From JTM:

How about failure of NASA to show the "blowtorch" in any frames
immediately subsequent to those last frames you saw (but still prior
to disintegration), on that same film that NASA delayed nearly a week
before presenting only partially to selected members of Congress (via
that "15 second clip" from the north)?

Does your rationale for agreement find that acceptable?

The official explanation for why the blowtorch stopped, and then
restarted with the high altitude windshear, seemed reasonable to me....

On Feb 22, 1:31 am, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:

From JTM:

How about failure of NASA to show the "blowtorch" in any frames
immediately subsequent to those last frames you saw (but still prior
to disintegration), on that same film that NASA delayed nearly a week
before presenting only partially to selected members of Congress (via
that "15 second clip" from the north)?

Does your rationale for agreement find that acceptable?

The official explanation for why the blowtorch stopped, and then
restarted with the high altitude windshear, seemed reasonable to me....

What official explanation for why the "blowtorch stopped, and then
restarted" are you referring to? I think once it started it never
stopped. The blowtorch started at around 59 seconds, flickered less
than one second and then continously grew into a bigger and bigger
flame after that. I wrote about this on another subject titled "Who'll
Take the Fall for Lockheed/NASA This Time?". If you are referring to
the black smoke puffs at liftoff, there was never any flames visible
at liftoff as best I can recall from the report but the smoke did
reportedly stop around T+ 3 seconds.

On Feb 22, 4:06pm, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:

And when I do go to the length of singling certain
individuals out (like the Launch Director, etc) I do so because I see
a severe lack of proper accountability for mistakes that were made.

Proper accountability? What sort of accountability is proper, outside
the law?

I do not have any goal of headhunting, guilt trips, or punishment for
anyone. My motivation for highlighting what I see to be
accountability that has yet to be properly taken is so that grave
errors of this type can be better avoided in the future.

Accountability that has yet to be properly taken? Obviously you don't
mean punishment as prescribed by law.

So that grave errors of this type can be better avoided in the future?
"Grave errors" (such as white-collar folks in high places made here)
have never been better avoided by merely making fall guys of working-
level folks carrying out orders. Obviously such fall guys should have
loudly objected; but complicity does not make them the primary
culprits, unless their track records were abominable.

The ones I recall you complaining about in past years were field-
center folks who were actually REWARDED and/or PROMOTED. I think you
had a very legitimate complaint, because I believe that was criminal.
(Tom Moser pushed hard for the launch and worked hard to cover up; he
was quickly promoted to NASA Hdqtrs.)

From JTM:





On Feb 22, 4:06pm, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:

And when I do go to the length of singling certain
individuals out (like the Launch Director, etc) I do so because I see
a severe lack of proper accountability for mistakes that were made.

Proper accountability? What sort of accountability is proper, outside
the law?

I do not have any goal of headhunting, guilt trips, or punishment for
anyone. My motivation for highlighting what I see to be
accountability that has yet to be properly taken is so that grave
errors of this type can be better avoided in the future.

Accountability that has yet to be properly taken? Obviously you don't
mean punishment as prescribed by law.

I mean to say that here we are 20-something odd years later and many
people who were at fault have yet to admit to having made a mistake.
Maybe they've admitted it privately, but I haven't seen it done
publicly so that future programs can grow from their lessons learned.

So that grave errors of this type can be better avoided in the future?
"Grave errors" (such as white-collar folks in high places made here)
have never been better avoided by merely making fall guys of working-
level folks carrying out orders. Obviously such fall guys should have
loudly objected; but complicity does not make them the primary
culprits, unless their track records were abominable.

The ones I recall you complaining about in past years were field-
center folks who were actually REWARDED and/or PROMOTED. I think you
had a very legitimate complaint, because I believe that was criminal.
(Tom Moser pushed hard for the launch and worked hard to cover up; he
was quickly promoted to NASA Hdqtrs.)

Everyone who was involved in that launch decision, and knowledgeable
others who were peripheral yet in a position to voice objection, were
all responsible to a certain extent for the tragedy.

