Why do we have a conscience?

j.wilkins1@uq.edu.au (John Wilkins) wrote in
news:epk3o8$dbi$1@darwin.ediacara.org:

William Morse <wdmorse@twcny.rr.com> wrote:

"Anon." <bob.ohara@SOD.OFF.Spammers.helsinki.fi> wrote in news:ep85ir
$290g$1@darwin.ediacara.org:

John Wilkins wrote:
Stephen <stephen63@gmail.com> wrote:

Why do we have a conscience?

We do? Do you have any clear data on this?

Would he allow himself to lie to us?

Bob


Nicely put. And nice to see you are still lurking out there.
But as I think Dr. John is well aware, there are experiments (I am
thinking for instance of some in which one person gets to determine a
ratio to divide "found money" with a second person, and the second
person gets to choose whether to accept the ratio) which do show that
there is a conscience. So we should return to the orginal question of
why we have one. Which is of course easy

There are social reciprocal calculators in the brain, yes (and they
work more or less well in differing individuals). That is *not* a
conscience. That is a social reciprocation calculator. A conscience is
a moral pointer to moral correctness or truth. I claim that is a
fiction. There is no such faculty or capacity of the brain or any
other physical property or subsystem of the human animal. "Conscience"
is the reification of social norms. That we follow social norms is a
fact about us (with an evolutionary history). That norms of a certain
kind or type *should* be followed is not a fact, it's a moral posit,
and to assert that we have this faculty because moral norms exist and
are enforced is to make both a post hoc claim and commit the
naturalistic fallacy in ethics.

I don't know the correct name for it, but objecting to the existence of
an observed behavior on philosophical grounds does not make a
particularly effective argument

In fact we do have a conscience: we have a word for it that is heavily
used and clearly describes a mental faculty shared by almost everyone. We
have a word - psychopath - for people who don't have that mental faculty.

We know that the faculty is associated with the prefrontal cortex, as
damage to that part of the brain destroys the faculty. Conscience is
clearly a pointer to moral correctness - keeping in mind that morality is
largely a social construct. We have it because social norms do exist and
_have been_ enforced, and it keeps us out of the kinds of trouble that a
social animal which disobeys social norms gets into. As I noted
previously, it is a self-regulatory mechanism.

Now I agree that a conscience is not a social reciprocation calculator -
because in highly social animals there isn't time to make the required
calculations before taking an action. In semi-social animals a conscience
isn't needed because the calculations are easier: cats don't have
consciences, dogs do.

I have two answers for you, both of which I think are parts of the
complex
truth.
1) We have a conscience because it keeps us from doing things we would
later
regret as a consequence of natural selection at the individual level.

JE:-
The term "individual level" has to be corrected to "fertile individual
level" simply because genes within infertile individuals cannot be
passed on
to another individual until the one they are within becomes fertile.

I agree that offspring produced to function as tools, rather than as
potentially reproductive individuals are not direct players in the
evolution
game.

They would be like mitochondria in vertebrate males. We might
disagree about offspring with potentially fertile futures, but which do
not
survive to maturity.

2) We have a conscience because it contributes to functioning of our
social
organizations as a consequence of natural selection at the group level.

JE:-
What do you mean?
1) Selection BY the group acting on just fertile individuals (the
Baldwin
effect) where the group is not acting as a _selectee_ just a _selector_.

Not this.

2) Selection OF the group (i.e. the group does act as a selectee and not
just a selector) by default comparison of the fitness of groups in which
each group fitness is:

i) just the sum of the fitness of each fertile individual which
comprises any one group.

Not this.

ii) not just the sum of the fitness of each individual which
comprises any one group.

This mechanism would be included in my meaning.

Guy A Hoelzer hoelzer@unr.edu wrote:-

I have two answers for you, both of which I think are parts of the complex
truth. 1) We have a conscience because it keeps us from doing things we
would later regret as a consequence of natural selection at the individual
level.

JE:-
The term "individual level" has to be corrected to "fertile individual
level" simply because genes within infertile individuals cannot be passed on
to another individual until the one they are within becomes fertile.

I agree that offspring produced to function as tools, rather than as
potentially reproductive individuals are not direct players in the evolution
game.

JE:-
Do you agree that infertile forms must remain an integrated part of a
fertile form?

They would be like mitochondria in vertebrate males. We might disagree about
offspring with potentially fertile futures, but which do not survive to
maturity.

2) We have a conscience because it contributes to functioning of our social
organizations as a consequence of natural selection at the group level.

