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Science Forum Index » Cognitive Science Forum » Symbols, State and Mind.
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| Alex Green |
 Posted: Tue Feb 10, 2004 5:50 am |
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It is often the case when talking about 'mind' that correspondents
declare they are sceptical that the other party even has a mind
because they are only privy to the communications (behaviour/output)
of the other party. Is this a tenable position?
A symbol consists of a set of things arranged in space and/or time.
Suppose there were a machine connected to a measuring device. At a
particular state of the measuring device the machine creates a symbol
and transmits/throws the symbol to some other place. Another machine
finds the symbol.
The symbol could be any form of things whatsoever so unless the
recipient contains a set of properties of the symbol, some measuring
device(s) and a function for comparing properties with the symbol it
would be indistinguishable from the environment.
Suppose the first machine creates a symbol when the cogs and wheels
within it have a particular state. As before, the recipient must
contain properties, measuring device and functions to deal with the
symbol.
Suppose the objective of the transfer of the symbol is to allow the
second machine to check the processing of the state of the first
machine. The first machine sends a symbol for its initial state and
then a symbol for its final state. The second machine receives the
first symbol, sets its state to correspond to that of the first
machine and then operates what should be an identical process, it
stores the output. At the end it compares the output state with that
specified by the second symbol.
How do the states of the two machines correspond with each other? The
first machine must have a table of properties of symbols (a symbol
'state' specification) to generate the original symbols.
The second machine must also have a partial state specification to
pick up the symbol. To set its own state according to the symbol and
operate the process it must have a full state specification for the
first symbol. Similarly, when it receives the second symbol it must
have a full state specification for the second symbol to complete the
task.
When a person declares that a communication does not give them any
insight into the existence of 'mind' in another person are they being
honest, pedantic or autistic?
Best Wishes
Alex Green |
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| Wolf Kirchmeir |
| Posted: Tue Feb 10, 2004 5:50 am |
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On 10 Feb 2004 02:50:07 -0800, Alex Green wrote:
....snip...
Quote: When a person declares that a communication does not give them any
insight into the existence of 'mind' in another person are they being
honest, pedantic or autistic?
Best Wishes
Alex Green
I'll pose another riddle:
I say, "Isn't that a lovely blue morning glory!" You look and agree. Have you
had the same experience of "blue morning glory" as I have?
An anecdote that may shed some light:
I was repeatedly asked by my students whether we in fact see colours the same
way. I said I don't know, and in any case, how can you tell? Well, we use the
same words for the same colours, don't we? But someone said, What about the
colour blind? What's "colour blind" I asked. Oh, you know people who can't
tell red from green. Well, then all we can really tell is whether two people
see the same colour differences..... And we had a fun few minutes discovering
that certain colours are called "red" or "brown" even though they are the
same colour. And that "aqua" is considered a green by some people and a blue
by others. And that some colours are called yellow by some people and orange
by others. And so on. No wonder the colour designers make big bucks!
--
Wolf Kirchmeir, Blind River ON Canada
"Nature does not deal in rewards or punishments, but only in consequences."
(Robert Ingersoll) |
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| Alex Green |
| Posted: Tue Feb 10, 2004 2:03 pm |
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"Wolf Kirchmeir" <wwolfkir@sympatico.can> wrote in message news:<jbysxveflzcngvpbpna.hsvj3e2.pminews@news1.sympatico.ca>...
Quote: On 10 Feb 2004 02:50:07 -0800, Alex Green wrote:
...snip...
When a person declares that a communication does not give them any
insight into the existence of 'mind' in another person are they being
honest, pedantic or autistic?
Best Wishes
Alex Green
I'll pose another riddle:
I say, "Isn't that a lovely blue morning glory!" You look and agree. Have you
had the same experience of "blue morning glory" as I have?
So we've decided that there's something in common. As there had to be
for communication. All you are wondering is how much.
Notice that my original example included a report about a measuring
device. The method of communication was the same for the measuring
device as for a report on an internal state. Am I as entitled to deny
knowledge of your measurements as much as you are entitled to deny
knowledge of my mind?
Best Wishes
Alex Green |
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| Wolf Kirchmeir |
| Posted: Wed Feb 11, 2004 4:54 am |
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On 10 Feb 2004 11:03:48 -0800, Alex Green wrote:
Quote: ...snip...
When a person declares that a communication does not give them any
insight into the existence of 'mind' in another person are they being
honest, pedantic or autistic?
Best Wishes
Alex Green
I'll pose another riddle:
I say, "Isn't that a lovely blue morning glory!" You look and agree. Have you
had the same experience of "blue morning glory" as I have?
So we've decided that there's something in common. As there had to be
for communication. All you are wondering is how much.
Not "how much" but "what". Which is, I think, the point of my anecdote, which
you snipped.
--
Wolf Kirchmeir, Blind River ON Canada
"Nature does not deal in rewards or punishments, but only in consequences."
(Robert Ingersoll) |
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| Alex Green |
| Posted: Wed Feb 11, 2004 6:04 pm |
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"Wolf Kirchmeir" <wwolfkir@sympatico.can> wrote in message news:<jbysxveflzcngvpbpna.hsxdfd4.pminews@news1.sympatico.ca>...
Quote: On 10 Feb 2004 11:03:48 -0800, Alex Green wrote:
...snip...
When a person declares that a communication does not give them any
insight into the existence of 'mind' in another person are they being
honest, pedantic or autistic?
Best Wishes
Alex Green
I'll pose another riddle:
I say, "Isn't that a lovely blue morning glory!" You look and agree. Have you
had the same experience of "blue morning glory" as I have?
So we've decided that there's something in common. As there had to be
for communication. All you are wondering is how much.
