Materialism, and Causation
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Several weeks ago in a discussion with Ashlie Benjamin Hocking
on the
thread The Behaviorist Mantra we had occasion to examine the
nature of
causation in material and sentient contexts and different
approaches
to the subject were essayed by each of us.

I opined the view that for environmental circumstances E and
sentient
behavior B the nature of causation could best be described as
follows:

(E1 with B1) produces (E2 with B2) produces (En with Bn)
.. . .

where the term "produces" is used to signify ordinary sequences
of
material causation describable according to conventional
physical laws
but the term "with" is taken to refer to some kind of
combinatorial
principle according to which E and B interact differently from
the way
in which interactions occur according to the idea of
"produces". And
the kind of causation described by "produces" would best be
described
in reference to sentience as particular in nature because it
refers to
changes to B without describing B in itself whereas the kind of
causation described by "with" is best described as general in
nature
because it refers to the nature of B without reference to
change.

On the other hand AHB opined that sequences of sentient
behavioral
causation could best be described according to

E1 produces B1 produces E2 produces B2 produces En produces
Bn . . .

However this raises an interesting question. If ordinary
sequences of
material causation can be described as

E1 produces E2 produces E3 produces En . . .

how then are we to tell the difference between E and B in terms
cause
and effect.

In other words since the "produces" rule only reflects
causational
properties characteristic of material interactions alone, where
is
there any distinguishing rule of interaction between material
circumstances and sentient being such that we can tell the
difference?

I think the answer to this question is that most scientists
would
agree with ABH's view that there is no difference and that
sentient
behavior as well as behavioral changes are completely defined
according to principles of material interaction and causation
alone.

I on the other hand incline to the view that there are
different
principles of interaction between E and B than between E1 and
E2
and that the different principles are what determine the nature
of
sentience to begin with and define the nature of the causation
between E and B in general as opposed to particular terms.

And as justification for this view I cite the ordinary
behavioral
experimental evidence that we behave as if we are different
from
matter and material interactions alone. Now we understand the
nature
of the principles defining matter and material interactions
fairly
well. So we don't need to understand what it is that we are
behaving
as if we were different from. Rather the question becomes what
is the
nature of the behavior itself which defines this kind of
behavior? And
that can only be addressed and answered by means of some kind
of
combinatorial "with" principle describing the interaction
between
E and B that causes us to behave that way as distinct from
matter.

Regards - Lester