JE:-
What do you mean? 1) Selection BY the group acting on just fertile
individuals (the Baldwin effect) where the group is not acting as a
_selectee_ just a _selector_.

Not this.

JE:-
Ok.

2) Selection OF the group (i.e. the group does act as a selectee and not
just a selector) by default comparison of the fitness of groups in which
each group fitness is:

i) just the sum of the fitness of each fertile individual which
comprises any one group.

Not this.

JE:-
Ok.

ii) not just the sum of the fitness of each individual which
comprises any one group.

This mechanism would be included in my meaning.

JE:-
Why did you exclude selection OF the group in which each group fitness is
just the sum of the fitness of each fertile individual which comprises any
one group?

Why do we have a conscience?

JE:-
The term "individual level" has to be corrected to "fertile individual
level" simply because genes within infertile individuals cannot be
passed on
to another individual until the one they are within becomes fertile.

I agree that offspring produced to function as tools, rather than as
potentially reproductive individuals are not direct players in the
evolution
game.

JE:-
Do you agree that infertile forms must remain an integrated part of a
fertile form?

I think this may be an accurate description of the relationship between an
infertile organism and it's parent(s) sometimes, but it is not necessarily
so. I don't see a mule as being an integrated part of any fertile form.

ii) not just the sum of the fitness of each individual which
comprises any one group.

This mechanism would be included in my meaning.

JE:-
Why did you exclude selection OF the group in which each group fitness
is
just the sum of the fitness of each fertile individual which comprises
any
one group?

Because under this description there is no evidence that the group
actually
exists as a possible unit of selection.

It suggests that the existence of
the group as a potential target of selection is a figment of our
imagination.

I prefer to think of group selection acting when there is
absolutely no correlation between individual fitnesses and group
fitnesses.

In my opinion fitnesses at nested levels of organization are often
intertwined and only semi-independent, but it is important to recognize
that
being semi-independent is not the same as being entirely dependent. It
is
autonomy by degree.

William Morse <wdmorse@twcny.rr.com> wrote:

j.wilkins1@uq.edu.au (John Wilkins) wrote in
news:epk3o8$dbi$1@darwin.ediacara.org:

William Morse <wdmorse@twcny.rr.com> wrote:

"Anon." <bob.ohara@SOD.OFF.Spammers.helsinki.fi> wrote in
news:ep85ir $290g$1@darwin.ediacara.org:

John Wilkins wrote:
Stephen <stephen63@gmail.com> wrote:

Why do we have a conscience?

We do? Do you have any clear data on this?

Would he allow himself to lie to us?

Bob


Nicely put. And nice to see you are still lurking out there.
But as I think Dr. John is well aware, there are experiments (I am
thinking for instance of some in which one person gets to
determine a ratio to divide "found money" with a second person,
and the second person gets to choose whether to accept the ratio)
which do show that there is a conscience. So we should return to
the orginal question of why we have one. Which is of course easy

There are social reciprocal calculators in the brain, yes (and they
work more or less well in differing individuals). That is *not* a
conscience. That is a social reciprocation calculator. A conscience
is a moral pointer to moral correctness or truth. I claim that is a
fiction. There is no such faculty or capacity of the brain or any
other physical property or subsystem of the human animal.
"Conscience" is the reification of social norms. That we follow
social norms is a fact about us (with an evolutionary history).
That norms of a certain kind or type *should* be followed is not a
fact, it's a moral posit, and to assert that we have this faculty
because moral norms exist and are enforced is to make both a post
hoc claim and commit the naturalistic fallacy in ethics.

I don't know the correct name for it, but objecting to the existence
of an observed behavior on philosophical grounds does not make a
particularly effective argument ;-)

Philosophy isn't supposed to get at the truth, but to make it obvious
there are other ways of thinking. WhatI'm trying to do here is make
people *define* what they mean, and consider if the folk definitions
are in fact referential. If the "faculty of conscience" does not lie
in the brain, but in the relations of brains to each other (i.e., in
social contexts and interactions), any attempt to "find the
conscience" or the "moral gene" will fail.

In fact we do have a conscience: we have a word for it that is
heavily used and clearly describes a mental faculty shared by almost
everyone. We have a word - psychopath - for people who don't have
that mental faculty.

I would rather say that psychopaths lack empathy than that they lack a
moral faculty. They know well enough what the norms are - they simply
don't *care*.

