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 Posted: Sat Oct 24, 2009 5:23 pm |
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http://rawstory.com/2009/10/bryan-whitman-2/
Pentagon used psychological operation on US public, documents show
By Brad Jacobson
Wednesday, October 21st, 2009 -- 10:12 am
Figure in Bush propaganda operation remains Pentagon spokesman
In Part I of this series, Raw Story revealed that Bryan Whitman, the current
deputy assistant secretary of defense for media operations, was an active
senior participant in a Bush administration covert Pentagon program that
used retired military analysts to generate positive wartime news coverage.
A months-long review of documents and interviews with Pentagon personnel has
revealed that the Bush Administration's military analyst program -- aimed at
selling the Iraq war to the American people -- operated through a secretive
collaboration between the Defense Department's press and community relations
offices.
Raw Story has also uncovered evidence that directly ties the activities
undertaken in the military analyst program to an official US military
document's definition of psychological operations -- propaganda that is only
supposed to be directed toward foreign audiences.
The investigation of Pentagon documents and interviews with Defense
Department officials and experts in public relations found that the decision
to fold the military analyst program into community relations and portray it
as "outreach" served to obscure the intent of the project as well as that
office's partnership with the press office. It also helped shield its senior
supervisor, Bryan Whitman, assistant secretary of defense for media
operations, whose role was unknown when the original story of the analyst
program broke.
In a nearly hour-long phone interview, Whitman asserted that since the
program was not run from his office, he was neither involved nor culpable.
Exposure of the collaboration between the Pentagon press and community
relations offices on this program, however, as well as an effort to
characterize it as a mere community outreach project, belie Whitman's claim
that he bears no responsibility for the program's activities.
These new revelations come in addition to the evidence of Whitman's active
and extensive participation in the program, as Raw Story documented in part
one of this series. Whitman remains a spokesman for the Pentagon today.
Whitman said he stood by an earlier statement in which he averred "the
intent and purpose of the [program] is nothing other than an earnest attempt
to inform the American public."
In the interview, Whitman sought to portray his role as peripheral, noting
that his position naturally demands he speak on a number of subjects in
which he isn't necessarily directly involved.
The record, however, suggests otherwise.
In a January 2005 memorandum to active members of both offices from
then-Pentagon press office director, Navy Captain Roxie Merritt, who now
leads the community relations office, emphasized the necessary "synergy of
outreach shop and media ops working together" on the military analyst
program. [p. 18-19]
Merritt recommended that both the press and community relations offices
develop a "hot list" of analysts who could dependably "carry our water" and
provide them with ultra-exclusive access that would compel the networks to
"weed out the less reliably friendly analysts" on their own.
"Media ops and outreach can work on a plan to maximize use of the analysts
and figure out a system by which we keep our most reliably friendly analysts
plugged in on everything from crisis response to future plans," Merritt
remarked. "As evidenced by this analyst trip to Iraq, the synergy of
outreach shop and media ops working together on these types of projects is
enormous and effective. Will continue to examine ways to improve processes."
In response, Lawrence Di Rita, then Pentagon public affairs chief, agreed.
He told Merritt and both offices in an email, "I guess I thought we already
were doing a lot of this."
Several names on the memo are redacted. Those who are visible read like a
who's who of the Pentagon press and community relations offices: Whitman,
Merritt, her deputy press office director Gary Keck (both of whom reported
directly to Whitman) and two Bush political appointees, Dallas Lawrence and
Allison Barber, then respectively director and head of community relations.
Merritt became director of the office, and its de facto chief until the
appointment of a new deputy assistant secretary of defense, after the
departures of Barber and Lawrence, the ostensible leaders of the military
analyst program. She remains at the Defense Department today.
When reached through email, Merritt attempted to explain the function of her
office's outreach program and what distinguishes it from press office
activities.
"Essentially," Merritt summarized, "we provide another avenue of
communications for citizens and organizations wanting to communicate
directly with DoD."
Asked to clarify, she said that outreach's purpose is to educate the public
in a one-to-one manner about the Defense Department and military's
structure, history and operations. She also noted her office "does not
handle [the] news media unless they have a specific question about one of
our programs."
Merritt eventually admitted that it is not a function of the outreach
program to provide either information or talking points to individuals or a
group of individuals -- such as the retired military analysts -- with the
intention that those recipients use them to directly engage with traditional
news media and influence news coverage.
Asked directly if her office provides talking points for this purpose, she
replied, "No. The talking points are developed for use by DoD personnel."
Experts in public relations and propaganda say Raw Story's findings reveal
the program itself was "unwise" and "inherently deceptive." One expressed
surprise that one of the program's senior figures was still speaking for the
Pentagon.