It would be easy for me to agree with you that such people "should
have loudly objected", but I am also sympathetic to the difficulty

that goes into making such a critical decision.  Wayne Hale put it
very well in describing the launch decisions that he was responsible
for.  Here is an excerpt from one of his famous emails of recent
years:

     "I have given the Go 28 times. Every time was the toughest thing
I have ever done.
     And I have never ever been 100 percent certain, it has always
been gray,
     never a sure thing. But the team needs to have confidence that
the decision
     was good. It is almost a requirement to speak the words much
bolder than
     you feel, like it is an easy call. Then you pray that you were
right."

(Ref -http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5522536)

Certainly, the collective decision process by all those involved that
led to this mistake was a grave error.  But the bigger problem I see
is the massive failure to own up to the error.

It is clear to me that the Rogers Commission was charged primarily
with the task of getting the program going again.  Not a thorough
finding of fault with a goal that something similar never happens
again.  O-rings got tagged with the overwhelming majority of fault,
then their focus was moving forward.  Not a big surprise when the
"investigation panel" consists of people like Neil Armstrong, Sally
Ride and Chuck Yeager.

The Hens Guarding the Henhouse!

When John Young and Bob Crippen were called to testify along with
George Abbey, Paul Weitz and Hank Hartsfield, I did not see anyone
pressing them with questions about how safe they felt it was to press
ahead with launching after a night of frozen cold-soaking on an icicle
encrusted pad.  Was it not their duty to speak up for the crew when
they saw everyone caught up in "go fever"?

And when the investigation is so weak that you never get pressed about
mistakes you had made, isn't it your duty to voluntarily admit to it
so that others can learn and help avoid repeating the mistake?
Perhaps the most glaring example of this is Gene Kranz.  He was
sitting in MCC that morning.  I have never seen him official
questioned about his thoughts, actions and inactions.  And when he
wrote his book, he totally skipped over that part.  A more fitting
title would have been:

_Failure_Is_Not_Acknowledged_

I have never seen anyone from the Ops side pressed about their
complicitness with the 51L launch decision.  The official record from
the Commission is particularly dismal.  There was someone who asked
the testifying astronauts about the L-minus-1 MMT discussion where
everyone was queried for concerns about the freezing temperature.  It
was someone like Weitz who stated that he was a member of that
meeting, then later corrected his statement to say that he wasn't in
that meeting.  And that's pretty much where the Commission left it.
When you have "heros" investigating "heros", it is hardly conducive to
getting to the bottom of things.

It is especially sad to think that if Ops had been held accountable
for Challenger, then that part of the organization might have done a
better job of questioning the decision to continue launching in the
post STS-112 environment where the first flight of ETcam recorded a
major SOFI foam damage event.

~ CT- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

On Feb 27, 9:26 am, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:

Everyone who was involved in that launch decision, and knowledgeable
others who were peripheral yet in a position to voice objection, were
all responsible to a certain extent for the tragedy.

Less than 24 hours after the explosion, Jesse Moore admitted to
reporters that NASA Acting Administrator Bill Graham had topside
responsibility for the launch. Graham approved the launch from
Washington. He was the "forcing function."

It would be easy for me to agree with you that such people "should
have loudly objected", but I am also sympathetic to the difficulty

Although you have indirectly recognized it in previous posts, this
latest long dissertation on your views makes no itemized mention of
the *waived* Launch Commit Criteria, the vast number of such
unfathomable waivers, the reasons for approving them, and the names of
the people who approved them (many verbal). Thus I have no inclination
whatsoever to indulge your sympathy for them.

From JTM:





On Feb 27, 9:26 am, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:
Everyone who was involved in that launch decision, and knowledgeable
others who were peripheral yet in a position to voice objection, were
all responsible to a certain extent for the tragedy.

Less than 24 hours after the explosion, Jesse Moore admitted to
reporters that NASA Acting Administrator Bill Graham had topside
responsibility for the launch. Graham approved the launch from
Washington. He was the "forcing function."

It would be easy for me to agree with you that such people "should
have loudly objected", but I am also sympathetic to the difficulty

Although you have indirectly recognized it in previous posts, this
latest long dissertation on your views makes no itemized mention of
the *waived* Launch Commit Criteria, the vast number of such
unfathomable waivers, the reasons for approving them, and the names of
the people who approved them (many verbal). Thus I have no inclination
whatsoever to indulge your sympathy for them.