Not "how much" but "what". Which is, I think, the point of my anecdote, which
you snipped.
Your point seemed to be: "Well, then all we can really tell is whether
two people see the same colour differences".
My point is that you were communicating about colour and understood
each other in many ways. The fact that you could not be certain about
whether you really experienced the exact same colours is interesting
but cannot be generalised to justify any statement about the
impossibility of communicating our mental states to each other.
Spatial position is much more likely than colour to evoke agreement
between observers but this agreement is based on an assumption that
the space of our Cyclopean vision is a vector space. Your 'agreement'
about colour differences is implying an underlying vector space for
colour coordinates. It could be argued that if there exists such a
vector space then it is likely that people can experience the same
colours but in a particular experience may have slightly different
colour vectors.
I would suggest that all communication between people is about states
of the brain because these intervene between sensory stimuli and the
output of communication symbols. Many of these states are conscious
states. |
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| galathaea |
| Posted: Thu Feb 12, 2004 7:41 pm |
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"Alex Green" wrote:
: It is often the case when talking about 'mind' that correspondents
: declare they are sceptical that the other party even has a mind
: because they are only privy to the communications (behaviour/output)
: of the other party. Is this a tenable position?
:
: A symbol consists of a set of things arranged in space and/or time.
: Suppose there were a machine connected to a measuring device. At a
: particular state of the measuring device the machine creates a symbol
: and transmits/throws the symbol to some other place. Another machine
: finds the symbol.
:
: The symbol could be any form of things whatsoever so unless the
: recipient contains a set of properties of the symbol, some measuring
: device(s) and a function for comparing properties with the symbol it
: would be indistinguishable from the environment.
:
: Suppose the first machine creates a symbol when the cogs and wheels
: within it have a particular state. As before, the recipient must
: contain properties, measuring device and functions to deal with the
: symbol.
:
: Suppose the objective of the transfer of the symbol is to allow the
: second machine to check the processing of the state of the first
: machine. The first machine sends a symbol for its initial state and
: then a symbol for its final state. The second machine receives the
: first symbol, sets its state to correspond to that of the first
: machine and then operates what should be an identical process, it
: stores the output. At the end it compares the output state with that
: specified by the second symbol.
:
: How do the states of the two machines correspond with each other? The
: first machine must have a table of properties of symbols (a symbol
: 'state' specification) to generate the original symbols.
:
: The second machine must also have a partial state specification to
: pick up the symbol. To set its own state according to the symbol and
: operate the process it must have a full state specification for the
: first symbol. Similarly, when it receives the second symbol it must
: have a full state specification for the second symbol to complete the
: task.
:
: When a person declares that a communication does not give them any
: insight into the existence of 'mind' in another person are they being
: honest, pedantic or autistic?
Just to give some formality, the papers
"Representing communicative intentions in collaborative conversational
agents" by Matthew Stone
"Speech and language processing" by Jurafsky and Martin
"Denotational semantics for agent communication languages" by Frank Guerin
and Jeremy Pitt
"From continuous dynamics to symbols" by Herbert Jaeger
"Attractors in the development of communication" by E. D. de Jong
"Autonomous formation of concepts and communication" by E. de Jong
(and much related research) show very well how mathematical models can
capture the Quinean connection language illustrates between "programs". If
our brains show computational abilities, then language certainly
demonstrates at least a connection between these computational aspects of
our brains in these models.
--
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
galathaea: prankster, fablist, magician, liar |
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| Wolf Kirchmeir |
| Posted: Sat Feb 14, 2004 5:45 am |
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On 11 Feb 2004 15:04:39 -0800, Alex Green wrote:
Quote: Your point seemed to be: "Well, then all we can really tell is whether
two people see the same colour differences".
Well, my point actually was "All we can tell is whether people can
differentiate the same colours", which I don't think is the same as seeing
the same differences. The test is whether people put the a group of
bluish-green colour swatches in the same sequence from green to blue, say.
And whether they place a yellow swatch in the sequence, or say it doesn't
belong. And so on.
But just what people see as the "difference" is IMO as unclear as what people
see. We do know that people can't distinguish between pure colours of a
single wave length and colours made up of a mix of wavelengths. That's
because of the chemistry of the retinal receptors, among many other things.
We also observe some people seem to be sensitive to small differences that
others don't notice. (The differences are "small" precisely because some
people can't differentiate the colours.) Again, what we are left with is what
people say about colours, what colours they choose to combine in their
designs and pictures, how they arrange swatches of colour, etc.
Anyhow, I think by experience you mean conscious experience. I have no idea
how that comes about, although I find both Dennett's and Minsky's ideas
interesting. But that doesn't mean I think their ideas point towards a
solution of the problem. All I can be reasonably sure of is that other people
are conscious, that cats an dogs are conscious in a somewhat less complicated
way, that worms are either quiescent or active, and that the roses in my
garden, if they think at all, give me no signs of it that I can recognise.
But whether conscious experience can be fully shared is another question
entirely, and I don't share your optimism that "communication between people
is about states of the brain because these intervene between sensory stimuli
and the output of communication symbols. Many of these states are conscious
states." The fact that communication works doesn't mean the we know how it
works, nor that we know what is communicated. For even if your claim were
true, it doesn't guarantee that the subjective experience is the same.
Communication leaves out too much - so much that I am amazed it works all, in
fact. Communication abstracts from experience, it transfers something about
the structure or form of "experience", not its content.
Nevertheless, your comments have made me reconsider some questions. Not that
I'm any closer to anything remotely resembling a definitive answer.
--
Wolf Kirchmeir, Blind River, Ontario, Canada
"Knowledge defines the boundaries of ignorance"
(after Augustine, Mcluhan and others.)
{drop first and last letters in address for correct email} |
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