bottom line is that no explanation is completely adequate, and that
this
illusion is a real mystery.

GS: Not really - at least not in one sense. The physicist's paper is
particularly bad (though I just skimmed it; for one thing, it confounds
empirical and conceptual issues) - its primary merit is in its treatment of
the obviously wrong view that the illusion is not optical. The MI is
clearly
an example of a so-called "size constancy" and if one can talk about this
(at least in a general way) one can pretty much talk about the MI.

Look, seeing is behavior. Like many behavioral phenomena, its explanation
involves a description of the currently present stimuli and the animal's
past history. The usual mentalistic description of perceptual illusions is
some version of the metaphorical "The brain constructs a model of what is
out there using information from the environment and knowledge about the
world." And, of course, they would say that, at least to some extent, "the
knowledge is obtained from experience" (that tells you a lot, right?).
Let's
build up to an explanation. Say we present, tachistoscopically, a black
valentine. People will probably report that it was red, or dark red, or
maybe purple (especially if we "draw attention to shape"). Why? Obviously
because of our history with red valentines. The response of "seeing red" is
partially under control of shape (we might give a Pavlovian explanation
here). If we crank up the viewing time past a few ms, of course, we get
enormous control by wavelength(s) of the light (or lack thereof). The MI is
no different, except that its explication is far more difficult than citing
a simple history of pairing red with a unique shape.

So there are really two sorts of questions. The first set are essentially
empirical questions. First, what sorts of circumstances produce the
illusion? This is basically what has been investigated already, of course,
and I think it is probably clear that a host of depth cues contribute in a
"family resemblance way." Most potent, however, is nearness to a horizon.
More difficult questions involve the sorts of histories that are necessary
to produce the illusion in nonhuman animals (the experiments wouldn't be
ethical with humans). These are enormously difficult experiments to do.
I'll
return to this issue at a later date (hehehe).

The second set of questions are essentially philosophical or conceptual.
What does it mean, for example, to say that we construct a model from
information and knowledge? Does formulating the issue in this fashion say
anything more than "the illusion appears under X, Y, and Z conditions?"
Does
formulating the issue in this fashion do anything about answering the
"more>difficult questions?"


LZ: So the explanation for the illusion is what?

GS: I didn't give an answer yet. I suggested that the answers (at least the
proximate ones) lie in the organism's ontogenic history.

LZ: The answers to
philosophical or conceptual questions the faculties of which are
denied by the behaviorist?

GS: I can't tell if you are saying that "philosophy or conceptual questions"
are outside the scope of behaviorism, or that behaviorists in some sense
deny "philosophy" and "conceptual" analyses, or if you are saying that
"behaviorists" deny that we "construct models" or "have knowledge."


LZ: If you want to deny those faculties I suggest you not appeal to them for
explanations[...]

GS: This makes me think you mean the latter (models, knowledge, etc.). I am
not appealing to "them." I am arguing that they are silly. We do "construct
models," but it is clearly metaphor when applied to this case. As to
knowledge, behaviorists do not deny the existence of the behavior that is
said to "require knowledge," but it denies that "knowledge" is a "thing" or
that it is the cause of behavior.

LZ: [...]unless you mean when
behaviorists use such terms it's okay but when others use them they're
meaningless folk idioms.

GS: Once again, I am arguing that the MI has to do with the same sorts of
ontogenic histories (which I did not specify) that generate "size
constancies." I did not appeal to the construction of models or to
knowledge.

On Sat, 06 Dec 2003 16:16:36 GMT, "Glen M. Sizemore"
gmsizemore2@yahoo.com> in sci.philosophy.meta wrote:

AB: The bottom line is that no explanation is completely adequate, and
that
this
illusion is a real mystery.

GS: Not really - at least not in one sense. The physicist's paper is
particularly bad (though I just skimmed it; for one thing, it confounds
empirical and conceptual issues) - its primary merit is in its treatment
of
the obviously wrong view that the illusion is not optical. The MI is
clearly
an example of a so-called "size constancy" and if one can talk about
this
(at least in a general way) one can pretty much talk about the MI.

