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Science Forum Index » Nanotechnology Forum » Encrypting Nanotechnology
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| Rory McLean |
Posted: Sat Nov 04, 2006 11:28 pm |
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Given the recent posting about nanotech programming languages
(30/Oct/06), I was thinking about some of the infrastructure that
a system of nanotech like an assembler, or even a cloud of
nanobots, might require.
Any product of nanotech which contain active elements, i.e. is
not a completely passive structure, depending on its fixed
material properties for its usefulness; will need to have
intercommunication between its elements. The exact medium that
this communication uses could vary, as it might be chemical,
electrical, mechanical, or maybe some application of quantum
mechanics, but it will be strongly desirable for it to be secure.
If nanotech intercommunication is not secure then this introduces
the possibility of it being 'hacked', either to change the
behaviour of the nanotech, or to extract some information that
the system desires to keep secure. This hacking would almost
certainly be itself done by nanotech.
Unfortunately adding security to nanotech intercommunication is
going to have overheads, and the usual problems of managing keys.
However, if the security mechanism is built into the nanotech,
for example into a set of nanotech manipulators intended to be
used for just one purpose, then a lot of the normal problems
about key distribution might go away.
I was speculating whether the security mechanism could be
something like the Enigma Machine (see Wikipedia; you could
easily have more than three rotors), with the specific
arrangement of the numbers on the rotors (whether mechanical, or
whatever) and the initial setting of the rotors, being the
starting state for encrypting all communications. The layout of
the rotors and their initial setting would need to be generated
from some random number source.
For real security the rotors could be re-positioned in response
to control instructions irregularly embedded in the encrypted
communications. In a situation where there are lots of messages
flying around being able to decode one into something meaningful
might be used to strongly indicate that it was directed to you.
Of course, we have to work out how to make things like assemblers
work in the first place, but when we do have them, ensuring that
they operate in a secure and reliable way is likely going to be
quite important to us.
---
The idea of using a mechanism related to the Enigma Machine comes
from discussions with Dr I.A. Newman, of Loughborough University,
UK.
--
Rory McLean
rory@romsys.demon.co.uk |
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| Perry E. Metzger |
Posted: Mon Nov 06, 2006 8:34 pm |
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Rory McLean <rory@romsys.demon.co.uk> writes:
Quote: Any product of nanotech which contain active elements, i.e. is
not a completely passive structure, depending on its fixed
material properties for its usefulness; will need to have
intercommunication between its elements. The exact medium that
this communication uses could vary, as it might be chemical,
electrical, mechanical, or maybe some application of quantum
mechanics,
Chemical, electrical and mechanical communication are all products of
quantum mechanics already. Quantum mechanics isn't some sort of
mysterious spooky force outside of the rest of physics -- pretty much
all of physics (outside of gravitation) is covered by QM.
Quote: but it will be strongly desirable for it to be secure.
If nanotech intercommunication is not secure then this introduces
the possibility of it being 'hacked', either to change the
behaviour of the nanotech, or to extract some information that
the system desires to keep secure. This hacking would almost
certainly be itself done by nanotech.
Unfortunately adding security to nanotech intercommunication is
going to have overheads, and the usual problems of managing keys.
However, if the security mechanism is built into the nanotech,
for example into a set of nanotech manipulators intended to be
used for just one purpose, then a lot of the normal problems
about key distribution might go away.
I was speculating whether the security mechanism could be
something like the Enigma Machine (see Wikipedia; you could
easily have more than three rotors),
If you're desire is to have your encryption system broken immediately,
choosing the state of the art from 1935 is perhaps a reasonable
choice. If what you're trying to do is actually protect communications
links, the issue is well understood already. Cryptography is a big
area of study, and there are lots of good modern books that can
provide you with an introduction to the field, not to mention a lot of
research and discovery that has happened in the last 60 years or so.
When I taught a university class in the topic, I used to use
Schneier's "Applied Cryptography" and "Handbook of Applied
Cryptography" by Menezes, Oorschot, and Vanstone as the primary
texts. Those books are now somewhat obsolete -- they don't cover
topics like AES and they were all written long before MD5 got broken
and such. None the less, you could start learning there.
Perry |
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| Phillip Huggan |
Posted: Thu Nov 09, 2006 10:33 pm |
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--- Rory McLean <rory@romsys.demon.co.uk> wrote:
<SNIP>
Quote: In general I would agree with you, but there are
likely to be
communication techniques which are not feasible
using the macro
scale properties of materials, and rely on QM
techniques which
can only be effectively utilised by nano scale
structured
materials, possibly dynamically manipulated using
nanotech. I
wouldn't rule these out.