"Running the military analyst program from a community relations office is
both surprising and unwise," said Nicholas Cull, a professor of public
diplomacy at USC's Annenberg School and an expert on propaganda. "It is
surprising because this is not what that office should be doing [and] unwise
because the element of subterfuge is always a lightening rod for public
criticism."
Diane Farsetta, a senior researcher at the Center for Media and Democracy,
which monitors publics relations and media manipulation, said calling the
program "outreach" was "very calculatedly misleading" and another example of
how the project was "inherently deceptive."
"This has been their talking point in general on the Pentagon pundit
program," Farsetta explained. "You know, 'We're all just making sure that we're
sharing information.'"
Farsetta also said that it's "pretty stunning" that no one, including
Whitman, has been willing to take any responsibility for the program and
that the Pentagon Inspector General's office and Congress have yet to hold
anyone accountable.
"It's hard to think of a more blatant example of propaganda than this
program," Farsetta said.
Cull said the revelations are "just one more indication that the entire
apparatus of the US government's strategic communications -- civilian and
military, at home and abroad -- is in dire need of review and repair."
A PSYOPS Program Directed at American Public
When the military analyst program was first revealed by The New York Times
in 2008, retired US Army Col. Ken Allard described it as "PSYOPS on
steroids."
It turns out this was far from a casual reference. Raw Story has discovered
new evidence that directly exposes this stealth media project and the
activities of its participants as matching the US government's own
definition of psychological operations, or PSYOPS.
The US Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command fact sheet,
which states that PSYOPS should be directed "to foreign audiences" only,
includes the following description:
"Used during peacetime, contingencies and declared war, these activities are
not forms of force, but are force multipliers that use nonviolent means in
often violent environments."
Pentagon public affairs officials referred to the military analysts as
"message force multipliers" in documented communications.
A prime example is a May 2006 memorandum from then community relations chief
Allison Barber in which she proposes sending the military analysts on
another trip to Iraq:
"Based on past trips, I would suggest limiting the group to 10 analysts,
those with the greatest ability to serve as message force multipliers."
Nicholas Cull, who also directs the public diplomacy master's program at USC
and has written extensively on propaganda and media history, found the
Pentagon public affairs officials' use of such terms both incriminating and
reckless.
"[Their] use of psyop terminology is an 'own goal,'" Cull explained in an
email, "as it speaks directly to the American public's underlying fear of
being brainwashed by its own government."
This new evidence provides further perspective on an incident cited by the
Times.
Pentagon records show that the day after 14 marines died in Iraq on August
3, 2005, James T. Conway, then director of operations for the Joint Chiefs,
instructed military analysts during a briefing to work to prevent the
incident from weakening public support for the war. Conway reminded the
military analysts assembled, "The strategic target remains our population."
[p. 102]
Same Strategy, Different Program
Bryan Whitman was also involved in a different Pentagon public affairs
project during the lead-up to the war in Iraq: embedding reporters.
The embed and military analyst programs shared the same underlying strategy
of "information dominance," the same objective of selling Bush
administration war policies by generating favorable news coverage and were
directed at the same target -- the American public.
Torie Clarke, the first Pentagon public affairs chief, is often credited for
conceiving both programs. But Clarke and Whitman have openly acknowledged
his deep involvement in the embed project.
Clarke declined to be interviewed for this article.
Whitman said he was "heavily involved in the process" of the embed program's
development, implementation and supervision.
Before embedding, reporters and media organizations were forced to sign a
contract whose ground rules included allowing military officials to review
articles for release, traveling with military personnel escorts at all times
or remaining in designated areas, only conducting on-the-record interviews,
and agreeing that the government may terminate the contract "at any time and
for any reason."
In May 2002, with planning for a possible invasion of Iraq already in
progress, Clarke appointed Whitman to head all Pentagon media operations.
Prior to that, he had served since 1995 in the Pentagon press office, both
as deputy director for press operations and as a public affairs specialist.
The timing of Whitman's appointment coincided with the development stages of
the embed and military analyst programs. He was the ideal candidate for both
projects.
Whitman had a military background, having served in combat as a Special
Forces commander and as an Army public affairs officer with years of
experience in messaging from the Pentagon. He also had experience in
briefing and prepping civilian and military personnel.
Whitman's background provided him with a facility and familiarity in
navigating military and civilian channels. With these tools in hand, he was
able to create dialogue between the two and expedite action in a sprawling
and sometimes contentious bureaucracy.
