On Feb 20, 7:29 am, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:

From Dave Mayes:> On Feb 13, 2:00pm, "Ercm" <n...@none.nnn> wrote:
I agree that anomaly is one of NASA's most overused words but what do
you expect from one of the government's premier scientific agencies?....
I agree with the overuse criticism.  But compounding the problem is
the fact that the meaning of the term "anomaly" is often misunderstood
within NASA.  The word is often used (misused) as a synonym for
"abnormal", "problem" or "failure".  But the pure form of the word
does not inherently connote any negativity.  It simply indicates a
deviation from the nominal.  I'll repeat:

- An anomaly is simply a deviation from the nominal.

And exactly what is a deviation from the nominal? How does one define
the term deviation? Let us use the shuttle's Caution and Warning
system and the System Management alert system as examples of anomaly
detection. Both systems provide aural and visual cues of anomalous
performance of key flight systems in real-time; however, the C & W
system provides alerts that can be catastrophic while the SM system is
a bit more advisory. So NASA can report two very different types of
anomalous performance--mission/life threatening, and much lesser
anomalies. It is the more serious anomalies that NASA publicly reports
that get our attention and that have contributed to the public
perception that anomalies connote "abnormal" "problem" and "failure".
So I guess you can blame the media and NASA PAO for the somewhat
misleading use of the term anomaly.

While NASA PAO does report some of the smaller anomalies, most of them
go unnoticed. You have to go to the post mission data analyses to get
into the overall set of mission anomalies. The analysis and detection
of anomalies can often be ciphered out only in terms of statistics
using two and three sigma deviations from a performance envelope
aspect. In other words anomalies may not be seen real-time because the
anomalous data must be compared to all or several prior missions.

While there certainly are inconsequential anomalies, all shuttle
performance anomalies need to be taken seriously and studied so that
they are well understood to insure a safe manned space flight
program.

NASA appears to have gotten itself into a lot of trouble by
misunderstanding the significance of observed anomalies. In the past,
NASA has taken clearly anomalous data and standardized (diluted) it to
the point that becomes virtually nominal. Such engineering
rationalization can lead to a "major malfunction".

Dave

On Feb 21, 1:30 pm, Dave Mayes <dmaye...@yahoo.com> wrote:

You and CT make a good team. By not so subtle inference you push your
belief in the credibility of the O-ring theory. Too many people argue
just for the sake of argument, when they can't argue the facts and
they can't argue the law. "Major Malfunction" was one of the first
books published about Challenger. That should tell you something about
how much technical delving went into its production. Try to keep an
open mind about the O-ring thing, Dave.

JTM- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

I placed "major malfunction" in quotes because I was actually quoting
the NASA PAO immediately following that tragedy.  I will never forget
that incredible bit of dramatic understatement.  Had I been referring
to the book by the same title I would have capitalized the title like
this: "Major Malfunction" and if possible italized it.

I have already indicated elsewhere that I will listen to what you have
to say and look at whatever evidence you present.  I do not have to
try to have an open mind, but be aware that mine is a skeptical open
mind.

On Feb 21, 1:56�pm, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:
tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:
From JTM (max...@mission51l.com):

Using proper grammatical analysis then, NASA obviously treated O-ring
erosion prior to 51-L as "nominal," and rightly so in my opinion. You
may (and probably do) disagree with me about that. I'll let you tell
refresh my memory, rather than searching the archives.

I don't remember ever having commented here before on whether or not
the o-ring problem was seen as nominal. �I can see your point. �If
this condition had been defined as what to expect for a typical
launch, then yes, it would become the nominal. �But it is not merely
the expectation of a result that makes it nominal. �You would need to
define the aberrant condition before a term like "nominal O-ring
erosion" could have meaning. �I am not aware of that ever having been
done.

Mike Mullane, however, is an astronaut who is quite outspoken in
publicly cautioning against the Normalization of Deviance. �He
preaches 51L as his prime cautionary example. �His view seems to fit
with what you are saying. �I expect that he would agree with the view
that O-ring erosion was treated as a nominal condition. �If not
formally defined, then in some psychological sense.

I just found a quote from his website:

=======> > Guarding against a "Normalization of Deviance"

Normalization of deviance is a long term phenomenon in which
individuals or teams repeatedly accept a lower standard of performance
until that lower standard becomes the "norm". Usually, the acceptance
of the lower standard occurs because the individual/team is under
pressure (budget, schedule, etc.) and perceives it will be too
difficult to adhere to the expected standard. Their intention may be
to revert back to the higher standard when this period of pressure
passes. However, by "getting away" with the deviation, it is likely
they will do the same thing when the same stressful circumstances
arise again. Over time, the individual/team fails to see their actions
as deviant.