We know that the faculty is associated with the prefrontal cortex, as
damage to that part of the brain destroys the faculty. Conscience is
clearly a pointer to moral correctness - keeping in mind that
morality is largely a social construct. We have it because social
norms do exist and _have been_ enforced, and it keeps us out of the
kinds of trouble that a social animal which disobeys social norms
gets into. As I noted previously, it is a self-regulatory mechanism.

I think there are several mechanisms in play in this case (not that I
go for massive modularity)

people have a very strong sense of self-interest, others less so. My
Asperger's son will stick with a position he *knows* is right come
hell or high water - how it affects his life and relations doesn't
matter to him. Does he have a stronger moral sense than others? Not
really - he's not following the societal norms, but his own.
Psychopaths put their own self-interests so perceived above anyone
else's; they are moral solipsists. But this is not because of the lack
of a conscience as such. It is about emphases and strengths or the
absence of them, of some set of mechanisms.

Now I agree that a conscience is not a social reciprocation
calculator - because in highly social animals there isn't time to
make the required calculations before taking an action. In
semi-social animals a conscience isn't needed because the
calculations are easier: cats don't have consciences, dogs do.

I think that social animals do have social reciprocation calculators,
but the "calculation" they do is an honorary kind of calculation -
just as we don't calculate the ballistic trajectory of a ball when we
catch it - we are *trained* into that, and trained into social
conformity. But I'll keep the term "social reciprocation calculator"
anyway.

I see consciousness more or less on a universal level whereas I view
conscience on a individual level. A true conscience is rare; it is like
compassion.

j.wilkins1@uq.edu.au (John Wilkins) wrote in
news:eptqk3$u4t$1@darwin.ediacara.org:

William Morse <wdmorse@twcny.rr.com> wrote:

Now I agree that a conscience is not a social reciprocation
calculator - because in highly social animals there isn't time to
make the required calculations before taking an action. In
semi-social animals a conscience isn't needed because the
calculations are easier: cats don't have consciences, dogs do.

I think that social animals do have social reciprocation calculators,
but the "calculation" they do is an honorary kind of calculation -
just as we don't calculate the ballistic trajectory of a ball when we
catch it - we are *trained* into that, and trained into social
conformity. But I'll keep the term "social reciprocation calculator"
anyway.


Well first of all, we "do" calculate the ballistic trajectory of a ball.
We have had this discussion before, and it is simply impossible to
remember all the possible trajectories by training - the only way to do
it is to have a ballistic calculator. I also think that social animals do
have social reciprocation calculators, but these work on one-to-one
relationships within the society. The purpose of a conscience is to work
on one-to-many and many-to-one relationships.

Guy A Hoelzer hoelzer@unr.edu wrote:-

JE:-
The term "individual level" has to be corrected to "fertile individual
level" simply because genes within infertile individuals cannot be passed
on to another individual until the one they are within becomes fertile.

I agree that offspring produced to function as tools, rather than as
potentially reproductive individuals are not direct players in the
evolution game.

JE:-
Do you agree that infertile forms must remain an integrated part of a
fertile form?

I think this may be an accurate description of the relationship between an
infertile organism and it's parent(s) sometimes, but it is not necessarily
so. I don't see a mule as being an integrated part of any fertile form.

JE:-
I think a mule represents a classic example as to why any infertile form
must remain an integrated part of a fertile form. The genes in a mule can go
nowhere because mules cannot breed only allowing a mule to have a zero
fitness. The best any mule can do is to assist the genes it has inherited
from its fertile parents to enter the next organism generation. This means
assisting its own parents to breed. If these parents mostly breed more mules
then the whole thing starts to resemble a eusocial reproductive strategy.

ii) not just the sum of the fitness of each individual which
comprises any one group.

This mechanism would be included in my meaning.

JE:-
Why did you exclude selection OF the group in which each group fitness is
just the sum of the fitness of each fertile individual which comprises any
one group?

Because under this description there is no evidence that the group actually
exists as a possible unit of selection.

JE:-
But I have been posting the same argument to sbe for nearly 5 years now.
Previously you rejected it (I think the closest was about 3 months ago).

The only possible reason why "under this description there is no evidence that
the group actually exists as a possible unit of selection" is because additive
fitness associations can only produce _fitness independent_ associations.

This means that selection between additive in fitness parts must be occurring
before selection between groups possibly can.

This in turn means group selection must always remain subject to individual
selection disallowing the evolution of organism fitness altruism in nature via
selection between additive in fitness groups.

It suggests that the existence of the group as a potential target of
selection is a figment of our imagination.