Buried in an obscure April 2008 online New York Times Q&A with readers,
reporter David Barstow disclosed:
"As Lawrence Di Rita, a former senior Pentagon official told me, they viewed
[the military analyst program] as the 'mirror image' of the Pentagon program
for embedding reporters with units in the field. In this case, the military
analysts were in effect 'embedded' with the senior leadership through a
steady mix of private briefings, trips and talking points."
Di Rita denied the conversation had occurred in a telephone interview.
"I don't doubt that's what he heard, but that's not what I said," Di Rita
asserted.
Whitman said he'd never heard Di Rita make any such comparison between the
programs.
Barstow, however, said he stood behind the veracity of the quote and the
conversation he attributed to Di Rita.
Di Rita, who succeeded Clarke, also declined to answer any questions related
to Whitman's involvement in the military analyst program, including whether
he had been involved in its creation.
Clarke and Whitman have both discussed information dominance and its role in
the embed program.
In her 2006 book Lipstick on a Pig, Clarke revealed that "most importantly,
embedding was a military strategy in addition to a public affairs one" (p.
62) and that the program's strategy was "simple: information dominance" (p.
187). To achieve it, she explained, there was a need to circumvent the
traditional news media "filter" where journalists act as "intermediaries."
The goal, just as with the military analyst program, was not to spin a story
but to control the narrative altogether.
At the 2003 Military-Media conference in Chicago, Whitman told the audience,
"We wanted to take the offensive to achieve information dominance" because
"information was going to play a major role in combat operations." [pdf link
p. 2] One of the other program's objectives, he said, was "to build and
maintain support for U.S. policy." [pdf link, p. 16 - quote sourced in 2005
recap of 2003 mil-media conference]
At the March 2004 "Media at War" conference at UC Berkeley, Lt. Col. Rick
Long, former head of media relations for the US Marine Corps, offered a
candid view of the Pentagon's engagement in "information warfare" during the
Bush administration.
"Our job is to win, quite frankly," said Long. "The reason why we wanted to
embed so many media was we wanted to dominate the information environment.
We wanted to beat any kind of propaganda or disinformation at its own game."
"Overall," he told the audience, "we're happy with the outcome."
The Appearance of Transparency
On a national radio program just before the invasion of Iraq, Whitman
claimed that embedded reporters would have a firsthand perspective of "the
good, the bad and the ugly."
But veteran foreign correspondent Reese Erlich told Raw Story that the embed
program was "a stroke of genius by the Bush administration" because it gave
the appearance of transparency while "in reality, they were manipulating the
news."
In a phone interview, Erlich, who is currently covering the war in
Afghanistan as a "unilateral" (which allows reporters to move around more
freely without the restrictions of embed guidelines), also pointed out the
psychological and practical influence the program has on reporters.
"You're traveling with a particular group of soldiers," he explained. "Your
life literally depends on them. And you see only the firefights or slog that
they're involved in. So you're not going to get anything close to balanced
reporting."
At the August 2003 Military-Media conference in Chicago, Jonathan Landay,
who covered the initial stages of the war for Knight Ridder Newspapers, said
that being a unilateral "gave me the flexibility to do my job." [pdf link p.
2]
He added, "Donald Rumsfeld told the American people that what happened in
northern Iraq after [the invasion] was a little 'untidiness.' What I saw,
and what I reported, was a tsunami of murder, looting, arson and ethnic
cleansing."
Paul Workman, a journalist with over thirty years at CBC News, including
foreign correspondent reporting on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, wrote
of the program in April 2003, "It is a brilliant, persuasive conspiracy to
control the images and the messages coming out of the battlefield and
they've succeeded colossally."
Erlich said he thought most mainstream US reporters have been unwilling to
candidly discuss the program because they "weren't interested in losing
their jobs by revealing what they really thought about the embed process."
Now embedded with troops in Afghanistan for McClatchy, Landay told Raw Story
it's not that reporters shouldn't be embedded with troops at all, but that
it should be only one facet of every news outlet's war coverage.
Embedding, he said, offers a "soda-straw view of events." This isn't
necessarily negative "as long as a news outlet has a number of embeds and
unilaterals whose pictures can be combined" with civilian perspectives
available from international TV outlets such as Reuters TV, AP TV, and al
Jazeera, he said.
Landay placed more blame on US network news outlets than on the embed
program itself for failing to show a more balanced and accurate picture.
But when asked if the Pentagon and the designers of the embed program
counted as part of their embedding strategy on the dismal track record of US
network news outlets when it came to including international TV footage from
civilian perspectives, he replied, "I will not second guess the Pentagon's
motives."
Brad Jacobson is a contributing investigative reporter for Raw Story.
Additional research was provided by Ron Brynaert.
.................................................................
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