Mullane uses the Challenger tragedy to make this point. Under
tremendous schedule and budget pressures and over multiple launches,
the NASA team accepted a lower standard of performance on the solid
rocket booster O-rings until that lower standard became the "norm". By
the dawn of Challenger, the NASA team had become so comfortable with
seeing occasional O-ring damage and getting away with it, the original
standard, in which ANY O-ring damage was defined as intolerable
deviance, was marginalized. Disaster resulted.
=======> > (Fromhttp://www.mikemullane.com/speakingprograms.htm)

How typical of you -- another appeal to authority (fallacious logic).

Astronauts are not always expert witnesses -- especially for all
things launch.

On Feb 21, 1:45 pm, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:

You would need to define the aberrant condition before a
term like "nominal O-ring erosion" could have meaning.
I am not aware of that ever having been done.

From the *closed* hearing held by the Presidential Commission in
Washington, DC, on February 7, 1986:
snip

You probably know me well enough to know that I am not a Lockheed
apologist (nor NASA, nor any other aerospace entity).

Not really. I don't know you at all, actually. I know that for years
you refused to state in this forum that you were a Lockheed employee,
all the while arguing the Lockheed/NASA O-ring position,

I call it like I see it, with a goal of seeking a perspective that is purged of
biases.

That's an admirable goal, but one which in my opinion you have failed
to demonstrate here. Allow me to quote a bit from your post of
12/10/2002:

"From John Maxson:

What is the *single* most important piece of data supporting
your conclusion as to the Challenger cause?
The evidence that convinced me was watching close-up video
of the SRB, both the black smoke at the pad and then the
blowtorch in flight.
Thanks. I don't consider asking questions (as to how you drew
your conclusions) to be debate. Correct me if I'm wrong. (Try
to consider me a Bob Schieffer asking these questions.)

No, asking questions is not debate (I was just saying that I wanted
to
avoid repeating discussions we've had in the past if there has been
no
change in either of our views).

Since the precise source (from which the black smoke at lift-off
originated) could not be determined because of loss of cameras,
how convinced would you rate yourself -- from that data alone?

(Let's say on a scale of 1 to 10. I'm taking your first observation
to be your answer, although I don't know of any close-up video
of the event you're describing. Perhaps you'll fill me in.)

[I asked only for a "single" conclusive piece of data, so I can't
consider two pieces in combination. Since I don't consider
clarifying comment to be debate, I should probably remind you
that contractors who received *film* frames (not video) of the
anamalous flare/plume were unable to determine (much less to
agree upon) the flare/flare's precise location.]

For the _single_ most significant piece of evidence, I would say that
was the "blowtorch" just prior to disintegration. With no other
evidence beside this, I would hypothetically place my confidence
somewhere above 50 percent that it was the SRB o-ring that failed.

But taken with all the other evidence (o-ring history, launch
temperature, black smoke at ignition, etc) I place my confidence well
above 90 percent. I hesitate to use '10' on the scale you've asked
for, because it doesn't convey room for error. So I will say '9'.

I am certain that it was o-ring blow-by. I consider that to be
established fact."

---end of quoted material---

I know a lot of people who "consider an O-ring failure to be
established fact." All I ask you is this: In a court of law, how does
anyone arrive at established fact without a fair trial? Why should
scientific judgments not be based on a fair trial as well? In other
words, Why not requre all members (like jurors) to withhold their
judgments until *both* sides have been afforded the *same* opportunity
to publicize thier facts. (Conclusions of Presidential Commissions,
especially when enhanced by a biased media, are by definition biased.)

The closest this nation ever came to questioning the O-ring theory was
in the House hearings. At the end, Chairman Roe ranted about how he'd
had all the contractor management up to testify, but "not one grunt."
When I asked him in person for permission to say a word (after one of
his hearings had recessed), he told me: "Maybe later." Well, you must
admit it's been awhile.

On Feb 20, 7:29 am, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:
snip
- An anomaly is simply a deviation from the nominal.

And exactly what is a deviation from the nominal? How does one define
the term deviation? Let us use the shuttle's Caution and Warning
system and the System Management alert system as examples of anomaly
detection. Both systems provide aural and visual cues of anomalous
performance of key flight systems in real-time; however, the C & W
system provides alerts that can be catastrophic while the SM system is
a bit more advisory. So NASA can report two very different types of
anomalous performance--mission/life threatening, and much lesser
anomalies. It is the more serious anomalies that NASA publicly reports
that get our attention and that have contributed to the public
perception that anomalies connote "abnormal" "problem" and "failure".
So I guess you can blame the media and NASA PAO for the somewhat
misleading use of the term anomaly.

While NASA PAO does report some of the smaller anomalies, most of them
go unnoticed. You have to go to the post mission data analyses to get
into the overall set of mission anomalies. The analysis and detection
of anomalies can often be ciphered out only in terms of statistics
using two and three sigma deviations from a performance envelope
aspect. In other words anomalies may not be seen real-time because the
anomalous data must be compared to all or several prior missions.