SNIP
Transmitting encypted information requires only a
laser and a fibre optic cable. We don't know if a
laser will yet be a MNTed product but these can be
produced easily with existing manufacturing
techniques. Surely in a post-MNT world these two 20th
Century inventions will be cheap enough to be
ubiquitous if desired.
WWII ENIGMA communication technologies were hacked by
cryptographers without the assistance of modern
computers (in response to your suggestion MNT should
use an ENIGMA-based encryption strategy).
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| Rory McLean |
Posted: Sat Nov 11, 2006 3:00 am |
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In article <12l7p8nf3667c71@news.supernews.com>, Phillip Huggan
<URL:mailto:cdnprodigy@yahoo.com> wrote:
Quote:
--- Rory McLean <rory@romsys.demon.co.uk> wrote:
SNIP
In general I would agree with you, but there are
likely to be communication techniques which are
not feasible using the macro scale properties of
materials, and rely on QM techniques which
can only be effectively utilised by nano scale
structured materials, possibly dynamically
manipulated using nanotech. I wouldn't rule
these out.
SNIP
Transmitting encypted information requires only a
laser and a fibre optic cable. We don't know if a
laser will yet be a MNTed product but these can be
produced easily with existing manufacturing
techniques. Surely in a post-MNT world these two 20th
Century inventions will be cheap enough to be
ubiquitous if desired.
Some work will be possible on this basis, and these links can be
made quite secure. But, trying to do all the nanotech work
requiring communication using a tethered system, particularly if
the system of nanotech is needing to radically change its shape
and/or size may be quite difficult, and a complication that you
would wish to avoid.
Quote: WWII ENIGMA communication technologies were hacked by
cryptographers without the assistance of modern
computers (in response to your suggestion MNT should
use an ENIGMA-based encryption strategy).
The decryption methods used at Bletchley Park were quite
ingenious, and the later availability of the Bombe to do some of
the brute-force work made amazing use of the available
technology. However, the user mistakes and technical
shortcomings of Enigma that enabled this decryption are now
quite well understood, and it is reasonably easy to work around
them.
A rotor-based system (or its electronic equivalent) has the
great virtues of simplicity and speed, both of which are likely
to be major issues in a nanotech environment. The main
complication is likely going to be the mechanism which changes
the values on, and rotation speed of, the rotors, as is needed
on a irregular basis to prevent decryption.
--
Rory McLean
rory@romsys.demon.co.uk |
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| Rory McLean |
Posted: Sat Nov 11, 2006 3:01 am |
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In article <12l7pgftg9ffkea@news.supernews.com>, Perry E. Metzger
<URL:mailto:perry@piermont.com> wrote:
Quote:
Rory McLean <rory@romsys.demon.co.uk> writes:
Rory McLean <rory@romsys.demon.co.uk> writes:
[snip]
Quote: I was speculating whether the security mechanism could be
something like the Enigma Machine (see Wikipedia; you could
easily have more than three rotors),
If you're desire is to have your encryption system broken immediately,
choosing the state of the art from 1935 is perhaps a reasonable
choice. If what you're trying to do is actually protect communications
links, the issue is well understood already. Cryptography is a big
area of study, and there are lots of good modern books that can
provide you with an introduction to the field, not to mention a lot of
research and discovery that has happened in the last 60 years or so.
With some simple modifications it is possible to take something
very similar to the rotor system of the Enigma Machine and
create an apparently continuous stream of white noise with
apparently random fluctuations.
I'd suggest not discussing a topic you don't understand. I named
several books you could read to correct your lack of understanding in
my previous posting. If you have trouble paying for them you can take
them out at a local library. Ignorance is easily corrected with
education.
I certainly don't claim to be a complete expert on the subject,
but I've taken a little interest in it for a few years. I'm
sure that there are further things to learn.
Quote: When I taught a university class in the topic, I used to use
Schneier's "Applied Cryptography" and "Handbook of Applied
Cryptography" by Menezes, Oorschot, and Vanstone as the primary
texts. Those books are now somewhat obsolete -- they don't cover
topics like AES and they were all written long before MD5 got broken
and such. None the less, you could start learning there.
I would agree with you that Schneier has some interesting things
to say,
Then perhaps you should read his books at least once. I'll be blunt --
your posting made it very clear that you haven't ever cracked either
of his texts on this topic, or any other for that matter.