Look, seeing is behavior. Like many behavioral phenomena, its
explanation
involves a description of the currently present stimuli and the animal's
past history. The usual mentalistic description of perceptual illusions
is
some version of the metaphorical "The brain constructs a model of what
is
out there using information from the environment and knowledge about the
world." And, of course, they would say that, at least to some extent,
"the
knowledge is obtained from experience" (that tells you a lot, right?).
Let's
build up to an explanation. Say we present, tachistoscopically, a black
valentine. People will probably report that it was red, or dark red, or
maybe purple (especially if we "draw attention to shape"). Why?
Obviously
because of our history with red valentines. The response of "seeing red"
is
partially under control of shape (we might give a Pavlovian explanation
here). If we crank up the viewing time past a few ms, of course, we get
enormous control by wavelength(s) of the light (or lack thereof). The MI
is
no different, except that its explication is far more difficult than
citing
a simple history of pairing red with a unique shape.

So there are really two sorts of questions. The first set are
essentially
empirical questions. First, what sorts of circumstances produce the
illusion? This is basically what has been investigated already, of
course,
and I think it is probably clear that a host of depth cues contribute in
a
"family resemblance way." Most potent, however, is nearness to a
horizon.
More difficult questions involve the sorts of histories that are
necessary
to produce the illusion in nonhuman animals (the experiments wouldn't be
ethical with humans). These are enormously difficult experiments to do.
I'll
return to this issue at a later date (hehehe).

The second set of questions are essentially philosophical or conceptual.
What does it mean, for example, to say that we construct a model from
information and knowledge? Does formulating the issue in this fashion
say
anything more than "the illusion appears under X, Y, and Z conditions?"
Does
formulating the issue in this fashion do anything about answering the
"more>difficult questions?"


LZ: So the explanation for the illusion is what?

GS: I didn't give an answer yet. I suggested that the answers (at least
the
proximate ones) lie in the organism's ontogenic history.

LZ: The answers to
philosophical or conceptual questions the faculties of which are
denied by the behaviorist?

GS: I can't tell if you are saying that "philosophy or conceptual
questions"
are outside the scope of behaviorism, or that behaviorists in some sense
deny "philosophy" and "conceptual" analyses, or if you are saying that
"behaviorists" deny that we "construct models" or "have knowledge."


LZ: If you want to deny those faculties I suggest you not appeal to them
for
explanations[...]

GS: This makes me think you mean the latter (models, knowledge, etc.). I
am
not appealing to "them." I am arguing that they are silly. We do
"construct
models," but it is clearly metaphor when applied to this case. As to
knowledge, behaviorists do not deny the existence of the behavior that is
said to "require knowledge," but it denies that "knowledge" is a "thing"
or
that it is the cause of behavior.

And I can't tell why you deny knowledge is a thing or that it is a
cause of behavior. What exactly is the scientific basis for such a
denial? I'll grant you that you and others can't explain knowledge,
but that's not a scientific rationale. If knowledge has properties it
is a thing and can be defined and analyzed in terms of those
properties in relation to other things including behavior. In other
words what is your definition of a "thing" such that it precludes
taking knowledge as a thing and why is that definition sacrosanct in
scientific terms?

We have all kinds of things that determine behavior besides the
environmental contingencies normally considered by behaviorism.
There are perceptual determinants of behavior, cognitive determinants
of behavior, abstract determinants of behavior, inferential
determinants of behavior - which you yourself appealed to to explain
the origin of "cognition" - philosophical determinants of behavior,
conceptual determinants of behavior, plus many others too numerous to
mention.

It doesn't even matter whether the conclusions of such behavioral
causes are correct or even internally consistent. We have all kinds of
philosophical conclusions that are blatant nonsense and yet determine
the behavior of philosophers and others who accept their findings. Not
to mention those who believe in astrology, magic, and lunar paradoxes.


And I don't mind calling these "things" behavior or behavioral causes.
We thus have perceptual, cognitive, conceptual, etc. kinds of behavior
indicative of the basis on which an organism acts. So what's the
problem? Why does behaviorism choose to deny these faculties? Probably
because they cannot be defined or experimented on in material terms.
Which is exactly the argument I've been making all along. Behaviorism
is itself wedded to an empiricist scientific methodology that forces
it to deny the relevance, bearing, and even existence of intellectual
determinants and causes of behavior.




LZ: [...]unless you mean when
behaviorists use such terms it's okay but when others use them they're
meaningless folk idioms.

GS: Once again, I am arguing that the MI has to do with the same sorts of
ontogenic histories (which I did not specify) that generate "size
constancies." I did not appeal to the construction of models or to
knowledge.




Regards - Lester