While there certainly are inconsequential anomalies, all shuttle
performance anomalies need to be taken seriously and studied so that
they are well understood to insure a safe manned space flight
program.

NASA appears to have gotten itself into a lot of trouble by
misunderstanding the significance of observed anomalies. In the past,
NASA has taken clearly anomalous data and standardized (diluted) it to
the point that becomes virtually nominal. Such engineering
rationalization can lead to a "major malfunction".

... the NASA team had become so comfortable with
seeing occasional O-ring damage and getting away with it, the original
standard, in which ANY O-ring damage was defined as intolerable
deviance, was marginalized. Disaster resulted.
=======> > > (Fromhttp://www.mikemullane.com/speakingprograms.htm)

I presented his words in support of the position you expressed.

For the _single_ most significant piece of evidence, I would say that
was the "blowtorch" just prior to disintegration.

Those words I wrote about O-rings more than 5 years ago, I still agree
with today.  As the proximate cause, that is what I see to be the
demise of Challenger.

On Feb 21, 7:20 pm, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:

I presented his words in support of the position you expressed.

Huh? Me? You okay?

On Feb 21, 8:19 pm, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:

For the _single_ most significant piece of evidence, I would say that
was the "blowtorch" just prior to disintegration.

Those words I wrote about O-rings more than 5 years ago, I still agree
with today. As the proximate cause, that is what I see to be the
demise of Challenger.

How about failure of NASA to show the "blowtorch" in any frames
immediately subsequent to those last frames you saw (but still prior
to disintegration), on that same film that NASA delayed nearly a week
before presenting only partially to selected members of Congress (via
that "15 second clip" from the north)?

Does your rationale for agreement find that acceptable?

Those words I wrote about O-rings more than 5 years ago, I still agree
with today. As the proximate cause, that is what I see to be the
demise of Challenger.

But again, I have a huge problem with people missing the forest for
the gaps in the segmented trees. I see it to be quite possible for
NASA to have flown well over one hundred successful missions with that
original O-ring design, if the known risks had been honored.

And the loss of life from -107 could have been avoided by having a
viable rescue plan in place (as we now have after the fact).

The biggest lessons learned that I see are not to perfectly engineer
our vehicles. It is not to expect perfect management decisions of how
to use those vehicles. It IS to be observant of the limitations, and
to either avoid those situations or have work arounds and contingency
plans in place for dealing with them. Specifically, AVOID launching
when conditions are well outside of tested limits (-51L types of
scenarios) and have a CONTINGENCY PLAN for alternate ways of getting
your crew down when facing the known foam threat. Both low cost
approaches.

And far more important than the above, the painful lesson learned is
how stupid it is to design a vehicle to carry people in an extremely
hazardous environment WITHOUT giving them a viable escape system.

I have stressed that mistake far more than anything to do with O-
rings. You will never get a perfect design. It is unaffordable and
unattainable. The smart choice is to avoid or work around the known
threats, and plan to have a way out when hit by the unknown threats.

O-rings are not as important as everyone has made them out to be.
It's high time we got a grasp of the bigger picture.

To put it more succinctly...

O-rings are the 51L scapegoat.

On Feb 22, 3:38am, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:
To put it more succinctly...

O-rings are the 51L scapegoat.

Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary:

"a goat upon whose head are symbolically placed the sins of the
people"

The symbolism is there, but the PEOPLE were not guilty! Rather, some
of its leaders and its prime launch-contractor management were, and
they have gone unpunished. Bill Rogers (admittedly representing
Lockheed) tried to make us all guilty in his Rose Garden speech, even
poor innocent Christa and her parents:

"This tragic accident was the result of the failure of that joint on
the right-hand booster rocket. ... In a sense, this is a kind of
national tragedy that a lot of us are to blame for. I mean, I think
that in a sense the administration, the Congress, the press, if you'll
excuse the expression, all of us were too optimistic, too willing to
accept the fact that this was operational, and I think we've all
learned a lesson."

Well, I CANNOT "excuse the expression." Ronald Reagan, and he alone,
declared the shuttle operational after only four flights. Ronald
Reagan's men, abetted by Lockheed, made sure we all "learned a
lesson," not a lesson we wanted to learn or deserved to learn, but one
that they wanted us to PAY for.

And when I do go to the length of singling certain
individuals out (like the Launch Director, etc) I do so because I see
a severe lack of proper accountability for mistakes that were made.

I do not have any goal of headhunting, guilt trips, or punishment for
anyone.  My motivation for highlighting what I see to be
accountability that has yet to be properly taken is so that grave
errors of this type can be better avoided in the future.

I do not mean to fault you personally, John, for anything you did or
didn't do.  You yourself are in the best position to make that
judgement.