JE:-
I argue that group selection between additive in fitness groups remains 100%
subject to individual selection, i.e. it can act as an amplifier for
Darwinian selection acting at the fertile organism level. The common
argument that it can contest and win against the Darwinian fertile organism
level was and remains _entirely_ false.

I prefer to think of group selection acting when there is absolutely no
correlation between individual fitnesses and group fitnesses.

JE:-
If the fitness of the group is NOT just the simple sum of the fitness of the
parts then that group must constitute one Darwinian selectee.

IOW what we are looking at here is one organism and any infertile offspring as
just a single unit of selection. Quite clearly the fitness of each cell or
each organ does not simply add up to provide the fitness of one organism no
matter how you define fitness. I might add neither does the fitness of the
genomic genes. Therefore it is not possible to argue that any of these parts
have an independent fitness.

Put another way, any such argument constitutes an oversimplification of
empirical reality which must be corrected before it can be validly applied.

In my opinion fitnesses at nested levels of organization are often
intertwined and only semi-independent, but it is important to recognize that
being semi-independent is not the same as being entirely dependent. It is
autonomy by degree.

JE:-
I have been attempting to discuss nested sets of fitness for over two years
now without a single response. Do you discriminate between intersecting sets
and nested sets?

"William Morse" <NOwdSPAMmorse@verizon.net> wrote...
j.wilkins1@uq.edu.au (John Wilkins) wrote in
news:eptqk3$u4t$1@darwin.ediacara.org:

William Morse <wdmorse@twcny.rr.com> wrote:

Now I agree that a conscience is not a social reciprocation
calculator - because in highly social animals there isn't time to
make the required calculations before taking an action. In
semi-social animals a conscience isn't needed because the
calculations are easier: cats don't have consciences, dogs do.

I think that social animals do have social reciprocation calculators,
but the "calculation" they do is an honorary kind of calculation -
just as we don't calculate the ballistic trajectory of a ball when we
catch it - we are *trained* into that, and trained into social
conformity. But I'll keep the term "social reciprocation calculator"
anyway.


Well first of all, we "do" calculate the ballistic trajectory of a ball.
We have had this discussion before, and it is simply impossible to
remember all the possible trajectories by training - the only way to do
it is to have a ballistic calculator. I also think that social animals do
have social reciprocation calculators, but these work on one-to-one
relationships within the society. The purpose of a conscience is to work
on one-to-many and many-to-one relationships.

Er... From what I have read, we do not calculate the trajectory of a
ball - at least professional American baseball outfielders do not. If
they did make that calculation, we would expect them to run to the
expected point of impact, and there await the ball's arrival. But instead,
they set a course and speed that will cause their path to intersect with
the ball at the point in time when the ball reaches the ground. It might
seem that this is a more difficult computational problem, but it is not.
It is accomplished by maintaining a constant rate of change in the angle
of elevation, and a constant value in the direction (as projected onto the
Earth's surface, relative to your own path). That second tactic also works,
by the way, in attacking moving land-bound prey.

All too often we see cognitive functions as one-time computations. But,
as in this case, they are often better seen as servo-loop computations -
maintaining a stimulus at some desired value. I wonder whether this
insight might not also be applicable to the question of moral calculations
as well.

"William Morse" <NOwdSPAMmorse@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:eq5f3k$o14$1@darwin.ediacara.org...
j.wilkins1@uq.edu.au (John Wilkins) wrote in
news:eptqk3$u4t$1@darwin.ediacara.org:

William Morse <wdmorse@twcny.rr.com> wrote:

Now I agree that a conscience is not a social reciprocation
calculator - because in highly social animals there isn't time to
make the required calculations before taking an action. In
semi-social animals a conscience isn't needed because the
calculations are easier: cats don't have consciences, dogs do.

I think that social animals do have social reciprocation
calculators, but the "calculation" they do is an honorary kind of
calculation - just as we don't calculate the ballistic trajectory
of a ball when we catch it - we are *trained* into that, and
trained into social conformity. But I'll keep the term "social
reciprocation calculator" anyway.


Well first of all, we "do" calculate the ballistic trajectory of a
ball. We have had this discussion before, and it is simply impossible
to remember all the possible trajectories by training - the only way
to do it is to have a ballistic calculator. I also think that social
animals do have social reciprocation calculators, but these work on
one-to-one relationships within the society. The purpose of a
conscience is to work on one-to-many and many-to-one relationships.