I have given very direct criticism in past threads about those types
of mistakes.  The waivers, and then the waivers to the waivers!
Hideous decision making made lethal by groupthink.

~ CT- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

Hideous decision making made lethal by groupthink.

On Mar 2, 2:27 am, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:

I have given very direct criticism in past threads about those types
of mistakes. The waivers, and then the waivers to the waivers!
Hideous decision making made lethal by groupthink.

Could you take the time to define what you mean by groupthink? I
certainly was no part of what Diane Vaughn and others profess. In the
words of one NASA engineer who was in a position to know:

"The decision came down from Washington."

On Mar 2, 2:27 am, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:

Hideous decision making made lethal by groupthink.

My evidence doesn't agree much at all with what I suspect you refer to
as groupthink. Rather, it strongly indicates that the time of launch
was cast in concrete the day before. The thinking of the launch group
appears immaterial.

Since you often respect what astronauts say more than those with
launch credentials, let me quote (as example) a couple of involved
astronauts.

Launch Control Center: "We're planning to come out of this hold on
time."

Scobee: "All right! Roger, go ahead. That's great."

Resnik: " ... 11:38. That's the time they talked about in the quarters
last night."

Scobee: "Sure was!"

Perhaps the best analysis on the 51L launch decision was written by
Hans Christian Andersen way back in the 1800s:  The Emperor's New
Clothes.  Whether overtly or subtly, pressure comes down from
Washington that the shuttle will be launched.  But sadly in this case,
there is no little boy to break from the groupthink to boldly assert
what everyone else is thinking.

On Mar 5, 8:51 pm, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:

Perhaps the best analysis on the 51L launch decision was written by
Hans Christian Andersen way back in the 1800s: The Emperor's New
Clothes. Whether overtly or subtly, pressure comes down from
Washington that the shuttle will be launched. But sadly in this case,
there is no little boy to break from the groupthink to boldly assert
what everyone else is thinking.

Perhaps the stumbling block in your case is that you were not
involved, and/or that you've been getting incomplete reports. Not
everyone attempting to expose the Pad B unreadiness and/or to stop
that flagrantly egregious launch was permitted by the NASA/Lockheed
cabal to remain at KSC. Allow me to cite only briefly from my book,
Chapter 4, Executive Betrayal, page 33:

"Moore and Aldrich, the two designated executioners, sat at the main
NASA console. Supporting them were Colonna, Kohrs, Honeycutt, Abbey,
and Rock. On the NASA console below were Weeks, Lucas, Reinhartz,
Mulloy, and three others.

Dick Hartung, NASA's Director of Operations for the Launch Control
Center, telephoned a warning from Austin, Texas. Hartung was normally
present for every launch; but this time he was returning from a
meeting at the Vandenberg Launch Site. He had just declared it 'unfit
to launch.' Hartung's call to Kennedy reached the Operations Control
Center just before the final hold ended. He vehemently expressed his
belief that it was too cold to launch."

From JTM:





On Mar 5, 8:51 pm, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:
Perhaps the best analysis on the 51L launch decision was written by
Hans Christian Andersen way back in the 1800s:  The Emperor's New
Clothes.  Whether overtly or subtly, pressure comes down from
Washington that the shuttle will be launched.  But sadly in this case,
there is no little boy to break from the groupthink to boldly assert
what everyone else is thinking.

Perhaps the stumbling block in your case is that you were not
involved, and/or that you've been getting incomplete reports. Not
everyone attempting to expose the Pad B unreadiness and/or to stop
that flagrantly egregious launch was permitted by the NASA/Lockheed
cabal to remain at KSC. Allow me to cite only briefly from my book,
Chapter 4, Executive Betrayal, page 33:

"Moore and Aldrich, the two designated executioners, sat at the main
NASA console. Supporting them were Colonna, Kohrs, Honeycutt, Abbey,
and Rock. On the NASA console below were Weeks, Lucas, Reinhartz,
Mulloy, and three others.