Yes, Schneier does say interesting things, and I've read quite a
bit of his writings. He makes a lot of sense, but I don't
necessarily agree with everything he says; I suspect that both
of us find that with many subjects.
Careful use of simple mechanisms that are well understood can
often produce useful results - to use a (crude) analogy, people
still construct stone buildings even though far more advanced
construction methods are known, and you can use modern methods
to make them comfortable and pleasant places to live in, or: we
still use crowbars, and the lever was probably one of the first
tools discovered.
I suspect that this is an area where there will be a lot of
disagreement, and that some form of practical demonstration,
which can relatively easily be done on the macro scale, will be
required.
I in no way guarantee the systems that I have sketched will
work, there is always the possibility that something has been
overlooked, but from what I have seen so far, of it and similar
systems over the last 15+ years, I feel it is worth further
investigation.
If nothing else a simple fast form of stream encryption of some
sort will likely be needed, that can be incorporated into
nanotech with minimal overhead, and that was just one
possibility, which has some attractive characteristics.
Quote: Perry
[And your humble moderator will bluntly suggest we maintain a civil tone
in the future, thank you. --JSN]
--
Rory McLean
rory@romsys.demon.co.uk |
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| Perry E. Metzger |
Posted: Sun Nov 12, 2006 10:56 pm |
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Rory McLean <rory@romsys.demon.co.uk> writes:
Quote: Some work will be possible on this basis, and these links can be
made quite secure. But, trying to do all the nanotech work
requiring communication using a tethered system, particularly if
the system of nanotech is needing to radically change its shape
and/or size may be quite difficult, and a complication that you
would wish to avoid.
Both Drexler's "Nanosystems" and the "Nanomedicine" series by Freitas
cover communications methods in substantial detail, including
extensive analysis of all the reasonable possible methods.
Quote: WWII ENIGMA communication technologies were hacked by
cryptographers without the assistance of modern
computers (in response to your suggestion MNT should
use an ENIGMA-based encryption strategy).
The decryption methods used at Bletchley Park were quite
ingenious, and the later availability of the Bombe to do some of
the brute-force work made amazing use of the available
technology. However, the user mistakes and technical
shortcomings of Enigma that enabled this decryption are now
quite well understood, and it is reasonably easy to work around
them.
A rotor-based system (or its electronic equivalent) has the
great virtues of simplicity and speed,
No, actually. There would be no advantages whatsoever to such a
system. A rotor based system would be slow, would not be any simpler
than modern methods, and would have other substantial disadvantages
over modern Feistel ciphers, some of which, like AES, are
extraordinarily fast, well understood, and have been subjected to
rigorous analysis.
Suggesting the use of variants of enigma for encryption is the moral
equivalent of suggesting to someone that if they need to do some
arithmetic quickly that they go out and buy some vacuum tubes, as
though we hadn't made sixty years of progress in computing and that
you couldn't buy a pocket calculator for a few dollars almost
anywhere. It is the equivalent of suggesting that ether is the state
of the art in anaesthesia or that the right way to get from New York
to London in a hurry would be by steamship. It is a profoundly
misguided idea.
Perry |
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| Rory McLean |
Posted: Mon Nov 13, 2006 10:46 am |
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In article <12lfnnpktmst366@news.supernews.com>, Perry E. Metzger
<URL:mailto:perry@piermont.com> wrote:
Quote:
Rory McLean <rory@romsys.demon.co.uk> writes:
[snip]
Quote: WWII ENIGMA communication technologies were hacked by
cryptographers without the assistance of modern
computers (in response to your suggestion MNT should
use an ENIGMA-based encryption strategy).
The decryption methods used at Bletchley Park were quite
ingenious, and the later availability of the Bombe to do some of
the brute-force work made amazing use of the available
technology. However, the user mistakes and technical
shortcomings of Enigma that enabled this decryption are now
quite well understood, and it is reasonably easy to work around
them.
A rotor-based system (or its electronic equivalent) has the
great virtues of simplicity and speed,
No, actually. There would be no advantages whatsoever to such a
system. A rotor based system would be slow, would not be any simpler
than modern methods, and would have other substantial disadvantages
over modern Feistel ciphers, some of which, like AES, are
extraordinarily fast, well understood, and have been subjected to
rigorous analysis.
[snip]
I would be interested in hearing what sort of alternative
synchronous stream cipher you think would provide properties
desirable for nanotech communications.
If you believe it would be an issue, I assume one which does not
use an algorithm which would be susceptible to attack by quantum
computing would be preferable.