Er... From what I have read, we do not calculate the trajectory of a
ball - at least professional American baseball outfielders do not. If
they did make that calculation, we would expect them to run to the
expected point of impact, and there await the ball's arrival. But
instead, they set a course and speed that will cause their path to
intersect with the ball at the point in time when the ball reaches the
ground. It might seem that this is a more difficult computational
problem, but it is not. It is accomplished by maintaining a constant
rate of change in the angle of elevation, and a constant value in the
direction (as projected onto the Earth's surface, relative to your own
path). That second tactic also works, by the way, in attacking moving
land-bound prey.

All too often we see cognitive functions as one-time computations.
But, as in this case, they are often better seen as servo-loop
computations - maintaining a stimulus at some desired value. I wonder
whether this insight might not also be applicable to the question of
moral calculations as well.

I will have to think about this one. Conscience is the balance between
pleasure and guilt, between individual benefit and group benefit, between
short term reward and long term reward? It downregulates or upregulates
selfish behavior through guilt and gratification in order to maintain an
optimum tradeoff? Interesting.

"Perplexed in Peoria" <jimmenegay@sbcglobal.net> wrote in
news:eq7nh9$1k3m$1@darwin.ediacara.org:


"William Morse" <NOwdSPAMmorse@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:eq5f3k$o14$1@darwin.ediacara.org...
j.wilkins1@uq.edu.au (John Wilkins) wrote in
news:eptqk3$u4t$1@darwin.ediacara.org:

William Morse <wdmorse@twcny.rr.com> wrote:

Now I agree that a conscience is not a social reciprocation
calculator - because in highly social animals there isn't time to
make the required calculations before taking an action. In
semi-social animals a conscience isn't needed because the
calculations are easier: cats don't have consciences, dogs do.

I think that social animals do have social reciprocation
calculators, but the "calculation" they do is an honorary kind of
calculation - just as we don't calculate the ballistic trajectory
of a ball when we catch it - we are *trained* into that, and
trained into social conformity. But I'll keep the term "social
reciprocation calculator" anyway.


Well first of all, we "do" calculate the ballistic trajectory of a
ball. We have had this discussion before, and it is simply impossible
to remember all the possible trajectories by training - the only way
to do it is to have a ballistic calculator. I also think that social
animals do have social reciprocation calculators, but these work on
one-to-one relationships within the society. The purpose of a
conscience is to work on one-to-many and many-to-one relationships.

Er... From what I have read, we do not calculate the trajectory of a
ball - at least professional American baseball outfielders do not. If
they did make that calculation, we would expect them to run to the
expected point of impact, and there await the ball's arrival. But
instead, they set a course and speed that will cause their path to
intersect with the ball at the point in time when the ball reaches the
ground. It might seem that this is a more difficult computational
problem, but it is not. It is accomplished by maintaining a constant
rate of change in the angle of elevation, and a constant value in the
direction (as projected onto the Earth's surface, relative to your own
path). That second tactic also works, by the way, in attacking moving
land-bound prey.

This may well be true for outfielders chasing down a line drive. For pop
flies, however, they do in fact run to the expected point of impact and
await the ball's arrival. And when they throw the ball to the catcher to
make the out at home, they have to calculate the trajectory. Or to use a
more topical example, Peyton Manning has to calculate both the expected
trajectory of his pass and the expected trajectory of his receiver, and
he doesn't get to use the mechanism you suggest since he can't adjust the
trajectory once the ball is thrown.

All too often we see cognitive functions as one-time computations.
But, as in this case, they are often better seen as servo-loop
computations - maintaining a stimulus at some desired value. I wonder
whether this insight might not also be applicable to the question of
moral calculations as well.

I will have to think about this one. Conscience is the balance between
pleasure and guilt, between individual benefit and group benefit, between
short term reward and long term reward? It downregulates or upregulates
selfish behavior through guilt and gratification in order to maintain an
optimum tradeoff? Interesting.



--
Yours,

Bill Morse

It was once projected that a million monkeys with a million typewriters
could, by random typing, eventually reproduce the works of Shakespeare.
Now, thanks to the internet, we know that this is not true

In article <ep3v6q$oce$1@darwin.ediacara.org>, "Stephen"
stephen63@gmail.com> wrote:
Why do we have a conscience?

No one knows.

I think that if one adopts truly consistent reductionist position,
there is no room for an evolutionary significance of consciousness.

snip

IMHO, there might be some room for evolutionary explanation of
consciousness if one assumes dualist stance (e.g. consciousness
is universal property of everything).