Dick Hartung, NASA's Director of Operations for the Launch Control
Center, telephoned a warning from Austin, Texas. Hartung was normally
present for every launch; but this time he was returning from a
meeting at the Vandenberg Launch Site. He had just declared it 'unfit
to launch.' Hartung's call to Kennedy reached the Operations Control
Center just before the final hold ended. He vehemently expressed his
belief that it was too cold to launch."

Wow, John.  That's quite a morsel.  I have a definite impression that
you have gathered the most facts from this incident of anyone I know.
I wish you the best with your book.  I don't know where you are at in
the process, but if you are still open for revisions I would offer a
suggestion of avoiding judgement coated terms like 'executioner'.  In
my view as a reader, the most persuasive arguments will present facts
as facts, speculation as speculation, and then lead the reader to
logical conclusions.  Calling those people 'executioners' at that
particular point in time seems to jump the gun a bit too much for my
taste.

On Mar 8, 7:49pm, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:
From JTM:

Dick Hartung, NASA's Director of Operations for the Launch Control
Center, telephoned a warning from Austin, Texas. Hartung was normally
present for every launch; but this time he was returning from a
meeting at the Vandenberg Launch Site. He had just declared it 'unfit
to launch.' Hartung's call to Kennedy reached the Operations Control
Center just before the final hold ended. He vehemently expressed his
belief that it was too cold to launch."

Wow, John. That's quite a morsel. I have a definite impression that
you have gathered the most facts from this incident of anyone I know.
I wish you the best with your book. I don't know where you are at in
the process, but if you are still open for revisions I would offer a
suggestion of avoiding judgement coated terms like 'executioner'. In
my view as a reader, the most persuasive arguments will present facts
as facts, speculation as speculation, and then lead the reader to
logical conclusions. Calling those people 'executioners' at that
particular point in time seems to jump the gun a bit too much for my
taste.

Obviously you've never read Chapter 3, Prelaunch Subversion, and
Chapter 2, Before Challenger..The book was first made available in
2000.

From JTM:

Obviously you've never read Chapter 3, Prelaunch Subversion, and
Chapter 2, Before Challenger..The book was first made available in
2000.

My bad.  I was thinking about one of your sons when I was talking
about book development.  I got my lines crossed.

No, I have never seen your book.  I've scanned through stuff you've
posted online.  I've had difficulty following your logic in several
places.  But I have been impressed with some key facts that you've
presented.  It's as though you've drawn a picture by connecting the
dots.  You've highlighted some important dots that I did not know
where there.  But you've also placed dots where I don't see any.  And
even for the ones we could agree on, I would not necessarily connect
them in the same way that you have.  The end result is that you see a
very different picture.  But that is not to say that there are not
important facts to be gathered from your book.  If I ever find it in a
library, or offered on a webpage, or on a friend's bookshelf, I will
be eager to search it for other morsels, and help me to build a more
complete picture for myself about the whole incident.

On Mar 10, 9:41 am, tdadamemd-spamblo...@excite.com wrote:
snip
No, I have never seen your book.  I've scanned through stuff you've
posted online.  I've had difficulty following your logic in several
places.  But I have been impressed with some key facts that you've
presented.  It's as though you've drawn a picture by connecting the
dots.  You've highlighted some important dots that I did not know
where there.  But you've also placed dots where I don't see any.  And
even for the ones we could agree on, I would not necessarily connect
them in the same way that you have.  The end result is that you see a
very different picture.  But that is not to say that there are not
important facts to be gathered from your book.  If I ever find it in a
library, or offered on a webpage, or on a friend's bookshelf, I will
be eager to search it for other morsels, and help me to build a more
complete picture for myself about the whole incident.

No one can connect dots they cannot see. In mathematics, however,
interpolation is often a useful tool -- depending on the accuracy of
one's envelope.

Perhaps the reason we see Challenger differently is because of our
professional education, pre-Challenger work experience, and direct
prelaunch involvement. Don't be afraid to keep enlightening forum-
dialogs going. You've come a long way since your first post to the
sci.space groups. You didn't get much encouragement.