--
Rory McLean
rory@romsys.demon.co.uk |
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| Perry E. Metzger |
Posted: Tue Nov 14, 2006 12:24 am |
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Rory McLean <rory@romsys.demon.co.uk> writes:
Quote: A rotor-based system (or its electronic equivalent) has the
great virtues of simplicity and speed,
No, actually. There would be no advantages whatsoever to such a
system. A rotor based system would be slow, would not be any simpler
than modern methods, and would have other substantial disadvantages
over modern Feistel ciphers, some of which, like AES, are
extraordinarily fast, well understood, and have been subjected to
rigorous analysis.
[snip]
I would be interested in hearing what sort of alternative
synchronous stream cipher you think would provide properties
desirable for nanotech communications.
(One wonders what an asynchronous stream cipher might be, but I guess
I'll play along.)
Generally speaking, there is no reason one would use a stream cipher
for such an application. They don't offer particular advantages,
especially now that we understand that it is essential to send
authenticators in all cryptographic protocols, and stream ciphers are
easily misused.
Were I designing such a thing right now I'd probably just use a stock
cryptographic protocol (rolling your own is always dangerous) and
stock cipher algorithms.
Presuming that you're using an ordinary networking protocol for the
communications (there might be reasons not to), things like IPSEC and
SSL are well understood. (Given the computing limitations of some
proposed nanomachine designs, like Freitas' microbovores, it might be
necessary to use something lighter weight in terms of protocols.)
On the crypto algorithm side, AES is a fine cipher for most such
applications. Right now HMAC using SHA-2 variants is probably the best
you can deploy for the MAC, but there will almost certainly be new
MACs that result from the current NIST process that was triggered by
the weaknesses found in MD5 and SHA-1.
Of course, all of this assumes that you are specing such a thing
today. By the time we have actual nanomachines to deploy, we'll may
have better theory on protocols and ciphers, and doubtless we'll have
far more experience -- it would be best to use whatever the state of
the art ends up being in the future. I can guarantee you that will be
rather different in 20 years than it is today.
Quote: If you believe it would be an issue, I assume one which does not
use an algorithm which would be susceptible to attack by quantum
computing would be preferable.
So far as I know, there are no algorithms that break Feistel ciphers
in polynomial time on quantum computers, but of course that might
change someday. Naturally any selection of a cipher suite would
require attention be paid to the state of the art at the time in
cryptanalysis. A couple of years ago no one would have worried about
the use of, say, HMAC with MD5.
Perry |
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| Perry E. Metzger |
Posted: Wed Nov 29, 2006 1:43 am |
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[ Moderator's note: I've approved the following post, but only as an endpoint
to this thread. The thread's relevance to nanotechnology has evaporated,
among other problems. -JimL ]
Rory McLean writes:
Quote: I was a bit reluctant to say too much because of wishing to stay
'on topic', but there is an introduction to encryption, below.
I'm not going to address my comments to Mr. McLean, as that does not
seem to be very useful.
There may be some who are interested in the topic Mr. McLean broached,
but who do not know how to learn more about the topic. I would
strongly recommend that such persons ignore the recent postings by
Mr. McLean as he does not appear able to distinguish subjects that he
understands and can comment on from those that he does not understand
and cannot comment on.
However, that need not leave the interested reader in ignorance.
Cryptography is a large area which requires substantial study to
become expert in, but the knowledge of experts is widely available via
books and papers, and introductory materials are quite accessible to a
reader with a reasonable background in mathematics.
There are a number of good books on the market that I mentioned in
earlier postings. Bruce Schneier has written two, and as these things
go they are only moderately out of date at this point. "Handbook of
Applied Cryptography" which I also mentioned is also, again, only
modestly out of date and is a reasonable introduction to the subject.
I caution that although the principles explained in these books remain
reasonably correct, details, such as which particular cryptographic
algorithms are currently reasonable to use, are not, and the reader
will have to seek more up to date sources.
Having read an introductory volume or two, a student should be in a
reasonable position to learn more about the subject, and especially to
read recent papers.
There are also a lot of sources out there that focus very specifically
on subtopics in cryptography, such as cryptographic protocols, linear
and differential cryptanalysis, "mental games", cryptographic PRNGs,
zero-knowledge proofs, digital cash and credentials, etc. -- good
academic libraries will have these references. I would not recommend
studying such things until one has a basic grounding, but they should
be fairly accessible given a firm grasp of the basics of the field.
There are also a number of good online forums for discussing these
topics, including sci.crypt and the cryptography mailing list that I
run.
Perry |
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